

EVALUATION



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Adapting for Change: Country Strategy Approach in Fragile Contexts

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EVALUATION OF SELECTED FINLAND'S COUNTRY STRATEGIES AND COUNTRY STRATEGY APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH FOCUS ON FRAGILE CONTEXTS

Volume 1 – Synthesis Report

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Acronyms and abbreviations

DPP	Development Policy Programme
EMS	Evaluation Management Services
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCA	Finnish Church Aid
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HEIICI	Higher Education Institutions Institutional Cooperation Instrument
HR	Human Rights
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IHPs	International Humanitarian Principles
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	International Science Foundation
MADAD	EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MPF	Multi-Partner Fund to Somalia
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
oPt	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PBS	Programme Based Support



PEA	Political Economy Analyses
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (New Deal)
RBM	Results Based Management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SWAP	Sector-wide Approach
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme



Tiivistelmä

Arvioinnissa tarkasteltiin, kuinka Suomen kehitysyhteistyön maaohjelmien laadinta ja seuranta palvelevat kehitysyhteistyön suunnittelua ja toteutusta hauraissa tai konfliktiympäristöissä. Arviointi perustuu kyseisten maaohjelmien tulosohtausjärjestelmän analyysiin, sidosryhmähaastatteluihin, avun määrälliseen analyysiin, 64:n hankkeen dokumenttianalyysiin ja kenttämattkoihin, jotka tehtiin Afganistaniin, Libanoniin (liittyen Syyria-Irak -ohjelmaan), Myanmariin, miehitetulle Palestiinalaisalueelle ja Somaliaan.

Johtopäätökset: Arvioinnin tärkeimmät johtopäätökset olivat: (1) Maaohjelmien tarkoitus on hauraissa maissa ja alueilla toimittaessa epäselvä. (2) Maaohjelmien laatiminen tarjoaa mahdollisuuden vahvistaa Suomen kehitysyhteistyön sisäistä ja ulkoista johdonmukaisuutta. (3) Kehitysyhteistyön tarkoituksenmukaisuuden näkökulmasta maaohjelmilla oli myönteinen, mutta suurelta osin passiivinen rooli. (4) Suomi tunnetaan hauraissa maissa ja alueilla periaatteitaan kunnioittavana ja puolueettomana toimijana. (5) Tulosohtausta voidaan kehittää vielä paremmaksi. (6) Maaohjelmissa on saavutettu arvokkaita tuloksia, mutta ne eivät vielä muodosta kokonaisuutta, joka olisi enemmän kuin osiensa summa. (7) Kehitysyhteistyön voisi kytkeä paremmin keskipitkän aikavälin tavoitteisiin, mukaan lukien rauhanrakennus. (8) Ihmisoikeusperustaisen lähestymistavan toteuttamista on mahdollista tukea paremmin.

Suositukses:

(i) Rakenteelliset suositukses

Ulkoministeriön tulisi:

1. Sopia, että maaohjelmien tulee tukea hauraissa maissa ja oloissa tarvittavaa mukautuvaa ohtausta (*adaptive management*) ja luoda yhteyksiä kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun välille.
2. Vahvistaa hauraiden maiden maaohjelmia niin, että niissä keskitytään erityisesti rauhanrakennuksen ja valtion kehittämisen tavoitteisiin ja niihin liittyvät riskit otetaan aiempaa paremmin huomioon.
3. Lisätä rahoituksen joustavuutta ja kehittää hauraisiin maihin ja oloihin sopivia avustusmuotoja.

(ii) Menettelyihin liittyvät suositukses

Ulkoministeriön tulisi:

4. Kehittää tulosohtausta niin, että voidaan maksimoida sen hyödyt erityisesti riskienhallinnan näkökulmasta.
5. Päivittää keskeiset politiikkalinjaukses ja toimintaohjees (*policy frameworks*) paremmin vastaamaan tilannetta ja tarpeita hauraissa maissa ja oloissa.
6. Varmistaa, että ihmisoikeusperustaista lähestymistapaa sovelletaan hauraissa maissa ja oloissa entistä perusteellisemmin.

Avainsana 1: Suomi / Avainsana 2: hauraus / Avainsana 3: strategia / Avainsana 4: tarkoituksenmukaisuus / Avainsana 5: tuloksellisuus / Avainsana 6: johdonmukaisuus / Avainsana 7: kytkenät



Referat

Denna utvärdering bedömde vilken roll Finlands landstrategier för utvecklingssamarbete har haft i planeringen och genomförandet av samarbete i instabila och konfliktutsatta länder och områden. En kombination av utvärderingsmetoder användes, däribland analys av institutionella system, intervjuer med intressenter, kvantitativ analys, dokumentstudier av 64 projekt, samt besök i Afghanistan, Somalia, det ockuperade palestinska territoriet, Libanon (för Syrien-Irak-programmet), och Myanmar.

Slutsatser: De viktigaste slutsatserna av utvärderingen var följande: (i) landstrategier har ett oklart syfte i instabila länder och områden; (ii) landstrategier som metod kan bidra till bättre intern och extern koherens; (iii) landstrategier skapar förutsättningar för att stärka stödets relevans, men har hittills inte använts på ett proaktivt sätt; (iv) Finland är känt som en principfast och neutral aktör i instabila kontexter; (v) resultatstyrnings-processer kan ännu förbättras; (vi) värdefulla resultat har uppnåtts med hjälp av landstrategierna, men de utgör inte en helhet som är mer än ”summan av delarna”; (vii) det finns potential för att starkare koppla utvecklingssamarbetet till övergripande mål på medellång sikt, inklusive fredsbyggande, samt; (viii) det finns förutsättningar för att bättre stöda genomförandet av ett människorättsbaserat perspektiv.

Rekommendationer:

(i) Strukturella rekommendationer

Utrikesministeriet bör:

1. Utveckla användningen av landstrategier så att de är bättre lämpade för anpassning av stöd i instabila länder och områden (*adaptive management*), vilket skulle stärka kopplingen mellan utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärt stöd.
2. Stärka landstrategierna för instabila länder och områden så att de har ett tydligare fokus på målsättningarna för freds- och statsbyggande, inklusive relaterade risker.
3. Öka den finansiella flexibiliteten för verksamhet i instabila länder och områden och utveckla finansieringsmekanismer som är bättre lämpade för dessa sammanhang.

(ii) Processrekommendationer

Utrikesministeriet bör:

4. Förbättra resultatstyrningen så att den är till maximal nytta i instabila länder och områden, särskilt för riskhantering.
5. Förnya eller anpassa centrala policy-ramverk för verksamhet i instabila länder och områden.
6. Säkerställa att ett människorättsbaserat perspektiv tillämpas så konsekvent som möjligt i instabila länder och områden.

Nyckelord 1: Finland / Nyckelord 2: instabil / Nyckelord 3: strategi / Nyckelord 4: relevans / Nyckelord 5: effektivitet / Nyckelord 6: koherens / Nyckelord 7: samband



Abstract

The evaluation assessed the role of the Country Strategy approach in the planning and implementation of Finnish co-operation in fragile or conflict-affected situations. It applied a multi method approach, including institutional systems analysis, stakeholder interviews, quantitative analysis of assistance, desk analysis of 64 projects and field missions to Afghanistan, Somalia, OPT, Lebanon (for Syria/Iraq) and Myanmar.

Conclusions: Eight conclusions included: (i) An unclear purpose of the Country Strategy in fragile contexts (ii) The potential of the approach to further support internal and external coherence (iii) A benign but largely passive role in assuring relevance of assistance (iv) Valuable reputational capital of Finland as a principled and neutral actor in fragile contexts (v) Continued scope for results based management processes to mature (vi) Valued results delivered but not yet more than the ‘sum of the parts’ (vii) Scope for stronger linkage to the medium term, including peacebuilding and (viii) Potential to further support the delivery of a human rights-based approach.

Recommendations:

(i) Structural recommendations

1. Explicitly conceptualise the Country Strategy approach as a tool for adaptive management in fragile contexts, building links between humanitarian and development assistance.
2. Enhance the technical rigour of Country Strategies in fragile situations, geared to specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims and with strong attention to risk.
3. Increase financial flexibility for work in fragile contexts and develop appropriate financing modalities.

(ii) Procedural recommendations

4. Enhance RBM systems to maximise their value with a specific emphasis on risk in fragile contexts.
5. Refresh or revise the key policy frameworks for working in fragile contexts.
6. Ensure more rigorous treatment of the Human Rights-Based Approach in fragile contexts.

Keyword 1: Finland / Keyword 2: fragile / Keyword 3: strategy / Keyword 4: relevance /
Keyword 5: effectiveness / Keyword 6: coherence / Keyword 7: connectedness



Yhteenvedo

Johdanto

Raportissa esitetään ulkoministeriön kehitysevaluoinnin yksikön tilaaman riippumattoman arvioinnin tulokset. Toimeksianto tarkasteli Suomen kehitysyhteistyön maaohjelmälähestymistapaa hauraassa tai konfliktiympäristössä. Tarkoituksena oli analysoida, missä määrin maaohjelmien laadinta ja seuranta palvelevat kehitysyhteistyön suunnittelua ja toteutusta hauraissa toimintaympäristöissä ja otetaanko maaohjelmissa huomioon hauraiden olojen erityiset haasteet ja toimintaedellytykset. Tarkastelujakso ulottui vuodesta 2012 nykypäivään saakka.

Arvioinnissa käsiteltiin kolmea pääkysymystä:

1. Missä määrin maaohjelmat ovat edistäneet Suomen ja kumppanimaiden kehityspoliittisia tavoitteita ja ohjanneet Suomen yhteistyötä hauraissa maissa ja alueilla?
2. Missä määrin maaohjelmat tukevat politiikkajohdon mukaisuutta?
3. Kuinka maaohjelmia voidaan kehittää edelleen, jotta ne soveltuisivat paremmin käytettäväksi erityisesti hauraissa maissa ja oloissa tehtävään yhteistyöhön?

Metodologia

Arviointi toteutettiin maaliskuun 2019 ja helmikuun 2020 välisenä aikana. Suunnittelussa käytettiin systemaattista lähestymistapaa, jossa kerättiin aineistoa ulkoministeriön tulosohjausjärjestelmästä sekä kokemuksia maaohjelmien käytöstä ja toteuttamisesta Afganistanissa, Myanmarissa, miehitettyllä Palestiinalaisalueella, Somaliassa sekä Syyriassa ja Irakissa (tästä lähtien 'alueet'). Aineiston keruu toteutettiin kuudessa vaiheessa niin, että arvioinnin näyttö vahvistui asteittain prosessin edetessä. Kokonaisuus rakentui seuraavista osista: (1) ulkoministeriön käytänteiden analyysi, (2) 387 sidosryhmien haastattelua, (3) määrällinen analyysi Suomen kehitysyhteistyöstä vuosina 2012–2018, (4) 64:n projektin dokumenttianalyysi, (5) viisi kenttämateriaalia syys-lokakuussa 2019 ja (6) muiden organisaatioiden kokemusten hyödyntäminen. Tulosten oikeellisuuden varmistamiseksi järjestettiin kaksi työpajaa ulkoministeriössä helmikuussa 2020.

Konteksti

Maaohjelmat. Ensimmäiset maaohjelmat, siinä muodossa kuin ne nykyisin tunnetaan, lanseerattiin vuonna 2012. Ne kattavat erityisesti ulkoministeriön alueosastojen hallinnoiman kahdenvälisen ja korvamerkityn monenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön Suomen kumppanimaissa. Niiden tarkoituksena on ollut tuoda merkittävä osa Suomen kehitysyhteistyöstä tulosohjauksen piiriin.

Ulkoministeriö päivitti maaohjelmien laadintaa koskevat ohjeet tammikuussa 2020. Uudistettu ohjeistus ei koske vain hauraita maita tai alueita, mutta sen avulla pyritään kokonaisvaltaisempaan yhteistyöhön kaikissa kumppanimaissa.

Maaohjelmat ja tarkastelun kohteena olleet maat ja alueet. Arvioinnissa mukana olleet viisi esimerkkiä – neljä maata ja yksi alue – ovat keskenään erilaisia sekä haurauden juurisyiden ja aiheuttajien että sen vaikutusten osalta. Kaikille yhteistä on se, että olot ovat äärimmäisen epävakaita ja riskialttiita. Näissä maissa tai alueilla Suomen yhteistyölle on ominaista, että resurssit kanavoitetaan monenvälisten järjestöjen ja kansainvälisten kehitysrahoituslaitosten kautta.



Maaohjelmat poikkeavat toisistaan myös laadintatavaltaan ja sisällöltään. Afganistan on poikkeustapaus, koska maaohjelmaa tukee hallituksen eduskunnalle tekemä selonteko, joka sisältää tarkat tavoitteet myös ulko-, turvallisuus- ja kauppapolitiikalle. Syyrian ja Irakin osalta ulkoministeriö on laatinut alueellisen ohjelman, joka kattaa toiminnan sekä Syyriassa että ympäröivissä maissa (Libanon, Jordania, Turkki, Egypti ja Irak).

Löydökset

Tarkoituksenmukaisuus (*Relevance*): Evaluoinnissa tarkasteltujen maaohjelmien suunnittelu- ja laadintaprosessit poikkesivat toisistaan ja ohjelmat palvelivat erilaisia – pääasiassa ulkoministeriön sisäisiä – käyttötarkoituksia. Maaohjelmien strategisten painopistealueiden kuvauksissa tuotiin esille konflikteihin ja haurauteen liittyviä näkökulmia, mutta ne eivät toimineet maaohjelmien lähtökohtana. Lisäksi konflikteja ja epävakautta koskevat analyysit olivat puutteellisia. Toteutetut hankkeet olivat linjassa sekä kumppanimaiden kansallisten strategioiden ja suunnitelmien että niitä toteuttavien viranomaisten tarpeiden kanssa. Myös välittömien hyödynsaajien tarpeet oli huomioitu. Maaohjelmilla oli kuitenkin vähäinen rooli sen varmistamisessa, että kumppaniorganisaatiot kohdentavat tuen asianmukaisesti. Keskeiset politiikkavuoropuhelun tavoitteet olivat asiayhteyden sopivia ja liittyivät valtiorakenteiden kehittämiseen. Tavoitteet eivät kuitenkaan pohjautuneet Suomen monenvälisen järjestöjen vaikuttamissuunnitelmiin.

Suomen tukea oli joissain tapauksissa mukautettu muuttuneisiin olosuhteisiin. Maaohjelmat voisivat silti olla lähtökohtaisesti joustavampia, ja helpottaa mukautumista muuttuviin tilanteisiin entistä enemmän.

Tuloksellisuus (*Effectiveness*): Maaohjelmien vaikuttavuustavoitteisiin suhteutettuna tulokset olivat hajanaisia. Tulosohtauksen menettelyt olivat kehittyneet ajan myötä, mutta niissä oli joitain sisällöllisiä heikkouksia ja niistä puuttui konflikteihin ja haurauteen liittyviä indikaattoreita. Hankkeet tuottivat yksittäisiä tulosryppäitä, jotka vaikuttivat vain rajallisesti haurauden vähentämiseen ja joiden linkit maaohjelmiin olivat vähäisiä. Lämpileikkaavien tavoitteiden osalta tulokset keskittyivät pääasiassa naisten ja tyttöjen mukaan ottamiseen hanketasolla. Poliittikavuoropuhelussa ja epävirallisissa kuulemisissa saavutettiin myönteisiä tuloksia, joiden avulla Suomen maine tärkeänä ihmisoikeuksien ja sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa painottavana kumppanimaana korostui.

Jäykistä rahoitukseen liittyvistä menettelyistä huolimatta käytetyt yhteistyön muodot (*aid modalities*) ja niiden keskinäinen tasapaino olivat sopivia. Suomen päätös suunnata suurin osa tuestaan monenvälisen järjestöjen kautta hauraille alueille todettiin oikeaksi. Menettely, jossa hanketukea kanavoidaan monenvälisen järjestöjen kautta (*multi-bi modality*), osoittautui myös hyödylliseksi.

Johdonmukaisuus (*Coherence*): Lukuun ottamatta Afganistania, ulkoministeriön kehitysyhteistyön siiloutuneet, eri osastojen rooleihin perustuvat toimintamallit näkyivät puutteellisena sisäisenä johdonmukaisuutena. Suomen tuki oli hyvin linjassa ulkopuolisten toimijoiden viitekehysten ja aloitteiden kanssa, vaikka maaohjelmien merkitys johdonmukaisuuden edistämässä oli vähäinen. Sekä maaohjelmiin sisällytetyt että niiden ulkopuolelta rahoitetut ohjelmat ja hankkeet myötävaikuttivat Suomen kehityspoliittisen ohjelman toteutumiseen, mutta itse maaohjelmilla ei ollut juurikaan osuutta tulosten aikaansaamisessa.

Maaohjelmien sisäiset kytkennät (*Connectedness*): Suomi piti voimakkaasti esillä ihmisoikeuskysymyksiä ja nojautui politiikkavuoropuhelussa ja epävirallisissa kuulemisissa omiin periaatteisiinsa. Ohjelmatasolla ihmisoikeuskysymyksiä huomioon ottaminen ei kuitenkaan ollut järjestelmällistä. Kansainvälisten humanitaaristen periaatteiden (*International Humanitarian Principles*), “Do No Harm” -periaatteen sekä vahingoittumattomuuteen ja avun lopulli-



siin hyödynsaajiin kohdistuvan vastuuvollisuuden (*Accountability to Affected Populations*) toteutuminen humanitaarisessa avussa oli vaihtelevaa ja riippuvainen kumppaniorganisaatiosta. Vaikka maaohjelmissa kiinnitettiin huomiota valtiorakenteiden vahvistamiseen ja rauhanrakentamiseen, niistä puuttui selkeä lähestymistapa aiheeseen. Rahoitetut ohjelmat eivät myöskään sisältäneet järjestelmällistä keskipitkän tai pitkän aikavälin suunnitelmaa.

Johtopäätökset

Arvioinnin tärkeimmät johtopäätökset olivat:

1. Maaohjelmia käytetään monella eri tavalla, ja ne tunnetaan huonosti ulkoministeriön ulkopuolella. Olisi hyvä selkiyttää, mikä niiden tarkoitus on erityisesti hauraissa toimintaympäristöissä tarvittavan mukautuvan ohjauksen näkökulmasta (*adaptive management*).
2. Maaohjelmia tulisi kehittää edelleen tukemaan sisäistä ja ulkoista johdonmukaisuutta. Evaluoinnissa saatiin näyttöä ulkoministeriön osastojen ja yksikköjen siiloutuneisuudesta, minkä lisäksi on vähän todisteita siitä, että Suomen vahva ulkoinen johdonmukaisuus olisi nykyisellään maaohjelmoinnin ansiota.
3. Suomen tuki vastasi yleisesti ottaen hyvin hyödynsaajien ja keskeisten sidosryhmien tarpeisiin. Kehitysyhteistyön tarkoituksenmukaisuuden näkökulmasta maaohjelmien (Afganistanin kohdalla hallituksen selonteko eduskunnalle) rooli oli myönteinen mutta suurelta osin passiivinen.
4. Suomi tunnetaan haurailta alueilla periaatteellisena ja puolueettomana toimijana, joka edistää kannanotoissaan aktiivisesti sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa ja ihmisoikeuksia. Tätä mainepääomaa voisi hyödyntää myös valtiorakenteiden kehittämisessä ja rauhanrakentamisessa. Ulkoministeriön vuonna 2014 julkaisemaa ohjeistusta, joka koski toimimista hauraissa valtioissa, on käytetty vähän eikä niitä tunneta laajasti.
5. Maaohjelmien seurantaan liittyvät tulosohtauksen prosessit ovat tärkeitä siiloutuneessa organisaatiossa, mutta niitä on mahdollista kehittää edelleen, muun muassa systemaattisempi lähestymistapa riskienhallintaan.
6. Maaohjelmissa on saavutettu arvokkaita tuloksia, mutta ne eivät vielä muodosta kokonaisuutta, joka olisi enemmän kuin osiensa summa. Tulokset ovat suurelta osin yksittäisiä ja pirstoutuneita, eikä niitä ohjannut selkeä tavoite vähentää epävakautta. Vähäinen huomio joihinkin haavoittuvassa asemassa oleviin ryhmiin asettaa kyseenalaiseksi Suomen ihmisoikeusperustaisen lähestymistavan toteutumisen. Tuen kanavien valinta ja niiden keskinäinen tasapaino vastasivat toiminnan tarpeisiin.
7. Maaohjelmat voivat edistää keskipitkän aikavälin tavoitteita esimerkiksi parantamalla varainmyöntöprosesseja. Voidaan myös luoda jatkumoa humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välille painottamalla enemmän rauhanrakentamista.
8. Suomen rooli esimerkillisenä ihmisoikeuksien puolustajana politiikkavuoropuhelussa haurailta alueilla ei näkynyt yhtenäisesti hanketasolla. Tämä johtui pitkälti ulkoministeriön lähestymistavasta, joka perustuu luottamukseen siitä, että kumppaniorganisaatiot ottavat ihmisoikeudet itsenäisesti huomioon toteutuksessa. Maaohjelmat voivat tarjota lisätukea Suomen ihmisoikeusperustaisen lähestymistavan toteuttamiselle.



Hauraiden maiden maaohjelmia koskevat suositukset

Esitetyn näytön perusteella arviointi antaa kuusi suositusta, joiden tarkemmat kuvaukset löytyvät raportista:

(i) Rakenteelliset suositukset

Ulkoministeriön tulisi:

Suositus 1: Sopia, että maaohjelmien yksi käyttötarkoitus on tukea hauraisissa maissa ja oloissa tarvittavaa mukautuvaa ohjausta (*adaptive management*) ja luoda yhteyksiä kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun välille. Tämä edellyttää mm. seuraavanlaisia toimia: (1) Maaohjelmien käyttötarkoitus tulee ilmaista selkeästi. Määrittelyssä tulisi ottaa huomioon maaohjelmien rooli strategisen ohjauksen välineenä, sisäinen ja ulkoinen vastuuvollisuus, sekä ulkoministeriötä ja kumppaniorganisaatioita hyödyttävä oppiminen. (2) Suomen tuen päämäärät tulee määritellä selkeästi poliittisesta näkökulmasta niin, että ne tukevat haurauden ja konfliktien vähentämistä tai rauhanrakentamista ja valtiorakenteiden kehittämistä. (3) Maaohjelmien rooli mukautuvan ohjauksen (*adaptive management*) työkaluna tulee määritellä. (4) Riskitasot ja -tyypit tulee tunnustaa/todeta selkeästi. (5) Ulkoministeriön tulee sitoutua luomaan parempi jatkumo humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön rahoituskanavien välille.

Suositus 2: Vahvistaa hauraiden maiden maaohjelmia niin, että niissä keskitytään erityisesti rauhanrakennuksen ja valtion kehittämisen tavoitteisiin ja niihin liittyvä riskit otetaan aiempaa paremmin huomioon. Suosituksen mukaan maaohjelmien tulisi perustua parempiin analyyseihin, erityisesti yhteiskuntapolitiikan osalta. Konflikteihin ja epävakauteen liittyvät tekijät tulisi ottaa paremmin huomioon, erityisesti silloin, kun asetetaan valtiorakenteiden kehittämistä ja rauhanrakentamista koskevia tavoitteita. Jälkimmäisiin liittyen evaluoinnissa suositellaan laaja-alaista ohjeistusta liittyen valtiorakenteiden kehittämiseen ja rauhanrakentamiseen. Konflikti- ja epävakauskysymykset tulisi sisällyttää myös kansalaisjärjestöjen ohjelmatukeen ja monenvälisiin vaikuttamissuunnitelmiin. Tuki tulisi myös kytkeä tiiviimmin keskipitkän aikavälin tavoitteisiin, etenkin rauhanrakentamisen ja valtiorakenteiden kehittämisen näkökulmasta.

Suositus 3: Lisätä rahoituksen joustavuutta ja kehittää hauraisiin maihin ja oloihin sopivia avustusmuotoja. Evaluointitiimi ehdottaa kahta mekanismia rahoitusprosessien joustavuuden lisäämiseksi: (1) Maaohjelmat ja niiden rahoitusosuudet hyväksytään etukäteen koko neljän vuoden ajanjaksolle (edellyttäen, että eduskunta hyväksyy talousarvion), jotta hankkeiden hyväksyminen olisi mahdollisimman joustavaa. (2) Harkitaan temaattisen rahoitusmekanismin perustamista hauraiden alueiden ominaistarpeet huomioiden. Käytäntö mahdollistasi nopean tuen tarjoamisen ja siinä sekä humanitaarisen että kehitysrahoituksen kanavia. Haurauteen ja konfliktikysymyksiin erikoistunut tukipalvelu (helpdesk) olisi yksi mahdollinen tapa tukea ulkoministeriön henkilöstöä.

(ii) Menettelyihin liittyvät suositukset

Ulkoministeriön tulisi:

Suositus 4: Kehittää maaohjelmien tulosohejausta siten, että voidaan maksimoida niiden hyöty koskien erityisesti riskienhallintaa hauraisissa maissa ja oloissa. Ehdotetaan, että tulosohejauksen viitekehyksiä tarkastellaan uudelleen ja muokataan. Tämän tarkoituksena on selkiyttää Suomen päämääriä kumppanimaissa vaikuttavuustasolla, erityisesti koskien haurauden ja konfliktien vähentämistä. Lisäksi sovelletaan asianmukaisia haurautta koskevia indikaattoreita edistyneen havainnollistamiseksi. Ehdotetaan myös, että väliarviointien ja riippumattomien evaluointien käyttöä parannetaan. Lisäksi ne riskienhallinnan säännöt, jotka ovat osa maaohjelmien toimintaohjeita, otetaan täysimääräisesti käyttöön.



Suositus 5: Päivittää tai muokata keskeiset politiikkalinjaukset ja toimintaohjeet (*policy frameworks*) vastaamaan paremmin tilannetta ja tarpeita hauraissa maissa ja oloissa. Evaluointitiimi ehdottaa, että ulkoministeriö tarkastelee uudelleen organisaation sisällä vähän tunnettua ja vähälle käytölle jäänyttä vuonna 2014 julkaistua linjausta koskien toimimista hauraissa valtioissa ja laatii ulkoministeriön laajuiset riskienhallintaa koskevat linjaukset, joissa määritellään riskien sietorajat ja joissa yksilöidään riskikategoriat, mukaan lukien hauraat ja konfliktitilanteet.

Suositus 6: Varmistaa, että ihmisoikeusperustaista lähestymistapaa sovelletaan hauraissa maissa ja oloissa entistä perusteellisemmin. Maaohjelmien yhteiskunta-poliittiseen selvitykseen tulisi sisällyttää perusteellinen ihmisoikeustilanteen analyysi, minkä lisäksi tulisi selkiyttää ihmisoikeuksiin liittyvät tavoitteet kaikissa päivitettyissä maaohjelmissä. Näin vahvistetaan ihmisoikeusperustaisen lähestymistavan perusteellisempaa käyttöä rahoituksissa hankkeissa ja lisätään ihmisoikeusanalyysin sisällyttämistä väliarviointeihin.



Sammanfattning

Inledning

Den här rapporten presenterar resultatet av en oberoende utvärdering av landstrategiers roll i planeringen och genomförandet av Finlands samarbete i instabila och konfliktutsatta länder och områden. Utvärderingen har beställts av det finska utrikesministeriets utvärderingsenhet. Utvärderingens syfte var att bedöma hur väl landstrategier fungerar som instrument, samt hur lämpliga och genomförbara de är i instabila och konfliktutsatta länder och områden, där särskilda utmaningar och behov måste beaktas. Utvärderingen sträcker sig över tidsperioden 2012 till idag.

Tre grundläggande frågor ställdes:

1. I vilken utsträckning har landstrategier som instrument bidragit till Finlands och samarbetsländernas policy-mål och väglett Finlands samarbete i instabila länder och områden?
2. I vilken utsträckning har landstrategier främjat policy-koherens?
3. Hur kan landstrategier vidareutvecklas för att vara mer relevanta för arbete i instabila länder eller områden?

Metod

Utvärderingen genomfördes från mars 2019 till februari 2020. Information samlades systematiskt in från utrikesministeriets olika dokumentdatabaser, och om erfarenheter från landstrategier i Afghanistan, Myanmar, det ockuperade palestinska territoriet, Somalia, Syrien och Irak (hädanefter "områdena"). Utvärderingen använde sig av sex olika datainsamlingsmetoder för att under processens gång stegvis bygga en tillförlitlig evidensbas. Dessa inkluderade: (1) analys av utrikesministeriets institutionella system och praxis; (2) 387 intervjuer med intressenter; (3) kvantitativ analys av Finlands utvecklingssamarbete under perioden 2012–2018; (4) dokumentstudie av 64 projekt (5) fem fältbesök i september och oktober 2019, och; (6) insamling av erfarenheter från andra organisationer. För att verifiera resultaten av utvärderingen ordnades två arbetsmöten på utrikesministeriet i februari 2020.

Kontexten

Landstrategier. Landstrategier i sin nuvarande form infördes 2012. De omfattar särskilt det bilaterala och öronmärkta, multilaterala utvecklingsstöd som används i Finlands långvariga samarbetsländer och som administreras av utrikesministeriets regionavdelningar. Ett syfte med landstrategierna har varit att den här delen av Finlands stöd bättre skulle kopplas till ministeriets resultatstyrningsprocesser.

Reviderade riktlinjer för landstrategier antogs i januari 2020. Avsikten med de förnyade riktlinjerna är ett mer enhetligt arbete i alla samarbetsländer, inklusive i instabila länder och områden.

Landstrategierna och de fem utvärderade länderna eller områdena: Utvärderingen fokuserade på fem olika länder eller områden, som alla skiljer sig åt i fråga om varför de är instabila och vilka konsekvenser denna instabilitet har medfört. Samtliga kontexter är mycket oberäkneliga och riskutsatta. Typiskt för alla de fem situationerna är att Finlands bilaterala stöd kanaliseras genom multilaterala organisationer och internationella utvecklingsbanker.



De fem landstrategierna skiljer sig också åt. Landstrategin för Afghanistan till exempel grundar sig på statsrådets redogörelse och innehåller särskilda målsättningar också för utrikes-, säkerhets- och handelspolitik. För Syrien och Irak har Finland antagit en regional strategi, som omfattar både Syrien och kringliggande länder (Libanon, Jordanien, Turkiet, Egypten och Irak).

Utvärderingens resultat

Relevans: De fem undersökta landstrategierna utformades genom olika processer and tjänade olika – främst utrikesministeriets interna – syften. Landstrategiernas strategiska prioriteringar tog konflikts- och instabilitetsrelaterade faktorer i beaktande, men dessa var inte strategiernas utgångspunkt. Landstrategiernas analys av sådana faktorer var också bristfällig.

Programstödet låg i linje med både nationella strategier och planer, samt med den primära målgruppens och nationella myndigheters behov. Landstrategierna gav dock inte tillräcklig vägledning till samarbetspartners för att säkra en så relevant inriktning av stödet som möjligt. Prioriteringarna för den (utvecklingspolitiska) dialogen var förenliga med kontexten, och fokuserade på statsbyggande. Prioriteringarna var ändå inte baserade på de strategier som Finland har gjort upp för att påverka de multilaterala institutionernas arbete.

I vissa fall hade Finlands programstöd anpassats till ett förändrat sammanhang. Landstrategierna kunde ändå från början vara mer flexibla för att vid behov underlätta anpassning.

Resultateffektivitet: Gentemot landstrategiernas fastslagna resultatmål var resultaten varierande. Metoderna för resultatstyrning hade förbättrats över tid, trots vissa kvalitetsmässiga svagheter och avsaknaden av ett konflikt- och instabilitetsperspektiv. Programmen ledde till resultat på enstaka resultatområden men bidrog endast i begränsad utsträckning till att minska instabiliteten, och kopplingen till landstrategierna förblev otydlig. De resultat som uppnåddes gentemot målsättningar på tvärgående områden handlade framför allt om kvinnors och flickors deltagande. Inom policy-dialog och informella överläggningar nåddes positiva resultat, vilket har stärkt Finlands anseende som en principfast samarbetspartner vad gäller mänskliga rättigheter och jämställdhet.

Trots de begränsningar som orsakades av stelbenta finansiella processer har Finlands val av biståndsmekanismer varit relevanta, och en bra balans har uppnåtts mellan dessa mekanismer. Finlands beslut att kanalisera en majoritet av stödet till instabila länder och områden via det multilaterala systemet har varit välgrundat. Också beslutet att kanalisera programstöd via multilaterala organisationer (så kallat multi-bi-stöd), har utfallit väl.

Koherens: Som ett resultat av den fragmentering och silomentalitet som råder inom utrikesministeriet och de olika roller och tillvägagångssätt olika avdelningar har, fanns det med undantag av Afghanistan begränsad intern koherens för stödet. Finlands stöd var i linje med externa ramverk och initiativ trots att landstrategierna inte verkar ha haft en särskilt viktig roll i det här avseendet. Program och projekt – både de som låg inom och utom ramen för landstrategierna – bidrog till förverkligandet av Finlands utvecklingspolitiska prioriteringar, men landstrategierna hade ingen avgörande roll.

Samband: Finland betonade starkt mänskliga rättigheter från ett principiellt perspektiv inom policy-dialogen och informella samråd, men på programnivå hanterades inte mänskliga rättigheter på ett systematiskt sätt. Internationella humanitära principer, att inte vålla skada och ansvarsutkrävande gentemot drabbade befolkningsgrupper, gavs varierande uppmärksamhet i det humanitära arbetet, vilket till stor del berodde på samarbetspartners agerande. Även om landstrategierna beaktade behovet av stats- och fredsbyggande åtgärder, saknades en tydlig metod för att inkludera dessa. Det fanns även en brist på långsiktighet inom de finansierade programmen.



Slutsatser

Utvärderingens viktigaste resultat var följande:

1. Landstrategierna används på olika sätt och är inte allmänt kända utanför utrikesministeriet. Därför skulle det vara viktigt att tydligare klargöra syftet med landstrategierna, särskilt i fråga om hur de kan anpassas till arbete i instabila länder och områden.
2. Landstrategier som instrument borde utvecklas för att bättre bidra till intern och extern koherens. Från utvärderingen framgår tydligt den fragmentering som finns mellan utrikesministeriets avdelningar och enheter. Dessutom hittades inga tydliga bevis för landstrategiernas bidrag till den förhållandevis starka externa koherensen.
3. Finlands stöd i instabila länder och områden var generellt sett relevant i fråga om målgruppens och andra aktörers behov. Landstrategierna (statsrådets redogörelse för Afghanistan undantagen) gav förutsättningar för att säkerställa relevans, men hade ingen aktiv roll i detta sammanhang.
4. Finland har ett värdefullt renommé som en principfast och neutral aktör i instabila länder och områden. Detta gäller särskilt Finlands pro-aktiva inställning till jämställdhet och mänskliga rättigheter. Den positiva finlandsbilden på detta område kunde utnyttjas aktivare för att uppnå målsättningar inom stats- och fredsbyggande. De riktlinjerna som antogs för utvecklingssamarbete i instabila stater 2014 har inte varit allmänt kända och använts i mycket begränsad utsträckning.
5. Vikten av resultatstyrnings-processer kopplade till landstrategierna förstärktes av utrikesministeriets fragmenterade organisation. Processerna kan ändå utvecklas ytterligare, bland annat genom en mer systematisk hantering av risker.
6. Landstrategierna har bidragit till värdefulla resultat i instabila länder och områden. Resultaten är dock utspridda, och motsvarar därför inte mer än ”summan av delarna”. Landstrategierna var inte styrda av en tydlig agenda för att minska instabiliteten. Finlands resultat i ambitionen att genomgående beakta mänskliga rättigheter (*human rights based approach*) kan ifrågasättas, då marginaliserade grupper inte alltid beaktades i tillräcklig utsträckning. Valet av olika biståndsformer och balansen mellan dem motsvarade behoven.
7. Bland annat genom förbättrade finansiella mekanismer kan landstrategier bättre bidra till en tydligare koppling av stöd till målsättningar på medellång sikt. En ökad tonvikt på fredsbyggande kan också bidra till en starkare koherens mellan humanitärt stöd och utvecklingssamarbete (nexus).
8. Finlands roll som principfast förespråkare av mänskliga rättigheter var tydlig i policydialogen i instabila länder och områden, men syntes inte genomgående på projektnivå. Det här berodde långt på utrikesministeriets tillvägagångssätt, som baserades på tillit till samarbetspartners vilja och förmåga att beakta dessa principer i genomförandet av projekten. Landstrategi-mekanismen kan erbjuda ett extra stöd till genomförande av ett rättighetsperspektiv.

Rekommendationer

På basis av utvärderingens slutsatser har sex rekommendationer utformats. Dessa sammanfattas nedan och återges mer ingående i rapporten:

(i) Strukturella rekommendationer

Rekommendation 1: Landstrategi-konceptet bör tydligare definieras så att ett av strategiernas syften är att stöda anpassningsarbetet i instabila länder och områden (*adaptive management*) samt stärka kopplingen mellan humanitärt stöd och lång-



siktigt utvecklingssamarbete. Detta skulle innebära följande åtgärder: (1) Ett förtydligande av syftet med landstrategier i instabila eller konfliktutsatta länder och områden, med fokus på landstrategiers roll som ett redskap för långsiktig styrning; ansvarsutkrävande internt och externt; och lärande för utrikesministeriet och dess samarbetsorganisationer; (2) Ett förtydligande av avsikten med Finlands stöd på ett politiskt plan så att målsättningarna stöder också minskad instabilitet och konflikter samt fredsbyggande och stärkande av statliga strukturer. (3) Ett förtydligande av landstrategiers roll som ett verktyg för anpassning av stöd i instabila länder och områden; (4) Tydligare definiera och erkänna olika riksnivåer och risktyper, och (5) Att utrikesministeriet förbinder sig till att stärka kopplingen mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktigt utvecklingssamarbete.

Rekommendation 2: Stärka den tekniska kvalitén på landstrategier i instabila länder och områden så att de fokuserar särskilt på mål för fredsbyggande och stärkande av statliga institutioner, samt bättre beaktar relaterade risker. Detta innebär att den analytiska grunden som landstrategier vilar på bör stärkas, särskilt i fråga om politisk och ekonomisk analys. Det är viktigt att bättre beakta konflikt- och instabilitets-perspektiv i landstrategier, särskilt då man definierar målsättningar för fredsbyggande och stärkande av statliga institutioner. I utvärderingen rekommenderas att generella riktlinjer för stats- och fredsbyggande i instabila länder och områden tas fram. Beaktande av konflikts- och instabilitetsperspektiv bör integreras också i programstöd till civilsamhällets organisationer och planer för multilateral påverkan. Det är också viktigt att tydligare koppla stödet till målsättningar på medellång sikt, med fokus på fredsbyggande och statsbyggande.

Rekommendation 3: Öka den finansiella flexibiliteten och utveckla lämpliga finansieringsmekanismer för verksamhet i instabila länder och områden. Rekommendationen inbegriper två förslag på mekanismer för att öka de finansiella processernas flexibilitet. (1) Godkänn landprogrammen för utvecklingssamarbetet, inklusive programmens finansieringsplan, för hela fyraårsperioden i förskott (förutsatt att riksdagen godkänner budgeten). Det här skulle bidra till att maximera flexibiliteten när särskilda program ska godkännas. (2) Överväg att skapa tematiskt inriktade finansieringsmekanismer för stöd i instabila länder och områden. Detta skulle förbättra möjligheten till snabba insatser, och stärka kopplingen mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktigt utvecklingssamarbete. En särskild helpdesk för rådgivning om instabilitets- och konfliktfrågor kunde vara ett sätt att stöda utrikesministeriets personal.

(ii) Processrekommendationer

Rekommendation 4: Uppdatera och anpassa politiska linjedragningar och resultatstyrning också till verksamhet i instabila länder och områden. Föreslås, att ramverk för resultatstyrning ses över och revideras. Avsikten är att förtydliga vad som avses med resultatmål på landnivå, särskilt då det gäller att minska instabilitet och konflikter. Relevanta indikatorer används för att mäta framsteg relaterade till minskad instabilitet. Systemet för halvtidsgenomgångar och oberoende utvärderingar behöver förbättras. Dessutom bör riktlinjer för riskhantering inom landstrategiprocessen tillämpas fullt ut.

Rekommendation 5: Uppdatera eller anpassa centrala policy-ramverk och handlingsmodeller för verksamhet i instabila länder och områden. Den år 2014 framtagna policyn för instabila stater som inte är allmänt känd eller använd inom utrikesministeriet bör ses över. Det är också viktigt att ta fram en riskhanteringspolicy för hela utrikesministeriet där man förtydligar Finlands riskacceptans samt definierar olika riskkategorier, inklusive de som relaterar till konfliktutsatta och instabila situationer.

Rekommendation 6: Säkerställ mer konsekvent användande av rättighetsperspektivet i instabila länder och områden. Denna rekommendation innebär att en grundlig analys av mänskliga rättigheter inkluderas i den politiska och ekonomiska analysen. Dessutom införs ett krav på att samtliga reviderade landstrategier ska innehålla tydliga målsättningar vad gäller mänskliga rättigheter. Dessa åtgärder förstärker användningen av rättighetsperspektiv i de aktiviteter som finansieras, samt förutsätter att en rättighetsanalys.



Summary

Introduction

This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation, commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), of the role of the Country Strategy approach in supporting the planning and implementation of Finnish co-operation in fragile or conflict-affected situations. The evaluation's purpose was to assess the applicability and feasibility of the Country Strategy approach in fragile contexts, over the period 2012-current, given their specific challenges and requirements.

The evaluation asked three main questions:

1. To what extent has the Country Strategy approach promoted Finnish and partner country policy objectives and guided Finland's cooperation in fragile contexts?
2. To what extent does the Country Strategy approach support policy coherence?
3. How can the Country Strategy approach be further developed for use in fragile situations?

Methodology

The study was conducted during the period March 2019 to February 2020. Its design adopted a highly systematic approach, drawing evidence from across the corporate systems of MFA, as well as the experience of Country Strategies in Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia and Syria/Iraq. Six 'evidence streams' were applied through a sequential approach, building the evidence base through progressively deeper analysis as the evaluation proceeded. These comprised: (1). Institutional systems analysis (2). 387 stakeholders interviewed (3). Quantitative analysis of Finnish assistance to the five relevant contexts for the period 2012–2018 (4). Desk analysis of 64 projects in the five contexts (5) Field missions to the five contexts in September and October 2019 and (6) Learning from other organisations. Findings were validated with MFA in workshops held in February 2020.

Context

The Country Strategy approach. The Country Strategy approach in its present form was launched in 2012. It encompasses specifically bilateral and earmarked multi-bilateral development assistance under the control of MFA's Regional Departments and applies to long-term partner countries. It sought to bring the relevant portion of Finnish assistance within a Results Based Management (RBM) framework.

Revised guidelines for the Country Strategy approach issued in January 2020. These are not specific to fragile contexts but seek a more comprehensive approach to the management of assistance in long term partner countries.

The five contexts and Country Strategies: The five contexts for the evaluation are diverse in terms of the root causes, sources and effects of their fragility. All are highly volatile and have high risk propensity. Finland's co-operation in all five is characterised by a channelling of bilateral resources through multilateral organisations and international development finance institutions.



The five Country Strategies are diverse. In particular, in Afghanistan, the Country Strategy takes the form of a parliamentary-agreed White Paper, including explicit objectives for foreign and security or trade policy. For Syria/Iraq, Finland has adopted a regional strategy, which supports both Syria and the surrounding countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq).

Findings

Relevance: Finland's Country Strategies in the five fragile contexts were designed through diverse processes and served various – though mainly internally MFA-focused – uses. Strategic priorities for Country Strategies were aligned with – but not determined by – conflict and fragility factors. The analytical basis of Country Strategies in terms of conflict and fragility was weak.

Programmatic assistance was well-aligned with both national strategies and plans, and with the needs of direct beneficiaries and national authorities. However, Country Strategies provided limited guidance to programme partners on ensuring appropriate targeting. Key dialogue priorities were appropriate to context, and geared to statebuilding, though not informed by Finland's multilateral agency influencing plans.

In volatile environments, Finland's programmatic assistance showed some adaptation to conditions over time. However, the Country Strategy approach can further support adaptive capacity.

Effectiveness: Despite some technical weaknesses and a lack of incorporation of conflict and fragility indicators, RBM procedures had matured over time. Patchy results were delivered against Country Strategy impact areas, with interventions delivering 'baskets' of individualised results and only limited contributions to fragility reduction (and with few links to the Country Strategy). Results on cross-cutting objectives mostly focused on the inclusion of women and girls in interventions. Positive results were achieved in policy dialogue and informal consultations, with Finland generating a reputation as a principled donor on human rights and gender.

Despite constraints from rigid financial procedures, choices and balance of aid modalities were appropriate, and Finland's choice to direct the bulk of its assistance to fragile contexts via the multilateral system validated. The multi-bi modality also demonstrated its utility.

Coherence: Other than in Afghanistan, the siloed model of MFA assistance was reflected in limited internal coherence. Finland's assistance was strongly coherent with external frameworks and initiatives despite a limited apparent role of the Country Strategy in promoting this. Programmes and projects financed both within and beyond the Country Strategy contributed to the realisation of Finland's Development Policy Programme priorities in the five contexts, but the Country Strategy had little role in supporting this contribution.

Connectedness: Finland strongly articulated human rights concerns from a principled perspective within its policy dialogue and informal consultations but programmatic attention to human rights concerns was unsystematic. Attention to the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations within humanitarian assistance was variable and partner-dependent. Although Country Strategies paid strong attention to statebuilding and peacebuilding concerns, a clear conceptual approach to statebuilding was lacking and funded programmes lacked a consistently medium or longer-term view in their designs.



Conclusions

The evaluation draws eight principal conclusions:

1. Given its diverse applications, and limited awareness beyond MFA, the purpose of the Country Strategy in fragile contexts would benefit from clarification in the next generation, particularly in relation to adaptive management for fragile contexts
2. The Country Strategy approach has further scope to support internal and external coherence, with fragmentation evident across MFA departments and units and little evidence of Country Strategy role in supporting Finland's strong external alignment.
3. Finland's assistance to fragile contexts was broadly relevant to both the needs of beneficiaries and of key stakeholders. However, the first generation of Country Strategies (other than the White Paper for Afghanistan) played a benign but largely passive role in assuring relevance.
4. Finland has valuable reputational capital as a principled and neutral actor in fragile states, including taking a progressive and proactive stance on gender and human rights. This capital has potential for further leverage to contribute to statebuilding and peacebuilding aims. However, there was limited use and awareness of the 2014 Fragile States guidelines,
5. Results based management processes allied to the Country Strategy approach demonstrated a high value in a siloed organisation but still have potential to mature, including a more systematic approach to risk management
6. Valuable results were delivered in fragile contexts through the Country Strategy approach, but do not yet comprise 'more than the sum of the parts', being largely individualised and fragmented. They were not steered by a clear fragility reduction agenda. Limited attention to some marginalised groups bring into question the realisation of Finland's Human Rights Based approaches commitments. Choices and balance of aid modalities were appropriate for needs.
7. The Country Strategy approach can further support the linking of assistance to medium term objectives, for example through improved financial procedures, as well as help guide assistance towards nexus concerns, with a stronger emphasis on peacebuilding.
8. The Country Strategy approach can further support Finland in the delivery of a human rights-based approach. Finland's role as a standard-bearer for human rights in policy dialogue within several fragile contexts was not consistently supported by programmatic attention to rights issues, arising from the largely trust-based approach to partners.

Recommendations

Building on the evidence presented, the evaluation makes six recommendations, further elaborated in the full report:

(i) Structural recommendations

Recommendation 1: Explicitly conceptualise the Country Strategy approach as a tool for adaptive management in fragile contexts, building links between humanitarian and development assistance where possible. This would require actions including: (i) Clear specification of the purpose of the Country Strategy within the fragile/conflict-affected context, geared to its role as a provider of strategic direction; internal and external accountability; and learning for MFA and partners; (ii) Definition of the specific intent of Finnish assistance employing an explicitly political lens, and gearing intended contributions to fragility and conflict reduction/specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims for the operating context; (iii) Specification of the intent of the Country Strategy as a tool for adaptive management in the context, (iv) Explicit recognition/statement of anticipated risk levels and types and (v) Commitment to the pursuit of a closer relationship between humanitarian and development programmatic streams.



Recommendation 2: Enhance the technical rigour of Country Strategies in fragile situations, geared to specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims in the context and with strong attention to risk. This recommendation includes enhancing the analytical basis of Country Strategies, particularly the Political Economy Analysis; improving the conflict/fragility sensitivity of Country Strategies, with a particular focus on statebuilding and peacebuilding goals; developing broad guidance on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in fragile situations; and ensuring that conflict and fragility issues are integrated into Programme based Support grants for Civil Society Organisations and Multilateral Influencing Plans. It also includes linking assistance more closely to medium term goals, particularly with a peacebuilding and statebuilding lens.

Recommendation 3: Increase financial flexibility for work in fragile contexts and develop appropriate financing modalities for fragile contexts. This recommendation proposes two mechanisms to enhance flexibility in its financial processes; (i) Approve the Country Programme, including its respective financial allocation (subject to Parliamentary approval of the budget), for its duration (four year period) in advance, to maximise flexibility of programmatic approval and (ii) Consider thematic windows for assistance to fragile contexts, specifically geared to providing rapid assistance, and which explicitly link humanitarian and development funding streams. A Helpdesk function may also be considered around the issue of fragility and conflict, to support MFA staff.

(ii) Procedural recommendations

Recommendation 4: Enhance the RBM systems allied to the Country Strategy to maximise their value with a specific emphasis on risk in fragile contexts. This recommendation suggests reviewing and revising RBM frameworks to clarify the statement of Finnish intent in the country at impact level, centred firmly on fragility/conflict reduction; and to apply relevant international indicators on fragility as a reflection of progress. It proposes improving the system of Mid-term reviews and independent evaluations. It also suggests ensuring that risk management directives within the revised Country Strategy guidance are fully implemented.

Recommendation 5: Refresh or revise the key policy frameworks for working in fragile contexts. This recommendation proposes revisiting the 2014 Fragile States policy, which is not widely known or utilised within MFA; and developing an MFA-wide Risk Policy, which specifies Finland's degree of risk tolerance, and clearly sets out risk categories, including those related to conflict-affected and fragile situations.

Recommendation 6: Ensure more rigorous treatment of the Human Rights-Based Approach in fragile contexts. This recommendation suggests integrating a robust human rights context analysis into the strengthened Political Economy Analyses, and requiring all revised Country Strategies to include clarity on human rights aims and objectives. It indicates increased rigour in ensuring the use of human rights-based approaches within funded initiatives, and the inclusion of human rights analysis within Mid Term Reviews.



Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Weak conflict/fragility analytical basis of Country Strategies including insufficiently rigorous attention to risk. Limited internal coherence, though Finland's assistance well-aligned with external frameworks and initiatives.	<p>Conclusion 1: The purpose of the Country Strategy in fragile contexts would benefit from clarification, particularly in relation to adaptive management.</p> <p>Conclusion 2: The Country Strategy approach has further scope to support internal and external coherence.</p>	<p>Recommendation 1: Explicitly conceptualise the Country Strategy approach as a tool for adaptive management in fragile contexts, building links between humanitarian and development assistance where possible.</p>
Programmatic assistance well-aligned with, and adapted to, national strategies and plans/needs of direct beneficiaries and national authorities but Country Strategies provided limited guidance or support. Strong attention to statebuilding and peacebuilding concerns within Country Strategies, though lacking a clear conceptual approach to statebuilding. Insufficiently rigorous approach to risk.	<p>Conclusion 3: While Finland's assistance to fragile contexts was broadly relevant to needs, the first generation of Country Strategies played a benign but largely passive role.</p> <p>Conclusion 4: Finland has a valuable role as a principled and neutral actor in fragile states, which has potential for further leverage to contribute to statebuilding and peacebuilding.</p>	<p>Recommendation 2: Enhance the technical rigour of Country Strategies in fragile situations, geared to specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims in the context and with strong attention to risk.</p>
Patchy results delivered against Country Strategy impact areas, with 'baskets' of individualised results rather than cohesive contributions to clear MFA goals in the context. Some limited contributions to reduced fragility delivered but many caveats/few linkages to the Country Strategy approach. Constraints in flexibility arising from rigid financial procedures. Aid modalities appropriate for context. Insufficiently medium-term view of programmes.	<p>Conclusion 6: Valuable results have been delivered in fragile contexts through the Country Strategy approach, but do not yet comprise 'more than the sum of the parts'</p> <p>Conclusion 7: The Country Strategy approach can further support the linking of assistance to the medium term/guide assistance towards nexus concerns.</p>	<p>Recommendation 3: Increase financial flexibility for work in fragile contexts and develop appropriate financing modalities for fragile contexts.</p> <p>Recommendation 5: Refresh or revise the key policy frameworks for working in fragile contexts.</p>
Some technical weaknesses/lack of incorporation of conflict and fragility indicators, but RBM procedures mostly applied.	<p>Conclusion 5: Results based management processes allied to the Country Strategy approach demonstrated a high value in a siloed organisation but still have potential to mature.</p>	<p>Recommendation 4: Enhance the RBM systems allied to the Country Strategy to maximise their value with a specific emphasis on risk in fragile contexts.</p>
Strong commitment to HRBAs within Country Strategies was not consistently reflected in funded assistance. However, Finland prove a consistently strong and principled articulator of human rights concerns within its policy dialogue and informal consultations.	<p>Conclusion 8: The Country Strategy approach can further support Finland in the delivery of a human rights-based approach.</p>	<p>Recommendation 6: Ensure more rigorous treatment of the Human Rights-Based Approach in fragile contexts.</p>



Keskeiset havainnot, päätelmät ja suositukset

Löydökset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset Ulkoministeriön tulisi:
<p>Maaohjelmien strategisten painopiste-alueiden kuvauksissa tuotiin esille konflikteihin ja haurauteen liittyviä näkökulmia, mutta ne eivät toimineet maaohjelmien lähtökohtana</p>	<p>Johtopäätös 1: Olisi hyvä selvittää maaohjelmien tarkoitus hauraimaissa / haurailualueilla, erityisesti mukautuvan ohjauksen (<i>adaptive management</i>) näkökulmasta.</p> <p>Johtopäätös 2: Maaohjelmilla voidaan tukea enemmän sisäistä ja ulkoista johdonmukaisuutta.</p>	<p>Suositus 1: Sopia, että maaohjelmien yksi käyttötarkoitus on tukea hauraimaissa ja oloissa tarvittavaa mukautuvaa ohjausta (<i>adaptive management</i>) ja luoda yhteyksiä kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun välille.</p>
<p>Toteutetut hankkeet olivat linjassa sekä kumppanimaiden kansallisten strategioiden ja suunnitelmien että niitä toteuttavien viranomaisten tarpeiden kanssa. Myös välittömien hyödynsaajien tarpeet oli huomioitu.</p> <p>Valtiorakenteiden kehitykseen ja rauhanrakentamiseen liittyviin kysymyksiin on kiinnitetty paljon huomiota maaohjelmissä, mutta ilman selkeästi määriteltyä lähestymistapaa. Niissä ei ole määritelty selkeästi sitä lähestymistapaa. Lähestymistapa riskienhallintaan ei ole ollut riittävän perusteellinen.</p>	<p>Johtopäätös 3: Suomen tuki vastasi yleisesti ottaen hyvin hyödynsaajien ja keskeisten sidosryhmien tarpeisiin. Tarkoituksenmukaisuuden näkökulmasta maaohjelmien rooli oli myönteinen, mutta suurelta osin passiivinen.</p> <p>Johtopäätös 4: Suomi tunnetaan hauraimaissa ja alueilla periaatteellisena ja puolueettomana toimijana, joka edistää kannanotoissaan aktiivisesti sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa ja ihmis-oikeuksia. Tätä mainepääomaa voisi hyödyntää enemmän myös valtiorakenteiden kehittämisessä ja rauhanrakentamisessa.</p>	<p>Suositus 2: Vahvistaa hauraiden maiden maaohjelmia niin, että niissä keskitytään erityisesti rauhanrakennuksen ja valtion kehittämisen tavoitteisiin ja niihin liittyvät riskit otetaan aiempaa paremmin huomioon.</p>
<p>Maaohjelmien vaikuttavuustavoitteisiin suhteutettuna tulokset olivat hajanaisia. Hankkeet tuottivat yksittäisiä tulosryppäitä, jotka vaikuttivat vain rajallisesti haurauden vähentämiseen ja joiden linkit maaohjelmiin olivat vähäisiä.</p> <p>Jäykistä rahoitukseen liittyvistä menetelyistä huolimatta käytetyt yhteistyön muodot (<i>aid modalities</i>) ja niiden keskinäinen tasapaino olivat sopivia. Suomen päätös suunnata suurin osa tuestaan monenvälisten järjestöjen kautta hauraille alueille todettiin oikeaksi. Menettely, jossa hanketukea kanavoidaan monenvälisten järjestöjen kautta (<i>multi-bi modality</i>), osoittautui myös hyödylliseksi.</p>	<p>Johtopäätös 6: Maaohjelmissä on saavutettu arvokkaita tuloksia, mutta ne eivät vielä muodosta kokonaisuutta, joka olisi enemmän kuin osiensa summa.</p> <p>Johtopäätös 7: Maaohjelmat voivat edistää keskipitkän aikavälin tavoitteita esimerkiksi parantamalla varainmyöntöprosesseja. Voidaan myös luoda jatkumoa humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välille painottamalla enemmän rauhanrakentamista.</p>	<p>Suositus 3: Lisätä rahoituksen joustavuutta ja kehittää hauraimiin maihin ja oloihin sopivia avustusmuotoja.</p> <p>Suositus 5: Päivittää tai muokata keskeiset politiikkalinjaukset ja toimintaohjeet (<i>policy frameworks</i>) vastaamaan paremmin tilannetta ja tarpeita hauraimaissa ja oloissa.</p>



Löydökset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset Ulkomministeriön tulisi:
Huolimatta joistakin sisällöllisistä heikkouksista sekä konfliktien ja haurauden indikaattorien puutteesta, tulosohjausta oli enimmäkseen käytetty.	Johtopäätös 5: Maaohjelmien seurantaan liittyvät tulosohjauksen prosessit ovat tärkeitä siiloutuneessa organisaatiossa, mutta niitä on mahdollista kehittää edelleen, muun muassa ottamalla systemaattisempi lähestymistapa riskienhallintaan.	Suositus 4: Kehittää maaohjelmien tulosohjausta siten, että voidaan maksimoida niiden hyöty koskien erityisesti riskienhallintaa hauraissa maissa ja oloissa.
Vahva sitoutuminen ihmisoikeusperustaiseen lähestymistapaan ei näkynyt yhtenäisesti toteutuksen tasolla. Suomi on kuitenkin osoittanut olevansa vahva ja periaatteellinen toimija ihmisoikeuskysymyksissä poliittisessa vuoropuhelussa ja epävirallisissa kuulemisissa.	Johtopäätös 8: Maaohjelmat voivat tarjota lisätukea Suomen ihmisoikeusperustaisen lähestymistavan toteuttamiselle.	Suositus 6: Varmistaa, että ihmisoikeusperustaista lähestymistapaa sovelletaan hauraissa maissa ja oloissa entistä perusteellisemmin..



1 Introduction

1.1 Evaluation purpose and objectives

This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation, commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), of the role of the Country Strategy approach in supporting the planning and implementation of Finnish co-operation in fragile or conflict-affected situations.

The evaluation's **purpose** was to assess the applicability and feasibility of the Country Strategy approach in fragile contexts,¹ given their specific challenges and requirements (see Terms of Reference, Annex 1). Its specific **objectives** were as follows:

- To assess the coherence between sample country and MFA internal strategies (including Multilateral Influencing Plans), as well as the Finnish Development Policy Programme 2016;
- To assess the relevance of Finland's co-operation in fragile situations, including the appropriateness and feasibility of its policy dialogue, as supported by Country Strategies, including adaptation over time;
- To assess the appropriateness of aid co-cooperation modalities, including multi-bi co-operation, in fragile contexts;
- To assess the extent to which Finnish development priorities, as articulated in Country Strategies, are prioritised within planning and implementation, including the integration of crosscutting objectives (the rights of the most vulnerable, gender equality and climate change preparedness and mitigation);
- To assess the extent to which Country Strategies have supported co-operation to be conflict and human-rights sensitive and to adhere to international commitments relevant to fragile situations;
- To assess the role of Country Strategies in supporting results achieved by Finnish co-operation, as far as they can be determined;
- To assess the role of Country Strategies in supporting Finland's approach to partnership in fragile contexts.

The evaluation drew evidence from across the corporate systems of MFA, as well as the experience of Country Strategies in Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia and Syria/Iraq. It covered the period 2012–current, with the emphasis on more recent activity (2016 onwards). The study was conducted by an international team, during the period March 2019 to February 2020.

¹ The term 'context' is used rather than 'country' since the five Country Strategies assessed included a regional strategy for the Syria/Iraq response.



1.2 Evaluation questions and methodology

The evaluation applied four main evaluation criteria to guide the overall enquiry; Relevance, Effectiveness, Coherence and Connectedness. Evaluation questions were aligned to these criteria, as follows (Table 1):


Table 1 Evaluation Questions

Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the alignment of Finland's Country portfolios and policy dialogue to address the causes of fragility? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland's assistance to the needs of stakeholders and beneficiaries, considering available resources? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland's assistance to the needs of key stakeholders, whether government, civil society or others? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach enable assistance to adapt appropriately over time, including in relation to volatile conditions?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the orientation of initiatives to best deliver results for key stakeholders and beneficiaries in the context? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach provide an enabling environment for results in non-discrimination, including gender equality and the empowerment of women, and climate change? • To what extent did the selected aid co-operation modality, particularly multi-bi co-operation, support the delivery of results in the context? • To what extent have Finnish Country Strategies/Portfolios contributed to any reductions in fragility?
Coherence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How/or does the Country Strategy approach support Finland in providing coherent assistance to the country, e.g. across MFA departments and multilateral influencing plans and funding? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support alignment with the plans and policies of other key donors/international actors in the context? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach contribute to the realization of wider Finnish Development Policy objectives?
Connectedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did Country Strategies adhere to international commitments on the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations? • To what extent did the Country Strategies take into account long-term and interconnected problems, e.g. through the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus?

The full evaluation approach and methodology are provided in Annex 2. Overall, a highly structured and systematic approach was adopted, to ensure a high degree of traceability and transparency of evidence. The evaluation's design combined theory-based evaluation with elements of contribution analysis (Mayne, 2001) and a utilisation-focused approach (Quinn Patton, 2008). It developed and applied a theoretical framework for the role of Country Strategies in supporting reductions in conflict/fragility, based on some key sources within the Finnish aid management system, including Finland's 2016–2019 Development Policy Programme; Finland's Policy for engaging in Fragile States; and its Country Strategy Guidelines (MFA 2014; MFA 2016a; MFA 2016b; MFA 2019a;) as well as some key international sources (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2020). The theoretical framework was tested and validated as the evaluation proceeded (see Annex 2 for discussion); it is presented in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1 Theory of Change






Contributions of Country Strategy modality to results





Other key elements of the methodology included an Evaluation Matrix (see Annex 4), which acted as the analytical ‘spine’ of the evaluation; and structured tools for data gathering and analysis. Six ‘evidence streams’ were applied through a sequential approach, building the evidence base through progressively deeper analysis as the evaluation proceeded (Figure 2):

Figure 2 Evidence-building approach



Source: Evaluation team

Quantitative analysis was conducted of Finnish assistance to the five relevant contexts for the period 2012–2018, generated from MFA statistics. Desk analysis was conducted of 64 projects across the five contexts (see Annex 4 for breakdown by context), and ten-day to two-week field missions conducted in Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia and Syria/Iraq in the period September–November 2019. Findings from these field studies, as contributory evidence streams to the overarching evaluation, can be found in Volume 2: Case Studies. A total of 387 stakeholders were interviewed, in Helsinki, in Finnish Embassies and with partners and stakeholders around the world. Findings, conclusions and recommendations were validated with key MFA stakeholders through workshops held in February 2020.

1.3 Evaluation terminology

To avoid confusion, and ensure consistency, the following definitions are applied throughout this report:

- **Country Strategy approach** refers to the approach adopted by Finland in managing its aid cooperation managed by MFA’s regional departments in partner countries, based on results. It includes an overarching results framework and set of results objectives, as expressed by individual Country Strategy documents;



- **Country Strategy** (*maaohjelma*) refers to individual country-specific frameworks which define the areas of cooperation, forms and objectives of support, and results indicators of MFA's regional departments' programmable aid. Country Strategies also encompass provisions for risk management and donor coordination, as well as the system of reporting, dialogue, getting management responses in writing, synthesising, dialogue and peer learning and upward accountability. For brevity in this report, the term 'Country Strategy' is also used to encompass the White Paper for Afghanistan and the regional strategic approach for Syria/Iraq.
- **Comprehensive Country Strategy** (*maastrategia*): describe broad strategies applicable for some countries which cover the full range of Finland's co-operation in a country. These may include security support, humanitarian assistance, CSO support through framework agreements and private sector instruments.
- **Country portfolio** refers to the list of Finland's aid co-operation interventions tagged to a specific country including projects and programmes implemented under different aid modalities, and which may not be fully encompassed by a Country Strategy (see section 3.2).

1.4 Limitations

Limitations to the evaluation include:

- Results data for the study was limited, being based on a combination of project reviews/evaluations and Country Strategy results reporting, triangulated by interview and other qualitative data. Moreover, where results are achieved through multi-stakeholder initiatives to which Finland contributes, linking achievements to Finland's Country Strategy approach is methodologically unfeasible. Case study teams were not able to independently verify results, nor were they required to do so under the terms of the evaluation (see MFA 2019a). Results presented by the evaluation are therefore caveated accordingly.
- The evaluation includes findings up to December 2019, the point at which data gathering closed. Concurrently, MFA was moving ahead with redesigning its Country Strategy approach. Efforts were made to ensure coherence between the two processes, in order to ensure that both were mutually constructive/reinforcing. However, revised Country Strategy guidance was issued in January 2020 (MFA 2020) as this evaluation report was being drafted. While the revised guidance has been incorporated into the evaluation where feasible, the evaluation's design and data gathering applied the former guidance, dated 2016 (MFA 2016a). Nonetheless, the evaluation offers important inputs that can refine and enhance the next generation of Country Strategies.
- Finally, the component case studies presented in Volume 2 do not comprise full evaluations of Finnish assistance in a given context. Accordingly, they do not claim to provide a definitive performance assessment of all Finnish assistance provided during the period 2012-current. Rather, they offer limited insights to the context, generated through a systematic approach, to inform the wider evaluative process.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the evaluation offers relevant and, it is hoped, useful, insights into Finnish assistance in fragile contexts, as governed by the Country Strategy approach at the time.



2 Evaluation Context – Fragility

2.1 The concept of fragility and international engagement in fragile situations

The concept of “fragility” entered development debates in the early 2000s. It was intended to support exploration of the often-complex interactions between state ineffectiveness, conflict and development challenges (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2004). Applying a ‘fragility’ lens was hoped to enable deeper understanding and anticipation of potential or actual state failure in some of the most challenging cases of development cooperation (Collier 2007).

Yet, even since the early 2000s, consensus has not yet emerged on the definition and assessment of ‘fragility’. The OECD defines fragility as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks”, which it measures along five dimensions: social, political, environmental, economic and security-related (OECD 2018). Its States of Fragility Report 2018 notes that fragility is a complex and dual-system problem and notes its multidimensionality (OECD 2018). The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index aggregates a set of indicators along four pillars: cohesion, economic, political and social (Fund for Peace, 2019).

Finland was an early adopter of the fragility approach

Finland was an early adopter of the fragility approach and contributed to its international conceptual and normative development. It has participated in several of the key international initiatives in addressing fragility, including:

- International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2008)
- New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2012)
- Stockholm Declaration (2016)

Finland’s wider engagement in these normative processes is not a central focus for this evaluation but is relevant in terms of the backdrop for the evolution of its strategic thinking, and for its contributions to the wider international agenda on the issue.

Globally, international assistance provided to fragile contexts has increased dramatically since 2009. In 2017, fragile contexts received USD 74 billion of net official development assistance (ODA) globally, amounting to 68% of total earmarked ODA (OECD 2018). The 15 ‘extremely fragile’ contexts globally received almost half of this amount. Most of this increase arises from increased volumes of humanitarian assistance – up by 144% in the same period. The OECD’s 2018 States of Fragility Report however points out that while assistance has focused on resolving immediate needs and concerns in fragile situations, funding flows for prevention and peacebuilding have been much more limited (OECD 2018).




2.2 Finland's engagement in fragile contexts

Bilateral Finnish support to fragile contexts reached USD 210 million in 2017 (34.6% of its gross bilateral ODA (OECD 2020)). It dedicated 14.6% of its ODA in 2017 to 'Extremely fragile contexts' as categorised by the OECD (see OECD 2018) and almost 20% to 'other fragile contexts' (Figure 3):

Bilateral Finnish support to fragile contexts reached USD 210 million in 2017


Figure 3 Bilateral ODA to fragile contexts (gross disbursements, percent of total ODA)



Source: own presentation based on OECD (2018)

Countries of assistance: The 'top five' fragile contexts supported by Finland in 2017 (Figure 4) were Nepal, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique. All are Long term partner countries under the current Finnish Development Policy (MFA 2016b). Somalia, Myanmar, Kenya, Zambia and the Syrian Arab Republic complete the 'top ten' countries of assistance in 2017 (OECD 2018).

Figure 4 Top ten recipients of Finnish bilateral assistance 2017 (gross disbursements, million USD, current prices)




Source: own presentation based on OECD (2018)



Sectors of investment: Finnish ODA to fragile contexts in 2017 supported social infrastructure and services, humanitarian assistance, productive sectors and economic infrastructure and services (Figure 5):

Figure 5 Finnish bilateral ODA to fragile contexts by sector



Source: own presentation based on OECD (2018)

2.3 Finland's planning and strategising in fragile contexts

MFA Development Policy Programmes: The overall goal of Finnish Development Co-operation is to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality (MFA 2020a). During the evaluation period (2012–2019), two Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) have guided MFA's development cooperation, including in fragile contexts (MFA, 2012a, 2016a). The DPPs reflect a clear intensification of Finland's work on fragility over time (Table 2).




Table 2 Finnish Development Policy programmes

DPP 2012–2015	DPP 2016–2019
Emphasis on Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), civil society and green economy in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	Adopts overarching framework of the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
<p>Priority areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights 2. An inclusive green economy that supports employment 3. Sustainable management of natural resources and environmental protection 4. Human development. 	<p>Priority areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Women’s and girls’ rights 2. Economic empowerment 3. Governance and democracy 4. Natural resources including food security.
<p>Priority countries</p> <p>Long-term partner countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, and Vietnam</p> <p>Afghanistan, Occupied Palestinian Territory and South Sudan cited as fragile contexts requiring additional support</p>	<p>Priority countries</p> <p>Long-term partner countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nepal, Myanmar/Burma</p> <p>Middle Eastern countries/regions bearing the consequences of Syria/Iraq conflicts</p> <p>Countries in Horn of Africa experiencing unrest</p> <p>Refugee-hosting countries e.g. Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia</p> <p>Afghanistan</p>
<p>References to fragility</p> <p>Finland will “explore the possibilities to emphasise further the specific needs of fragile states in its development policy and development cooperation” (MFA, 2012a).</p>	<p>References to fragility</p> <p>Highlights the close links between development policy and the other areas of Finland’s foreign and security policy, particularly apparent in the case of conflict areas, fragile states and refugee issues. Fragile states will play an increasingly important role in bilateral cooperation, because they have the greatest need for Finnish support</p> <p>Aid to be progressively channelled to support living conditions in countries of origin including conflict-affected countries</p>

Tools for engagement in fragile situations: Over the evaluation period, Finland produced a wide range of guidance and tools to support its country teams in applying development/humanitarian assistance, including in fragile contexts. These are set out in Figure 6.



Figure 6 Timeline of Finland's Development Policy Programmes and guidelines over the evaluation period



Source: Evaluation team

Significant developments over the evaluation period include:

- The 2014 Fragile States Policy (MFA, 2014) which emphasises the need for conflict analyses and conflict sensitivity; enhancing cooperation, coordination and effectiveness; strengthening local ownership; risk management; as well as funding and support channels.
- The adoption of a Results Based Management approach to development co-operation, with 2015 guidance (MFA, 2015c) requiring all assistance, including that provided through Country Strategies, to set clear impacts, outcomes, outputs and indicators, with annual reporting required on progress. This approach is reiterated in Finland's guidance for bilateral programming (MFA, 2012c, with updates in 2016 and 2018 (MFA, 2016c, 2018a) and progress was evaluated in 2015 (see MFA 2015d).
- The development of Results Maps for all four 2016-2019 DPP policy priority areas (MFA, 2019c). MFA's work in fragile contexts is explicitly linked strongly to Policy Priority Area 3: "Societies have become more democratic and better functioning"; and Policy Priority Area 1: Women's and girls' rights. Fragility is also implicitly integrated under Policy Priority 1: 'Developing countries' own economies have generated more jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being'; and 4: 'Food security and access to water and energy have improved, and natural resources are used sustainably.'



The 2019 Annual Report of the Development Policy Committee called for a new paradigm for Finland's Development Policy, including objectives, priority areas and levels of funding as well as key principles to be consistently applied across administrative periods (KPT, 2019).

Human Rights Based Approach: The human rights-based approach (HRBA) underpins all Finnish development cooperation. Finland's Development Policy Programmes consistently promote the use of HRBAs (MFA, 2007, 2012a, 2016a), although the specific interpretation of the themes has varied over time. Finland's current approach to HRBAs includes a focus on the rights of women; persons with disabilities; sexual and gender minorities; indigenous peoples; and economic, social and cultural rights (MFA 2015b). Since 2003, Finland has adopted a marker system, which provides a basis for assessing the degree of HRBA applied along a continuum of 'sensitive', 'progressive' or 'transformative', with all interventions required to be 'sensitive' at minimum. Grants from the Civil Society department for programme-based assistance require an explicitly human rights-based approach (MFA 2017). New guidelines for the Country Strategy, issued in January 2020 (MFA 2020) indicate that an Annex on HRBAs is under development.

Crosscutting objectives: Crosscutting 'themes' in Finnish development policy are closely linked to Finland's prioritisation of HRBAs in all its development co-operation, above. They were upgraded to 'objectives' in DPP 2012–2016 (MFA, 2012a), and comprise (1) gender equality, (2) non-discrimination (with a focus on persons with disabilities), and (3) climate sustainability, which encompasses both climate resilience (adaptation) and low emission development (mitigation). Women's and girls' rights were prioritised as the first policy priority area of DPP 2016–2019; guidance on cross-cutting objectives for "gender equality", "non-discrimination", "climate resilience", and "low emissions development" was under preparation in 2019.

Policy Dialogue/consultations in fragile contexts: The DPP and Fragile States Policy (MFA 2016a; MFA 2014) set out Finland's approaches to policy dialogue. The cited rationale is increased influence beyond the reach of a small nation, through collective work with the other Nordic countries and as a Member State of the European Union.

For fragile contexts, as per its 2014 Fragile States Policy (MFA 2014), Finland's intentions for its policy dialogue emphasise shared dialogue and agreement on the key problems at which international assistance should be targeted, and the role of long-term preventive measures, as well as peace- and statebuilding processes. It commits to applying the 2012 New Deal framework (New Deal 2020b), which emphasises coherence of international assistance, to avoid uncoordinated and fragmented provision. In some contexts, such as Myanmar, where no formal policy dialogue takes place, Finland employs informal consultations through its Embassies.

Delivery modalities in fragile contexts: Finland's assistance in fragile contexts is mainly delivered through multilateral agencies. Finland has an organisation-specific influencing plan for each multilateral organisation receiving more than 1M€ annually, which sets out influencing priorities globally.



3 The Country Strategy approach

3.1 Key features of the Country Strategy approach

Finland's aid cooperation to its long-term partner countries is planned and implemented under the Country Strategy (CS) approach. The purpose of the approach is to bring Regional Department- managed country-level policy and programmatic engagement into a broader framework of results-based management (RBM), following previously identified weaknesses (Poate and Bartholomew 2011; OECD DAC, 2012). Section 3.4 explains the results-based management nature of the Country Strategy approach.

MFA issued new instructions for the Country Strategy approach in 2012, and Country Strategies subsequently launched in all long-term partner countries in 2013. Since then, several sets of guiding documents have been produced to support country teams in all phases of the Country Strategy results management cycle, including updating the Country Strategies, reporting, use of indicators, as well as carrying out self-assessments (MFA 2016a).

The Country Strategy approach is far from comprehensive across Finnish assistance. It applies only to long-term partners and encompasses only bilateral and earmarked multi-bilateral development assistance under the control of MFA's Regional Departments. Country Strategies encompass also sector support (Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs)), and – in case planned specifically to support the result objective of the CS – may also encompass support to a Finnish or international Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). They also encompass the management of the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) for local NGOs by Finnish Embassies.

The Country Strategy approach is far from comprehensive across Finnish assistance

Some early-stage Comprehensive Country Strategies cover the full range of Finnish interventions in a country, including support to security, trade and other areas. These have been trialed in only a few partner countries, including Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq. Finnish engagement in Somalia has also contributed to recent thinking for the development of a concept to prepare more comprehensive Country Strategies (see section 3.5). The term 'Country Strategy' is also applied to encompass the Syria/Iraq Strategy, which is regional in nature (see section 4.1).

3.2 Coverage of Finnish assistance by Country Strategy

As noted in section 3.1, the Country Strategy approach does not encompass all aid flows or modalities for Finnish assistance. Additional forms of Finnish support which are not currently encompassed by the Country Strategy approach include:

- Support to the multilateral system through core contributions to the UN, the EU, multilateral development banks and other agencies – which consumed 44.4% of total ODA in 2017 (OECD 2020)
- Humanitarian support to countries in need, where a formal request has been made to the United Nations (UN) (MFA 2020c)



- Loosely earmarked financing to CSO-programmes through programme-based support (PBS), which enables CSOs to plan and implement their interventions according to their own strategies under an agreed general framework. CSOs eligible for the instrument are chosen through a competitive selection process. (MFA, 2019c)


Even where Country Strategies apply to a long-term partner country, they do not encompass all forms of Finnish assistance. Items which may, in a given context, fall outside the Country Strategy include:

- Support for private sector engagement/trade support such as Finnfund/Finnpartnership under DPP priority 2, addressing private sector engagement and creation of jobs and employment (Department for External Economic Relations; Unit for Development Finance and Private Sector Cooperation, Department for Development Policy, Trade Policy Unit)
- Project support for civil society organisations, allocated every two years by means of a call for proposals (unit for Civil Society)
- Foreign policy, security, peacebuilding and mediation support (Political Department)
- Humanitarian assistance (Department of Development Policy, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance)
- Specific institutional cooperation instruments, (between state institutions), for example the Higher Education Institutions Institutional Cooperation Instrument (HEI ICI) (Finnish National Agency for Education).

Even where Country Strategies apply to a long-term partner country, they do not encompass all forms of Finnish assistance

Figure 7 locates Country Strategies and associated portfolios within wider Finnish and international aid co-operation to fragile contexts:

Figure 7 Demarcating Finnish Country Strategies



Source: Evaluation team



Previous studies have identified the continued existence of silos in Finnish development assistance (OECD, 2017), for example between aid modalities in the context of private sector engagement (Spratt et al., 2018; Topper et al., 2019; van Gerwen et al., 2016). Studies have also identified a need for increased devolution of decision-making power to Embassies (Fölscher et al., 2016). Currently, day-to-day issues are dealt with through dialogue between Embassies and Helsinki on a case-by-case basis (OECD, 2017).

3.3 Institutional architecture for Country Strategies

Country Strategies are managed by MFA Country Teams, which integrate staff from both MFA's Regional Departments and relevant Embassies


Country Strategies and associated co-operation are managed by MFA Country Teams, which integrate staff from both MFA's Regional Departments and relevant Embassies in-country. Thematic advisers from the Development Policy Department provide support and further guidance on specific issues while the advisers of the Regional Departments assume the role of oversight in the formulation of Country Strategies.

Country Strategies are developed in accordance with Regional Departments' financial and operational plans (*talous-ja toimintasuunnitelma*). The Development Policy Steering Group (DPSG) provides feedback on Country Strategy papers before their Ministerial approval. Project and programme proposals falling under the Country Strategy are screened by the Quality Assurance Board (QAB). Country teams report annually on the progress of Country Strategies, and the corresponding Regional Department leadership provides a management response. The Political Department is invited to participate in the meetings of the QAB and the DPSG.

The Country Programming Task Force (CPTF) is an unofficial body within the MFA. It plays a key role in the Results Based Management cycle of the Country Strategy approach. The CPTF provides guidance for the drafting and reporting processes of Country Strategies, and it also compiles a synthesis of annual reports to the Steering Group for Development Policy as well as organising regional workshops for internal learning purposes.

Figure 8 describes the main architecture surrounding the Country Strategy approach:

Figure 8 Country Strategy architecture



Source: Fölscher et al., 2016; MFA, 2019c; MFA, 2019, personal communication, 24 June 2019; OECD, 2017)

3.4 Results Based Management approaches to Country Strategies

In line with the RBM approach indicated in section 3.1 above, all Finnish Country Strategies include a Results Framework (Annex 2 in the Country Strategy template), with associated impact areas, outcomes and outputs, to which Finnish assistance in the country is expected to contribute. The Results framework is complemented by a range of additional RBM tools, including:

- Assumptions, presented within the Results Framework
- A logic model, presented as Annex 1 in the Country Strategy



- A Risk management framework (Annex 3)

Reporting on results takes place through a range of mechanisms, including:

- Annual Country Strategy results reporting, with progress ratings/narrative judgements on outputs, outcomes and impacts
- Management responses to annual results reports
- A one-off self-assessment exercise, conducted in 2018//2019, and which reviewed progress over the period 2017-2018 (not available for Afghanistan)
- Management responses (in most cases) to the self-assessment
- Evaluations commissioned by the MFA across themes/issues, which frequently include country case studies (REFS).

As Finland's RBM system experiences ongoing refinement, two rounds of updates of results frameworks and risk matrices have been conducted in the current cycle of Country Strategies. These resulted in considerable refinement of matrices (see section 5.2.1). Additionally, six regional workshops were held in 2019. The first MFA Development Policy Results report was prepared in 2018, applying results data from Country Strategies and other sources (MFA 2018d).

A 2015 evaluation of Finland's Development Policy Programmes from a Results based management point of view found important progress made towards integrating RBM in planning, implementation and reporting, but a lack of inherently results-driven planning; inadequate information systems for monitoring and reporting results; and the absence of an overall 'results culture' (MFA 2015d). Outstanding challenges include: ongoing ICT systems limitations; weakness in staff capacities; and challenges with outcome-level reporting (interviews, 2019; MFA 2018e). Nonetheless, progress since 2015 continues to inform the development of next-generation Country Strategies, including in fragile situations.

3.5 Recent developments in Country Strategies

During late 2018 and early 2019, MFA worked to develop the concept for a more comprehensive approach to country strategies. This drew on experience from Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq, and applied learning from Somalia, to review how all forms of Finnish co-operation could be brought together to form a holistic approach to country planning and implementation (MFA, pers. comm. May/June 2019). Linked to an intensified focus on the 'triple nexus' of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding action, this initiative has focused on adapting existing processes and systems, while remaining cognisant of relatively inflexible 'humanitarian' and 'development' funding streams (ibid.).

The process culminated in revised Country Strategy guidelines, issued in January 2020 (MFA 2020b). These are not specific to fragile contexts but respond to the more comprehensive approach indicated within the learning process above, for example by requiring consultations with the different Departments/Units when mapping out the prioritized means of implementation for the strategic goals of the Country Strategies (MFA 2020b).

The 2020 Country Strategy Guidance states that separate Country Strategy documents will be prepared for the following countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Somalia, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nepal and Afghanistan (representing Finland's Long-Term partner countries). A specific strategy is under consideration for Iraq and may be prepared at a later date. Additionally, one integrated document will be prepared each for the Syria crisis response, Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa and Central Asia (MFA 2020b).

Revised Country Strategy guidelines issued in January 2020



4 The five contexts for the evaluation

4.1 Overview of the five contexts

The evaluation draws a large part of its evidence base from Country Strategies and portfolios in five contexts: Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt), Somalia and Syria/Iraq. These contexts are highly diverse in terms of the root causes, sources and effects of their fragility. Finland's approach to its co-operation, as reflected in Country Strategies, is accordingly diverse. Nonetheless, common features include:

The evaluation draws a large part of its evidence base from Country Strategies and portfolios in Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt), Somalia and Syria/Iraq

- **Volatility:** All five contexts are affected by armed conflicts and other forms of instability, with associated high risk-propensity and high levels of unpredictability;
- **Multilateral co-operation:** Finland's co-operation in all five is characterised by a channelling of bilateral resources through multilateral organisations and international development finance institutions, either through Trust Funds, contributions to initiatives such as budget support, or multi-bi co-operation, mostly in Myanmar and Syria/Iraq (see section 5.2.3);
- **Policy dialogue/informal consultations:** Finland's policy dialogue and consultation objectives in relevant contexts often consider wider aspects of political and policy engagement, reflecting the overlap between aid decision-making and political/policy aspects in fragile contexts (see sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.2);

Specific features include:

- In Afghanistan, where the Country Strategy takes the form of a parliamentary-agreed White Paper, the Country Strategy includes explicit objectives for foreign and security or trade policy and encompasses all these forms of Finnish Co-operation.
- Finland's regionally focused Syria/Iraq Strategy mainly focuses on the effects of the Syria regional conflict, with support provided inside Syria and to refugees in the surrounding countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq).

Contextually, Afghanistan, Somalia and oPt all have tenuous security situations, with Somalia at an early stage of statebuilding and oPt experiencing the dual challenges of occupation and a currently static peace process. The governance environment in Myanmar is complex, but under strain from outbreaks of conflict in Rakhine state, and their subsequent international ramifications. The situation in Syria remains highly volatile, with surrounding countries still requiring major international support to address refugee arising in their territories.

Volume 2: Case Studies contains individual descriptions of the country context. They note specific features of their fragility and discuss the relevant Country Strategy and associated portfolio, as well as identifying key partners in each context. Table 3 provides a summary:



Table 3 The five fragile contexts

Key features of context	Country Strategy period	Value of planned investment	Country Strategy impact areas
Somalia			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collapse of the state after 1991, with armed conflict between clans and, since the middle of the years 2000, by an Islamist group, Al-Shabaab • Some recent progress in the form of successful elections; however, statebuilding is slow, Somaliland and Puntland largely saved by armed violence • Involvement of neighbouring countries in the conflict; attempt to fight Al-Shabaab by Ethiopia and Kenya, rivalries of Arab states in the Peninsula • Droughts an increasing challenge, 4.5 million people food insecure • 2.6 million people internally displaced • 1.1 million refugees in neighboring countries 	2017–2020	EUR 25.7M	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Women’s and girls’ rights including increased availability and use of maternal, sexual and reproductive health services; improved national response to gender-based violence 2. Strengthened core state functions including strengthened public administration and increased public revenue
Afghanistan			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historic contestation of governance, collapse of the state after 1979, fragile democracy since 2002 – all creating massive migration flows • At the centre of the War on Terror after 2001 with massive NATO and US military intervention until 2014, then reduced presence for Transition Decade • Involvement of regional powers, especially Pakistan and Iran • Entrenched narco-economy with deep links in government • Persistent corruption, in part fuelled by military effort and huge aid inflows 	2017–2020	EUR 111 M (2017-2020) (Incl. EUR 28 M (2018)) Humanitarian aid: EUR 400,000 M (2018)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Justice, security, good governance and human rights 2. Improved basic public services 3. Diversified economic base
Occupied Palestinian Territory			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successive cycles of wars, conflicts and violence since 1948; two major Palestinian uprisings (Intifada) against the Israeli occupation, occurring in 1987 and 2000 • The “Two-State Solution” proposed in Oslo accords in 1993 remains the main paradigm for the international community; however, lack of progress has led to political deadlock • OPt dependent on foreign aid, lacking control over its own resources; trade and borders controlled by Israel • Palestinian territory remains occupied by Israel and the Palestinian Authority has powers only over a fraction of West Bank territory; Gaza has a de-facto Hamas government; a lack of elections contributes to the democratic deficit 	2016–2019	EUR 21 M	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Children’s rights to equitable and quality education (SWAP) 2. Resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas (Area C, Gaza, East Jerusalem) through better access to clean water and wastewater services and support to local development projects



Key features of context	Country Strategy period	Value of planned investment	Country Strategy impact areas
Syria and Iraq			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Syria, the social protest of 2011 escalated into a civil war, and then a regional proxy conflict with geopolitical consequences, outcome still uncertain Iraq is in the early phase of stabilising after a four-year period of occupation by an extremist entity (ISIS); the country has been in a continuous situation of conflict and instability since the Iraq-Iran war (1980 to 1988) Syria and Iraq fused into a single regional battle space by 2014, when ISIS occupation of certain Territory Multi-dimensional shock caused by the conflict has affected also Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and Egypt 	2017–2020	Annual pledges, e.g. EUR 35 M in 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Conditions for inclusive transition and sustainable peace in Syria Dignified life for affected populations in Syria and improved conditions for the safe return of refugees and IDPs in stabilized areas Dignified life for Syrian refugees and host-community affected populations in Syria's neighbouring countries Sustained stability and resilience of communities in Iraq, enabling IDPs and refugees to return
Myanmar			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under military rule since independence from the British in 1948 and until recent years Cyclone Nargis and referendum for new constitution in 2008 Aung San Suu Kyi with the NLD party won a landslide victory in 2015 Escalation of violence in 2017; 700,000 refugees to Bangladesh Civil war continues; Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, but not all parties signed, daily clashes continue, a call for new measures in 2018 	2016–2019	EUR 34M	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Good forest governance / Climate resilience Sustained peace and improved democratic governance / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups Quality education for all / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups

4.2 Volumes and channels of assistance

As set out in section 3.2, Country Strategies cover assistance provided by Regional Departments to partner countries. To understand the full range of Finnish co-operation in the five contexts, the evaluation analysed statistical data provided by MFA (MFA 2019b) covering the period 2012–2018 (the latest year for which data is available). Key points include:

- A comparatively high number of disbursements (*maksatukset*) per year/per aid modality, with 1252 separate disbursements across the five contexts 2012–2018 (an average of 179 per year). The highest number of disbursements per year passed through Finnish NGOs (725 disbursements 2012–2018);
- The highest volumes of aid to the five contexts passed through multilateral organisations as earmarked assistance; with 61% of assistance 2012–2018 distributed through this modality (see section 2.2). The main multilateral recipients over the period in the five contexts were the World Bank Group, the World Food Programme and the UN's Office for Project Services.

The highest volumes of aid to the five contexts passed through multilateral organisations



- The ‘top ten’ recipients of Finnish assistance in the five contexts comprise of 6 multilateral organisations and one Finnish NGO, Finn Church Aid, the Finnish Red Cross and the Embassies of Finland, which manage Funds for Local Co-operation, a small grants schemes.
- The highest volumes of assistance 2012–2018 were provided to Afghanistan (EUR 174.94 million), followed by Syria/Iraq (EUR 141.64 million) and Somalia (EUR 93.08 million). Myanmar received EUR 53 million over the period, and oPt EUR 60 million.
- Disbursements in the five contexts were highest for Government & Civil Society (EUR 134 million 2012–2018) and Emergency Response (EUR 119 million over the same period). Health, education and reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation consumed between EUR 41.6m (education) and EUR 48.68m (health) over the period. Administrative costs of donors consumed EUR 25.2m over the period.

Just over 57% of total ODA to the five contexts was delivered by relevant Regional Departments within the Country Strategy approach

Overall, across the country contexts, just over 57% of total ODA was delivered by relevant Regional Departments within the Country Strategy approach, with 43% delivered outside the approach. Proportions varied per context, however, with the majority of assistance to oPt, Afghanistan and Myanmar being channelled from Regional Departments, while, for Somalia and Syria/Iraq, the majority was channelled through other MFA departments.

Over the period 2012–2018, the percentage of ODA delivered by Regional Departments to the five contexts through multilateral systems ranged from 99% of assistance to Afghanistan provided by the Department for the Americas and Asia; to 59% in oPt by the Department for Africa and the Middle East (Table 4):

Table 4 Volumes and channels of assistance through Regional Departments

	A: Proportion of ODA channelled to country concerned through Regional Departments 2012–2018 (%)	Proportion of A provided through Regional Department to multilateral organisations (%)	Proportion of A provided to Finnish NGOs (%)	Proportion of ODA channelled to country concerned through other MFA departments 2012–2018 (%)
Afghanistan	69	99	1	31
Myanmar	77	69	19	23
oPt	77	59	2	23
Somalia	40	95	2	60
Syria/Iraq	24	79	14	76

The following sections describe the role of the Country Strategy in supporting Finland’s achievements in the five fragile contexts.



5 Evaluation findings

5.1 Relevance

Summary narrative

Finland's Country Strategies in the five fragile contexts were designed through diverse processes and have served various – though mainly internally-focused – uses. Awareness of the Country Strategy existed mostly internally.

Strategic priorities for Country Strategies were aligned with – but not determined by – conflict and fragility factors. Despite explicit MFA guidance for working in fragile contexts, the analytical basis of Country Strategies in terms of conflict and fragility was weak.

Programmatic assistance was well-aligned with both national strategies and plans, and with the needs of direct beneficiaries and national authorities. However, Country Strategies provided little guidance to programme partners on how to ensure appropriate targeting. Policy dialogue priorities, and issues raised by more informal consultations, were appropriate to context in all cases, with an appropriate focus on statebuilding elements, though not usually informed by headquarter-level multilateral agency influencing plans.

In highly volatile environments, Finland's programmatic assistance has showed some adaptation to conditions over time. However, the Country Strategy approach has further potential to play a key role in supporting this adaptive capacity.

In fragile contexts, constrained access due to security challenges often limits visibility over the operating terrain. Key ingredients of ensuring relevance include: A sound analytical basis (or at minimum awareness of the drivers of conflict and fragility in the context); alignment with direct beneficiary and key stakeholder needs; the adoption of conflict and fragility-sensitive approaches; and adaptation when conditions change (OECD 2016; MFA 2014). This section of the evaluation assessed the role of the Country Strategy in supporting the relevance of Finland's assistance through these elements.

5.1.1 Country Strategy design and use

Design processes: Country Strategy design processes were diverse. In, Somalia and Syria/Iraq, time pressure meant rapid development. In Myanmar, the formulation of the Country Strategy was initiated simultaneously with re-prioritising Finland's long-term development cooperation countries in Asia (MFA October 2019; interview). By contrast, in oPt, a lengthy design process was guided by human rights assessment and a preparatory study, which included consultations with stakeholders. In Afghanistan, the White Paper status meant that Parliamentary approval was required.

Country Strategy design processes were diverse



Strategic choices: Rationales for Finland’s strategic choices stemmed from three main foci: 1. DPP priorities, which provide the governing rationales for Finnish engagement in all countries (see sections 0 and 5.3.3); 2. National/international strategies and plans, if relevant (see section 5.1.4); and 3. Finland’s existing portfolio in the contexts (MFA October and November 2019 interviews). In Myanmar, the Country Strategy and some choices for intervention funding informed each other through an iterative process (see Volume 2: Myanmar Case Study).

- In Afghanistan, for example, the White Paper’s impact areas of improved justice, security, good governance and human rights, improved basic public services, and a diversified economic base are geared to the international community’s goals in the country.
- In oPt, impact areas of (1) Palestinian children’s right to equitable and quality education and (2) Strengthened resilience in vulnerable areas were selected based on Finland’s existing portfolio and the National Policy Agenda of the Palestinian Authority.
- In Syria/Iraq, the Strategy was developed around an existing ‘legacy’ portfolio of interventions, and was understood as a transitional mechanism to guide a new regional approach for Finland’s engagement.
- In Somalia, where the Country Strategy experienced a rapid preparation process, the selected impact areas (statebuilding and women and girls’ rights) were largely framed around existing interventions.

Uses and functions of Country Strategies: Fieldwork and interviews conducted for the evaluation found a range of actualised (as opposed to intended) uses of the Country Strategy in their respective contexts (Box 1):

Box 1 Country Strategy uses

Internally-facing

- As an internal strategic guide for bilateral assistance provided by Regional Departments (all five contexts)
- For internal management and accountability (oPt, Myanmar, Somalia and Syria/Iraq)

Externally-facing

- To confirm/legitimise financing choices made (Myanmar, oPt, Somalia)
- To articulate Finland’s position/inform formal policy dialogue (oPt, Somalia, Syria/Iraq)
- (For Afghanistan specifically): To provide the Finnish Parliament with updates on Finland’s support to Afghanistan

The main awareness and knowledge of the respective Country Strategies was vested in MFA stakeholders

Limited external knowledge of some Country Strategy documents: Other than in Myanmar and oPt, the main awareness and knowledge of the respective Country Strategies (including the White Paper in Afghanistan) was vested in MFA stakeholders. Only a few stakeholders outside MFA knew of its existence; and across all five contexts, even fewer were aware of its content (see Volume 2: Case Studies).



5.1.2 Analytical basis of Country Strategies

A sound analytical base is essential for ensuring that the Country Strategy and Finland's broader programming are well-grounded in knowledge of the operating conditions. *'Analysis of the root causes of fragility, conflict, risks and capacities is fundamental to identifying and prioritising responses that will contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and strengthen resilience to risk.'* (OECD 2016).

Guidance framework for analysis which lacks attention to fragility/conflict: Both the 2014 Fragile States Policy (MFA 2014) and the 2016 Country Strategy guidelines (2016a) emphasise the importance of a robust analytical basis to inform design. The 2016 Country Strategy Guidelines recognise the potential capacity limitations of Finland in conducting its own analysis, (also recognised in OECD 2016), proposing that Finland take *'...full advantage of existing political socio-economic /environmental/sustainable development, conflict and human rights analyses'* by other actors. It lists a range of analytical parameters to consider, including political stability, democracy, economic growth, environment, food security, public services, etc. (MFA 2016a). However, beyond a generalised list of 'democracy, governance and corruption' it does not propose analysis of the drivers of conflict/fragility. Guidance for the 2020 Country Strategy requests an update of the 2019 PEA (MFA 2020b).

A weak strategic analytical basis for conflict/fragility: Perhaps accordingly, of the five Country Strategies examined for this evaluation, four lack grounding in conflict/fragility analysis. All refer to the main high-level fragility factors in the context – for example, in the case of oPt, Israeli occupation, Palestinian political divisions, and lack of progress in the peace process. However, only Afghanistan, within the White Paper, provides a more substantive analytical basis, discussing the weak security context; the risks of increased terrorism and extremist movements; and the extreme political fragility.

Moreover, only the Syria/Iraq regional strategy made use of the extensive range of conflict and fragility assessments available in the context (see Volume 2: Syria/Iraq Case Study). Elsewhere, assessments such as those conducted by the World Bank, United Nations (UN) assistance missions, or those of other key bilateral or multilateral actors were not applied in Country Strategy design (see Volume 2: Case Studies for examples).

Finland did, however, require the production of Political Economy Analyses (PEAs) as part of its Country Strategy guidance (MFA 2016a) – in line with the recommendations of international guidance (OECD 2016). Accordingly, PEAs were produced for Myanmar, oPt, Somalia and Syria/Iraq Strategies in 2018. But other than for oPt, these were produced subsequent to the Country Strategies themselves and are highly variable in depth and scope. As internal documents, they are potentially less constrained than the externally available Country Strategies; yet, only those for Myanmar and oPt provide detailed analysis of key conflict and fragility factors in the environment and assess potential consequences for Finland's programming. For Somalia, for example, the PEA does not reference or consider conflict or fragility at the regional or local level, despite the centrality of these dynamics in Somalia's ongoing instability (de Waal 2017); similarly, the PEA for Syria/Iraq did not adopt a regional scope.

Within the Strategies themselves, political sensitivities play a role – in Myanmar and oPt, for example, the publication/labelling of 'fragility/conflict/human rights analysis' could potentially expose Finland to considerable political sensitivities. In Myanmar, moreover, not all areas of the country are affected by conflict/fragility. Nonetheless, the importance – as reflected in national and international guidance – of a sound analytical base for strategic planning is not borne out by the Country Strategies examined here.

The importance of a sound analytical base for strategic planning was not borne out by the five Country Strategies examined



Partial generation of conflict and fragility analysis by partners: A common statement by MFA interlocutors, and borne out by other evaluations (Zetter et al 2019), is that, as a comparatively small international actor, Finland depends on the conflict and fragility assessments produced by its extensive network of implementing partners. But there is no formal requirement in its partnership arrangements with civil society (MFA 2017), UN agencies or other partners, to ensure that interventions are informed by conflict/fragility analysis.

Conflict and fragility analysis conducted by implementing partners was often high-quality and informative

Nonetheless, evidence from across the evaluation found the production of some form of analysis in the majority of initiatives. Desk analysis of projects (subsequently validated by fieldwork) found that for the 56 for which information was available, 27 (or just under half, 48%) contained a discrete conflict/fragility analysis, while a further 14, or 25%, had developed a partial analysis. Field study validated these findings, noting that where conflict and fragility analysis was conducted by implementing partners – particularly CSOs – these were often high-quality and informative (Box 2).

Box 2 Implementing partner fragility/conflict analysis

In Myanmar, the CMI project design “Unlocking peace potential through the security sector” includes an elaborate context and conflict analysis conducted in 2018. Similarly, International IDEA presented a comprehensive situation analysis, which elaborates on several key points related to fragility, in its project proposal for the MyConstitution initiative in 2018.

In Somalia, the World Bank-managed Multi Partner Fund, to which Finland contributes, conducted a detailed and specific fragility/conflict analysis, including analysis of dynamics at local and regional level in the country which stresses the importance of the clan system in conflict and fragility factors.

Recognition of conflict and fragility within strategic-level risk assessments: The extreme volatility of fragile and conflict environments requires detailed attention to risk (ICAI, 2015, OECD 2016), as Finland’s guidance for working in fragile contexts, and new Guidance for Country Strategies, attest (MFA 2014, 2020). At strategic level, all Country Strategies are accompanied by a risk assessment, which have been updated annually. In most cases, these provide a summary of risks related to conflict and fragility, though these are generalised (e.g. ‘corruption’) rather than specific. Probability and impact ratings (high-medium-low), are provided, as well as mitigation measures, though these are also often generalised and do not identify the envisaged risks to programming.

Under the new Country Strategy guidance (MFA 2020a), risk systems are more developed, including a requirement to identify the causes and potential consequences of the risk, as well intended risk treatment (MFA 2020a). The new guidance also identifies three main categories of risk (strategic, operative and financial). It does not yet specify political or conflict/fragility-related risks. As MFA does not yet have a fully institution-wide Risk Policy or strategy, the guidance relates therefore to Country Strategies (and assistance which falls within these) alone.

Project and programme risk assessments mostly focused on technical/implementation issues: Reflecting the earlier strategic gaps in the risk framework, above, at implementation level (and for CSOs, doubtless as a result of MFA funding requirements (MFA 2017)), the majority of initiatives (46/54 or 83%) included a risk assessment. However, many focused purely on technical or implementation issues, rather than considering conflict- or fragility-related risks. Mitigating strategies were not necessarily included nor were comprehensive when they were present. MFA did not verify presence or utility of risk assessments, in line with the trust-



based approach adopted to its development co-operation (see also OECD 2017; MFA 2015a; MFA 2017b; Zetter et al 2019). Partners interviewed across the evaluation demonstrated mostly close knowledge of risks and challenges in specific operating contexts but reflected the focus in documentation on technical or implementation risks (interviews).

5.1.3 Adoption of conflict and fragility-sensitive approaches

Strategic choices aligned with, but not explicitly shaped, by conflict/fragility factors: Finland's strategic choices – reflected in its impact areas – aligned with the (limited) diagnosis of conflict and fragility available in all five Country Strategies. However, as noted in section 4.2, the rationales for these choices were shaped mostly by Finland's pre-existing portfolio and priorities in the context, as well as DPP priorities. They were not based on a detailed diagnostic of needs, mapped against Finland's comparative advantages in the context. In Somalia, for example, the two selected impact areas of women and girls' rights and statebuilding (articulated through a focus on capacity strengthening and Public Financial Management Reform) undoubtedly respond in general terms to needs in Somalia. However, these originated mainly in Finland's own previous and ongoing portfolio, rather than from a detailed analysis of Somalia's needs, and where Finland is best placed to contribute (MFA 2019 October interview). Similarly, in Syria/Iraq, the regional strategy reflects both Finland's legacy portfolio in the context, and Finland's commitments to the Syria crisis response within the European Union and multilateral frameworks (see section 5.1.1). In oPt, the focus on education arises from Finland's long partnership in the sector, dating back to 1995.

Finland's strategic choices aligned with the (limited) diagnosis of conflict and fragility available in all five Country Strategies

Little anticipation of the potential effects of conflict/fragility on strategic choices: Moreover, in Myanmar, oPt, Somalia and Syria/Iraq, Country Strategies lack a clear articulation of the anticipated *effects* of fragility and conflict in the context on Finland's strategic choices. For example: In Somalia, the Country Strategy does not signal the conflict- and fragility-sensitive response required for 'statebuilding' and 'women and girls' rights', and how the political landscape and settlement of Somalia, including elections over the period, might shape and affect these areas over time. In oPt, the Country Strategy did not specifically define the resilience emphasis under Impact Area 2, nor how this would potentially unfold amid fragile and (potentially) conflict conditions. By contrast, in Afghanistan, the White Paper is explicit on the need for a realistic approach in the light of fragility and conflict factors, including the importance of realism about the delays and obstacles inherent in implementation of development programmes, the need to adapt goals to the prevailing conditions, and the inevitability of a slow and risky pace of progress

Programmatic adaptation to findings from conflict and fragility analysis: The majority of projects analysed (35/53 for which information was available, or 66%) showed at least partial recognition of conflict and fragility dynamics in their design, with specific links identified between design features and fragility assessments and analyses conducted. Fieldwork verified these findings, and moreover identified some strong examples of where project and programme-level conflict and fragility analysis informed more strategic aspects of MFA's work, including policy dialogue/informal consultations. For example, in Myanmar, the IFRC and Conflict Sensitivity Analysis of the Finnish Government's Contribution to the UN FAO's REDD+ intervention (FCG International, 2019) informed discussion between the MFA and implementing organisations and found its way into project proposals and reports (MFA 2019 October interviews).

However, such examples were the exception, with most conflict and fragility analysis, particularly among CSO partners, being utilised mainly to inform individualised initiatives. Moreover, given the extremely limited external awareness of the respective Country Strategies beyond MFA, there were no clear links identified between project and programme conflict analysis/design features, and Country Strategies.



5.1.4 Alignment to beneficiary needs

'Needs' in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – as for other humanitarian and development settings – are highly diverse. They range from the needs of affected populations and other direct beneficiaries requiring humanitarian and development assistance, to those of civil society, government and other institutions, which may need support for capacity strengthening and institution-building.

For the latter, theory and practice in the field of planning and programming in fragile situations emphasises the importance of a systems-building approach, focused on the adoption of medium-term partnerships to build policy and strategy frameworks, improve capacities and strengthen ownership (OECD 2016; Ingram and Papoulidis 2018). For the former, the advent of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals has prioritised those 'left behind', namely neglected population groups and geographical areas (OECD 2016).

None of the five Country Strategies contained or reference comprehensive needs analysis

Limited needs analysis in the Country Strategy and consequently limited strategic direction to partners: In common with the limited fragility analysis, above, the evaluation found that none of the five Country Strategies contained or reference comprehensive needs analysis, either of direct beneficiary needs or capacity needs of government or other stakeholders, even where this was part of the planned impact areas and programme strategies. Country Strategies in oPt and Somalia, for example, focus on institutional capacity building in education and public financial management respectively. But neither Strategy provides or references capacity

assessments of the relevant national structures and systems.

Similarly, beneficiary analyses are largely broad-brush. The Syria/Iraq Country Strategy does not include a review of beneficiary needs though Finland has access to a large body of needs assessment from national and international partners working on the regional crisis response. In Somalia, the diverse needs of member states – whether governance or population-related – are not referenced, although these are diverse across the country. The Country Strategy approach therefore provided little strategic direction to partners on targeting, whether in terms of direct support to beneficiaries, or strategic/technical support to governments. Subsequent PEA and Situation Analyses do not address this gap.

Limited disaggregation of needs: For population-based beneficiaries of Finland's assistance in fragile contexts, albeit indirectly, disaggregation of needs is a fundamental part of Finland's human rights-based approach (MFA 2013a; MFA 2014). Within all five Country Strategies, the single area where disaggregation was definitively included is women and girls, cascading directly down from DPP priorities (section o).

However, the categorisation is limited to these broad-brush categories. Other categories of vulnerability – which may be strongly present in the context – are not reflected in Country Strategies. For example, in Somalia, while women and girls are certainly highly disadvantaged (see e.g. UNICEF (2019); UNDP (2019)), two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) face extreme vulnerability, as do several minority ethnic groups, who are not recognised by Government of Somalia (see e.g. Osman 2018). These groups are not mentioned in the Country Strategy. In oPt, the Country Strategy lacks analysis of the needs of camp-based refugees – one of the most vulnerable population groups in the context (e.g. UNCT oPt 2016).

These findings cohere with a meta-evaluation of Finland's human rights based approach in projects and programmes (MFA 2018e) which found that a majority of analysed projects identify 'vulnerable groups' without a diagnosis of what leads to vulnerability and how the intervention will impact them (see also Silvestrini et al 2018 and Topper et al 2018 on the lack of clarity around



concepts of vulnerability and inequality). In fragile situations, such analysis requires attention to conflict and fragility factors (section 5.1.2).

Analytical gap between needs analysis and programme strategies: Accordingly, at aggregate (Country Strategy) level, beyond the broad strategic direction to prioritise ‘women and girls’, the evaluation found frequent analytical ‘gaps’ undermining the intended justification for some areas of proposed programming. For example, in Somalia, the Country Strategy provides some data on the generalised conditions of women and girls in the country. But it does not present analysis or data to support the case for applying Finnish support to target the needs of victims of gender-based violence and women’s and girls’ rights within health, and particularly sexual and reproductive health.

Extensive availability of project/programme-level needs analysis: Despite this lack of direction from within Country Strategies, funded programmes and projects conducted extensive needs assessments of both direct beneficiaries and capacity needs where appropriate. For direct beneficiaries, the majority of relevant projects and programmes disaggregated needs by vulnerable group, as Table 5 shows (see also examples in Box 3):

Table 5 Needs analysis in projects

Total number of projects for which data available	Detailed needs analysis	Partial needs analysis	Detailed disaggregation	Partial disaggregation
53	33 (62%)	15 (28)	27 (51%)	13 (25%)

Box 3 Needs analysis in projects

In Afghanistan, projects financed under the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund have to meet World Bank standards. Consequently, the quality and evidence-base of needs assessment is high for education (EQUIP/EQRA) and community driven development (NSP/CC).

Fifteen of 17 examined projects in Syria/Iraq included some form of disaggregation by gender and/or vulnerable group, depending on the project scope. For example, World Bank, European Union and the programmes of United Nations organisations had disaggregated by vulnerable group in their supporting assessments, design and allocation of resources.

In Myanmar, the Save the Children Best Start project distinguishes specific groups of people, including children from ethnolinguistic minority communities, and children with disabilities. The target group is disaggregated also by gender.

Beyond the Country Strategy, humanitarian assistance provided by Finland to either UN agencies or (less usually) CSOs mostly relied on either CSOs’ own needs assessments or, for the UN, Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) conducted by UNOCHA and individual agencies. Humanitarian projects analysed for the evaluation, for example in Somalia and Syria/Iraq, found that Finland had generally applied these analyses in making its funding decisions. However, partners interviewed indicated that they are not required to report to MFA on this, though reports showed presence of such disaggregation around vulnerability categories.



Field study also highlighted some of the complexities around the balancing of external actors' priorities for needs, and national dynamics related to conflict and fragility:

- In Myanmar, in the Rakhine area, internal displacement and statelessness are main factors of social and economic vulnerability and insecurity among hundreds of thousands of people. While some IDP camps no longer exist, people are still not free to move. This makes it difficult for external actors to ensure alignment of assistance to beneficiary needs.
- In Afghanistan, some tensions arose between Finland's prioritisation of women and girls as a category for priority targeting, and the rationales for two projects. In a UNESCO adult literacy project, for example, Finland viewed positively the large number of women participating- due to its prioritisation of gender corporately. But this stood in contrast to government partners, who viewed the main target group prioritised as young men, due to high levels of unemployment and links to potential radicalisation. Similarly, in a counter-migration project, Finland set targets for the inclusion of women and disabled people, when the group most likely to migrate is in fact young and able-bodied men.

Few examples were identified of Finnish-led needs analysis informing wider sectoral or national strategic or programmatic choices. One exception was in Myanmar, where the Finnish Environment Institute carried out a Needs Assessment for the Effective Implementation of the Environmental Conservation Law in Myanmar (Hildén et al., 2016). This highly valued process had potential for use as a general framework for channelling donor support to the sector environmental governance and forests in Myanmar – even though Finland itself subsequently decided not to enter the sector (see Volume 2: Myanmar Case Study).

Project and programme-level designs clearly applied needs assessments produced

Use of analysis to inform programmatic targeting: Also, despite the lack of strategic direction provided by the Country Strategy, project and programme-level designs clearly applied needs assessments produced. Of 53 projects for which information was available, 48, or 90%, had explicitly applied the needs analysis produced, e.g. targeting identified vulnerable groups.

Specific vulnerable groups targeted by Finnish interventions under the five Country Strategies included:

- IDPs in Somalia, Syria/Iraq and Myanmar
- Victims of Gender Based Violence in Myanmar, Syria/Iraq and Somalia
- The needs of area C, Gaza and East Jerusalem in oPt
- Vulnerable ethnic groups in Myanmar
- Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries

However, NGOs and UN agencies largely targeted different vulnerabilities according to their mandate or speciality, rather than being directed more cohesively by the Country Strategy. Thus, Finland's targeting of vulnerabilities appears somewhat scattered across the five Country Strategies.

Consistent attention to gender within project designs but little presence of other crosscutting objectives: Gender (largely in the sense of recognising gender dimensions or 'including/targeting women and girls' (see MFA 2017b) received the most prominent attention within project designs across the five contexts, with little attention to climate change and non-discrimination:



- Analysis of 56 projects with information available found that 45 of these (81%) partially or fully recognised the importance of targeting at least one of these issues in design, though almost all were focused on gender.
- Fewer projects made explicit links to Finland’s Crosscutting Objectives in their own project or programme design and results frameworks, however, with just 19 (49%) of the 39 projects for which data is available, doing so.

However, gender was frequently treated as ‘including women and girls’ in terms of access, e.g. to Sexual and Reproductive Health services, rather than on empowering them to demand their rights to such services.

Non-discrimination and climate change received little attention within project designs, as identified by other studies (see Silvestrini et al 2018). However, in Myanmar, Finland adopted a progressive approach to disability within informal consultations with the government (see section 5.2.2). For climate change, only a forestry initiative in Myanmar, conducted under Impact area 1, and a water-related project in OPT (Gaza) reflected these concerns, along with Water Productivity and Climate Resilience initiatives conducted under the very broad Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to which Finland contributes.

5.1.5 Alignment to national stakeholder needs

The importance of aligning behind national conflict reduction or reconstruction plans is highlighted both in international and Finnish guidance for working in fragile contexts (OECD 2016; MFA 2014). The principle of strengthened local ownership is emphasised in the Fragile States Policy (MFA 2014).

Contextual nuances in the five contexts highlight the importance of a nuanced approach to ‘alignment’ and ‘ownership’ however:

- There is no formal bilateral dialogue with governments in Myanmar or Syria/Iraq, with this role adopted in Myanmar by multilateral agencies including the EU.
- For Syria/Iraq, Finland does not have bilateral relations with the Government of Syria, nor bilateral cooperation agreements with Lebanon or Jordan. It did not have a permanent diplomatic presence in Iraq until 2019; and in Turkey, programmes on Syria crisis-related activities occur through the European Union.
- In oPt, the Palestinian Authority has limited authority to work in Area C and Gaza and no authority in East Jerusalem, meaning that coverage here takes place through multilateral and CSO support.

Country strategies strongly aligned with national strategies and plans:

Other than in Myanmar, where the national development plan came into force after the Country Strategy had been developed (Government of Myanmar 2018), Finland’s Country Strategies are strongly aligned with relevant national (or international) frameworks in place at the time. Mostly, given the breadth and scope of these plans, Finland’s respective Country Strategies articulate a focus on specific areas (Table 6):

Finland’s Country Strategies were strongly aligned with relevant national (or international) frameworks in place at the time



Table 6 Alignment with relevant national/international strategies and plans

OPt	The Country Strategy is geared to statebuilding, with a focus on governance reform and service delivery. It is aligned with the priorities of the Palestinian NPA; the EU political framework of the 2-state solution, and the “European Joint Strategy in support of oPt 2017–2020”. The CS supports the Joint Strategy to reduce geographical fragmentation (through supporting Area C, Gaza and East Jerusalem).
Somalia	The Country Strategy is fully aligned to the National Development Plan 2017–2019, noting that Finland focused its efforts on two key areas: Building of effective and efficient institutions, and Social and human development.
Afghanistan	The White Paper frames support between Finland and the Government of Afghanistan’s National Priority Programmes, which are supported by the international community.
Syria/Iraq	The Strategy is aligned with the strategies and plans of the UN such as annual Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans.

Alignment with relevant national/international performance monitoring frameworks was less comprehensive: those for the oPt and Somalia frameworks were broadly aligned (though in Somalia, given the breadth of the national framework, non-alignment would have been challenging); while that for Afghanistan was only partially aligned, comprising a mix of Finnish and national priorities, requiring a somewhat artificial reframing of initiatives.

Strong programmatic alignment with relevant strategies and plans: The vast majority of Finnish-funded projects and programmes in the five countries were well-aligned (or partially aligned) with key relevant sectoral-level strategies and plans; and a majority were aligned with Country Strategies’ articulated priorities vis-à-vis partner policies and plans (Table 7):

Table 7 Programmatic alignment with national priorities and plans

Total number of projects for which data available	Fully aligned with partner policies and plans (partner country, UN, as appropriate)	Partially aligned with partner policies and plans (partner country, UN, as appropriate)	Fully aligned with Country Strategy priorities re: partner policies and plans (partner country, UN, as appropriate)	Partially aligned with Country Strategy priorities re: partner policies and plans (partner country, UN, as appropriate)
59	51 (86%)	2 (3%)		
52			32 (62%)	8 (16%)
Examples:				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Afghanistan, Finland is explicit in its support for trust funds as an essential mechanism enabling government to implement its own programs. The main trust fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to which Finland contributes, targets National Priority Programmes within five focus areas. It is therefore highly relevant to government needs. In OPt, both in the education and resilience sector the programmes support the implementation of national plans. In Myanmar, Finland’s key interventions all align with the sectoral plans in gender, forestry and education particularly. 				

The Country Strategy approach played little tangible influence in shaping alignment with national stakeholder needs

But, limited role of the Country Strategy in shaping programmatic alignment with national stakeholder needs: However, overall, the Country Strategy approach played ‘little tangible influence in shaping this alignment’. As section 4.2 explains, for Myanmar, Somalia, oPt and Syria/Iraq, many programmes managed by the Regional Department had begun before the Country Strategy was developed. With few stakeholders aware of the Strategy (section 4.2), ‘alignment’



was determined by implementing partners as they saw fit, rather than being driven by the Country Strategy. For Afghanistan, by contrast, the White Paper is based on international agreements in existence since 2002 and a largely stable portfolio.

Programmatic co-ordination with national systems and structures where feasible:

The principle of national ownership reflected in the Fragile States Policy (MFA 2014) is most tangibly reflected in delivery through, or in co-ordination with, national systems and structures. The evaluation found efforts by Finnish assistance to co-ordinate in this way where feasible. In Afghanistan, for example, directing a large majority of assistance through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ensured full integration with (as far as feasible) national structures and systems. Even under more difficult conditions, efforts were made: In Somalia, the Finland-supported Multi-Partner Fund was fully aligned with national financial and service delivery systems across government. In Syria/Iraq, Finland aligns its assistance through UN frameworks for the regional response.

Relevant policy dialogue priorities/themes for informal consultations: Finally, the policy dialogue priorities listed in section 2.2 provide a central opportunity to influence broader policy and political discussions, both formally and informally where appropriate. All five Country Strategies confirm the relevance of these priorities and apply/interpret them as specific for context. Statebuilding is a particular focus (Table 8):

Table 8 Relevant policy dialogue priorities/ themes for informal consultation

Afghanistan	Policy dialogue priorities included as a priority women and girls and were realised principally through participation in the ARTF Strategy Group. Finland's contribution of EUR 10 million per year affords it the opportunity to influence strategic and development policy decisions within the fund.
Myanmar	In the absence of direct bilateral policy dialogue, Finland uses sector co-ordination groups and individual interventions via (or through) the Embassy to influence government reform agendas and legislation. This includes advocating on gender with the Ministry of Social Welfare; and engaging on the inclusive education agenda on behalf of children with disabilities.
OPt	Finland's policy dialogue priorities with the Palestinian Authority, which are directly linked with Country Strategy impact areas and outcomes, include advocating for a peaceful two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including dialogue with Israel. In 2017 the MFA developed a 'Plan for Policy Dialogue in Support of Finland's Development Cooperation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory' and has developed a plan and a report on policy dialogue in the education sector.
Somalia	Finland's two main policy dialogue priorities are: Gender – women's and girls' rights and particularly within health, and Statebuilding. These align with the National Development Plan are appropriate priorities, though the case is not clearly made within the Country Strategy for Finland's comparative advantages here.
Syria/Iraq	Five strategic themes for political advocacy, design and through multilateral engagements: (i) Promoting inclusiveness of the peace and dialogue processes; (ii) Women's political participation and attention to their specific needs in conflict response; (iii) Further development of the concept of resilience and strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus; (iv) The special needs and rights and the protection of vulnerable groups, especially persons with disabilities in the conflict response; (iv) The innovative role of the private sector in bringing new solutions to the humanitarian and resilience challenges and in creating jobs

These priorities concern broad substantive issues in the context; they do not reference Finland's Multilateral Influencing Plans for individual agencies. The effectiveness of policy dialogue undertaken is discussed in section 5.2.



5.1.6 Adaptation over time

High-level policy frameworks which support adaptive capacity: Remaining ‘relevant’ over the duration of a four-year Country Strategy, in fragile contexts which require highly flexible and responsive approaches (MFA 2014; OECD 2016) is inherently challenging. As a comparatively ‘fixed’ document, to what extent has the Country Strategy approach supported the adaptation of Finnish co-operation in fragile contexts, and to what extent has it successfully remained relevant itself?

Highly dynamic operating environments: The five contexts can take this sub-clause out are highly dynamic and unpredictable, as Table 3 above summarises. Specific features include (Table 9):

Table 9 Features of fragility

Afghanistan	Stability declined since 2005, with no reduction in fragility overall and worsening conflict and violence.
Myanmar	Tensions between civilian and military government continue, resulting in upsurges of violence; and events in northern Rakhine State since October 2016 resulted in a vast influx of refugees fleeing the country into Bangladesh after the escalation of violence; effects on national governance.
OPt	The current Israeli-Palestinian political situation remains deadlocked, while the ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip and recurrent outbreaks of high levels of violence, ensure ongoing fragility.
Syria and Iraq	Both experiencing periods of active conflict and upheaval, with consequent refugee flows from Syria having a major effect on the surrounding countries, compounded by internal political challenges in e.g. Jordan and Lebanon.
Somalia	Statebuilding still incipient – Conflict continues, and security threats (mainly from Al Shabaab) increasing. Political settlement not yet fully ‘worked through’ in terms of resource and power-sharing between the federal government and member states. Tensions between the federal government and some states increasing.

Country Strategy documents varied relevance over time: Have had varied relevance over the period, as documents, have remained static over time. Depending on events in the context, however, their relevance has varied over the period.

In Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq, the high-level priorities articulated in the Strategy (see Table 3) ensured their ongoing relevance. In oPt, the two main impact areas (Children’s rights to equitable and quality education/resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas) remained relevant, although implementation under the second area was slow.

In Myanmar, two out of three impact areas retained their relevance, being well justified choices, which addressed key development challenges at the core of Myanmar’s fragile situation. However, the third, a forest governance component, lacked conceptual clarity and vision, and prove a missed opportunity for Finnish expertise. In Somalia, while the Country Strategy focused on statebuilding at central level, the ongoing development process meant a greater emphasis needed, by the end of 2019, on regional level statebuilding.

Programmatic adaptation over time: A majority 27 (67%) out of 42 interventions for which data was available) showed full or partial reorientation/adaptation to changing conditions over time. The remainder showed limited or no adaptation, though many of these were short-term (e.g. one year) interventions.



Adaptation included the following adjustments:

- *The seizing of opportunities where feasible:* Where opportunities arose, Finland's co-operation sought to seize them – though not necessarily influenced by the Country Strategy. For example, in Somalia, Finland's opportunistic grasping of the emerging Reconciliation meant that it is now a leading actor in this area (see Table 19 and Volume 2: Somalia Case Study). In Myanmar, Finland adapted to the increased relevance of the constitutional agenda since 2016 by supporting the MyConstitution project implemented by International IDEA.
- *Adapting target populations/geographical areas as evidence arose of changing needs:* Analysis found many examples of targeting adaptation over time, though these were not necessarily connected to either contributions from Finland or the Country Strategy. For example, in Afghanistan, based on longitudinal evidence of changing development indicators, UNICEF's Finland-supported education initiative re-focused on different provinces.
- *Supporting programmes with inbuilt flexibility:* Finland's assistance in the five fragile contexts also came with some 'hard-wired' flexibility in terms of programme design. For example, in OPT, the EU (and Finnish-supported) PEGASE programme had the inbuilt ability to shift its emphasis from salaries to civil servants and pensions to East Jerusalem Hospitals where needed – enabling a response to immediate and urgent needs. In Myanmar, although Finland did not change its strategic approach or its project portfolio in the wake of the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, several key projects adapted to the situation by providing additional support – or shifting existing support – to Rakhine. Additional humanitarian aid was also delivered outside the Country Strategy approach. modality. For the Syria crisis response, unearmarked funding to UN agencies in Syria allowed a geographical shift in operations if conflict flared up in an area of UN coverage.

Reorientation within existing strategic parameters is not always without its tensions, however, particularly regarding the priorities of host governments and international partners. One example was identified across the portfolio: in Afghanistan, UNICEF's WASH programme was redesigned to focus on integrated service delivery, based on evaluation findings (see Volume 2: Afghanistan Case Study). For Finland this meant a change from a project that had been specific to water, sanitation and hygiene in schools, which was classified as education, to a programme that worked across the WASH sector. This raised questions regarding continued Finnish support, since WASH in Afghanistan is not a Finnish priority.

Limited role of the Country Strategy in supporting adaptation: In all contexts, findings from across data streams clearly indicated that the Country Strategy approach, while it had provided a broad framework for relevance, had not in itself provided a vehicle for/facilitated adaptation of Regional Department-managed – or other – assistance in the contexts. Rather, in all contexts other than in Syria/Iraq, which showed evidence of a growing determinative role over time (see Volume 2: Syria/Iraq Case Study), its function was largely passive, with adaptation occurring at implementation rather than strategic level. The limited prominence of the Country Strategy approach at country level, particularly with partners, provided clear evidence of this, with no strategic or implementation partner indicating that their intervention had adjusted to context with reference to, or because of, the Country Strategy. Moreover, few partners or MFA staff were familiar with the 2014 guidelines for working in fragile contexts, which strongly advocate for flexibility.

The Country Strategy function in supporting adaptation was largely passive

Unsupportive financial systems for adaptive capacity: Finally, a repeatedly raised constraint was the limited perceived adaptive capacity of Finland's financial systems for its development co-operation. Under MFA systems (see MFA 2016c) pre-programming – as well as indi-



A repeatedly raised constraint was the limited perceived adaptive capacity of Finland's financial systems for its development co-operation

vidual programme approval – is required on an annual basis, leaving limited scope to respond to urgent needs or shifts as they arise. While adaptation is not completely unfeasible – as evidenced in the Myanmar adaptation to respond to the Rohingya crisis, above – project partners provided several examples of where adaptation was needed but could not be provided. These occurred both within and outside development co-operation provided by Regional Departments. Finland does not have contingency funds in projects, nor a Flexibility fund such that available under the Swedish co-operation system (OECD 2019b). This gap was challenged by partners given the volatile operating conditions in the five contexts, where needs can change on a daily basis.

5.2 Effectiveness

Summary narrative

Despite some technical weaknesses and a lack of incorporation of conflict and fragility indicators, RBM procedures were mostly applied across the Country Strategy approach, adding value to the Country Strategy as a corporate process. There were significant weaknesses in availability and quality of results data. The appropriateness of linear RBM approaches in fragile contexts was questioned.

Patchy results were delivered against Country Strategy impact areas, with interventions delivering 'baskets' of individualised results rather than contributing cohesively to clear MFA goals in the context. Results on cross-cutting areas mostly focused on the inclusion of women and girls in interventions. Positive results were achieved in policy dialogue and informal consultations, with Finland generating a reputation as a principled donor on human rights and gender. Portfolios delivered some limited contributions to reduced fragility – but with many caveats and few linkages to the Country Strategy approach.

Despite constraints in flexibility arising from rigid financial procedures, choices and balance of aid modalities were appropriate for specific contextual needs, and Finland's choice to direct the bulk of its assistance to fragile contexts via the multilateral system was validated. The multi-bi modality also demonstrated its utility under relevant conditions.

This section of the evaluation assesses the role of the Country Strategy in supporting the delivery of results. It reviews the quality of Results Based Management frameworks and practices; the role of the Country Strategy in framing project and programme results; the results achieved for beneficiaries and key stakeholders, including those for non-discrimination and climate change; contributions to reductions in fragility; and the role of the aid modality in supporting the achievement of results.

5.2.1 Use of results-based management approaches in Country Strategies

Quality and role of Country Strategy results frameworks: Despite two rounds of updates during the Country Strategy periods, review across the five Country Strategies found common challenges in the quality and use of results frameworks, as reflected in the previous Country Strategy approach evaluation (Fölscher et al., 2016). These included:



- Weak logical aggregation, e.g. from outputs-outcomes-impacts in Afghanistan Somalia and Myanmar, and impact statements which did not logically aggregate up to provide an overarching results statement for Finland's intended achievements in the context
- Confusions over terminology, with e.g. inputs being labelled as outputs, outcome statements being insufficiently results-oriented, etc. (all five contexts)
- An excessive focus on interventions rather than results (oPt)
- Unsuitable or inappropriate higher-level indicators (Afghanistan, oPt)
- A lack of adequate considerations of assumptions, critical for fragile contexts (Somalia)
- A lack of specific targets and undefined/inexplicit intended pathways to results (Somalia)

Within sample projects for oPt and Syria/Iraq, however, the quality of results frameworks had improved over time. New Country Strategy Guidance from January 2020 also provides extensive guidance on Results Framework preparation (MFA 2020b).

Passive coherence between Country Strategy Results Frameworks and portfolio interventions: Across the five contexts, coherence between the Country Strategy results frameworks and those of portfolio projects was strong. However, this coherence arose from the mostly reactive Country Strategy formulation process described in section 4.2, with Strategies built heavily around existing initiatives. Consequently, results frameworks largely reflected the intended results of the ongoing portfolio of interventions. They did not attempt to actively gear results on the ground to common overarching objectives for Finland in the context. Moreover, given the distant connections between interventions on the ground and the Country Strategy (see section 5.1.1), and in common with the previous evaluation of the Country Strategy approach, few direct connections were evident between results achieved and the Country Strategy approach itself (see Fölscher et al 2016).

Results frameworks did not attempt to actively gear results on the ground to common overarching objectives for Finland in the context

No Country Strategy results framework includes or links to any of the broader indicators available on reducing fragility or conflict, such as those produced by the Fragile States Index or OECD (Fund for Peace 2019; OECD 2018). However, these wider indicators are those to which Finnish, as all international assistance, should be explicitly geared.

Added value of RBM reporting systems and practices: Fieldwork, interviews and desk review found the Country Strategy RBM modality well established, in that required procedures – described in section 3.4 – were being rigorously implemented. During the period of the evaluation, in addition to results framework updates, annual Country Strategy reports and management responses were prepared; as well as 2018/2019 self-assessments for all contexts except Afghanistan and associated management responses in Somalia and Syria/Iraq (see Volume 2: Case Studies). These processes added considerable value to the Country Strategy approach for stakeholders, allowing time for reflection – important for overstretched MFA staff working under demanding conditions – and a bringing together of evidence and knowledge about progress to date (MFA 2019 October-November interviews).

RBM processes added considerable value to the Country Strategy approach for stakeholders

Consistent presence of project and programme-level results frameworks: Almost all financed interventions had a results framework fully or partially in place. Due to the 'passive coherence' between Country Strategy and funded interventions, above, the majority of project and programme results frameworks analysed through desk review cohered with the relevant Country Strategy priorities for the period (Table 10):



Table 10 Project level results frameworks

Number of projects with data available	Presence of full results framework	Presence of partial results framework	Full alignment of results framework with Country Strategy/other Finnish Development Policy priorities for the period	Partial alignment of results framework with Country Strategy/other Finnish Development Policy priorities for the period
63	41 (65%)	19 (30%)		
55			37 (67%)	8 (15%)

Significant gaps were evident in the availability and quality of project and programme-level reporting

Limited availability/quality of project-level results reporting However – in common with findings from other MFA evaluations (MFA 2015d; Zetter et al 2019), significant gaps were evident in the availability and quality of project and programme-level reporting, as follows;

- Availability of results:* Analysis of interventions found only 41 sample projects for which evidence of results reporting was available. Of these, 24 (or 58%) did provide some full or partial results reporting, while 17, or 41%, lacked any results reporting at all. To an extent, such gaps arise from the country-level delivery modalities for Finnish assistance. For UN and programme-based CSO partners, much results reporting takes place through Headquarter level processes. Moreover, where initiatives are multi-donor – as commonly the case in Afghanistan, oPt and Syria/Iraq for example – or where an initiative in one country forms part of a multi-country approach, results reporting is consolidated, rather than being linked to one specific contribution or specified in a single country.
- Quality of results reporting:* Also, in common with findings from other evaluations (MFA 2015d; Fölscher et al 2016), the quality of results reporting was highly variable. Fieldwork (see Volume 2: Case Studies) found some interventions producing rigorous and comprehensive results monitoring, while in others, the results management process was still emergent/undefined. There was a high presence of activity/input-level reporting rather than a concentration on results.
- Contributions through multilateral organisations:* The majority of support delivered in fragile contexts through the Country Strategy approach, as section 4 sets out – commonly applies agencies’ own monitoring and evaluation procedures, which are of variable rigour and quality. Baseline data was not available for most interventions, and few targets were clearly defined. Tracking progress at outcome and impact level was extremely challenging in the majority of the five contexts, given their extreme volatility/dependence on changes in the political environment and the lack of robust socio-economic data over time.

Questioning of linear RBM approaches in fragile contexts: Throughout the evaluation, stakeholders consistently questioned the relevance and appropriateness for fragile contexts of MFA’s linear RBM model. Aside from internal capacity challenges, the inherent volatility and dynamism of these environments – as reflected in section 5.1.5 above – renders the setting of four-year ‘impact level’ results, and planned achievement against them, extremely difficult. This view was reflected in interviews both with MFA staff – particularly some of those working directly with the Country Strategy approach in countries – and with implementing partners. Nota-



bly, interviewees reported that in contexts such as Afghanistan, Syria/Iraq and Myanmar, other Nordic donors were moving away from linear RBM approaches.

The flexible approach adopted by Finland to results reporting, and the fact that, to date, the Country Strategy results were largely formulated around existing initiatives, helped mitigate implementing partner concerns to some degree. Going forward, however, MFA's revised Country Strategy guidance, which adopts an overarching RBM approach at strategic level, but with specific targets and indicators at programmatic level (MFA 2020b), appears well-positioned to mitigate these concerns.

5.2.2 Delivery of results for beneficiaries and other stakeholders

Varied and diverse results were generated by Finland's interventions in the five contexts. These have been assessed by the evaluation in terms of progress towards impact areas of the relevant Country Strategy. Contributions to reduced fragility are presented in section 5.2.4.

Data limitations: Sections 1.4 and 5.2.1 reference limitations in results data available. The evaluation was unable to verify/triangulate individual results through e.g. visits to individual projects, and the strong propensity to report on activities rather than results at project level (e.g. the participation of numbers of beneficiaries) constrains higher-level results reporting. Accordingly, the main evidence base applied is MFA internal reporting, triangulated with results reports from partners where available, self-assessments, and interviews with implementing partners and MFA staff.

Additionally, while it was feasible to disaggregate projects and programmes managed under the Country Strategy approach (see section 5.4), in practice, many of the results generated were achieved by initiatives delivered through other modalities (see section 5.3). Concurrently, MFA's ongoing discussions on a more comprehensive approach to the Country Strategy approach rendered it important to consider assistance beyond that delivered under Country Strategies alone.

Patchy results across impact areas: Table 11 below therefore presents summarised progress against the respective impact areas of the five Country Strategies – taking into account both initiatives delivered through the Country Strategy and beyond it, through other forms of Finnish assistance. More detail on specific results and related programming is available in Volume 2: Case Studies.

Patchy results occurred
across impact areas



Table 11 Progress against Country Strategy impact areas

Afghanistan		
Impact 1: Justice, security, good governance and human rights.	Impact 2: Improved basic public services	Impact 3: Diversified economic base
Demonstrable results in improved transparency and accountability of the Ministry of Interior payroll (LOTFA), but few results in terms of improved service delivery; few tangible results in Women, Peace and Security theme	Demonstrable results in increased access to and improved quality of education but corruption concerns (Education Quality Improvement Project); demonstrable improvements in access to family planning take-up and use (MSI) but note questionable validity	Demonstrable results under NSP/Citizen's Charter in building Community Development Councils (CDCs) to support local governance and social-economic development. Few results in livelihood initiatives due to questionable design/implementation weaknesses (GTK, SALAM initiatives)

Myanmar		
Impact 1: Forest governance	Impact 2: Democracy/ rule of law	Impact 3: Quality education
No results since the main project severely delayed.	Demonstrable results on peace building through the flagship Joint Peace Fund and Felm/EBO. Enhanced understanding of the practice of democratic governance and the implications of rule of law in Myanmar (UNDP). Few/no results on access to justice through UNDP and UNFPA on women and girls' rights	Demonstrable results in school enrolment through World Bank's "Myanmar Decentralized Funding to Schools" project; improved and strengthened education sector in conflict-affected areas through UNESCO's STEM project.

Occupied Palestinian territory	
Impact area 1: Palestinian children's right to equitable and quality education enhanced.	Demonstrable results in enrolment, teaching quality, gender equity and learning outcomes but gaps remaining in inclusive education (support to JFA for education sector)
Impact Area 2: Strengthened resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas (Area C, Gaza, East Jerusalem)	Demonstrable results in improved access to water, with 1.8 million people in Gaza acquiring access to safe water and wastewater services (though quality standards not reached). No results from support to Area C and East Jerusalem due to slow implementation (MDTF)



Somalia	
Impact Area 1: Women and girls' rights	Impact Area 2: (Statebuilding):
Demonstrable results in expanding Sexual and Reproductive Health rights to women and girls in the healthcare arena (ISF, SCI, UNFPA) with reduced maternal mortality; increased number of births assisted by skilled healthcare staff; improvements in professionalisation of midwives; reductions in GBV. Limited results in reducing FGM incidence.	Demonstrable results in improved Public Financial Management (EU Budget Support) and strengthened public administration/increased revenue (MPF). Improved education and health sector policy frameworks and capacities (MIDA FINNSOM, support to UNFPA, ISF and SCI). Some results in improving local governance through local elections and work on reconciliation (Local governance FCA/Reconciliation initiative with Ministry of Interior)

Syria/Iraq			
Impact 1: Improved conditions for inclusive transition and sustainable peace in Syria.	Impact 2: Dignified life for affected populations in Syria and improved conditions for the safe return of refugees and IDPs in stabilised areas	Impact 3: Dignified life for Syrian refugees and host-community affected populations in Syria's neighbours (largest and most sensitive component)	Impact 4: Sustained stability and resilience of communities in Iraq, enabling IDPs and refugees to return.
No results in formal negotiations but strengthened/increased use of International Impartial and Independent Mechanism for assessing violations of international law in Syria. Demonstrable results in supporting inclusive intra-Syrian dialogues and increasing the number of women participants.	Demonstrable results in humanitarian outreach, though below target due to funding constraints (UNFPA). Good results from reconstruction activities (Syria Recovery Trust Fund). Some results in education (UNICEF No Lost Generation) but overall targets not reached	Demonstrable results in supporting refugees in Turkey (EU FRIT; MADAD; Jordan-based resilience projects) and in expanding resilience interventions in the regional response (UNDP Sub-Regional Response Facility)	No evidence of results 2 million IDPs had returned to their area of origin by early 2019; over 3000 infrastructure projects initiated by the UNDP Funding for Stabilisation Facility (MFA 2018)



Positive results from policy dialogue/consultations Results from ‘policy dialogue’ in some contexts, and informal consultations in others such as Myanmar, are often intangible and frequently difficult to specify. Demonstrable results in substantive areas were nonetheless identified across all five contexts (Table 12):

Table 12 Results from policy dialogue and consultations

Gender equality	<p>Afghanistan: Finland’s co-chairing of the Resolution 1325 (on Women, Peace and Security) Working Group enabled it to facilitate talks between the United States government and the Taliban on the Resolution in 2018/19.</p> <p>Myanmar: Finland’s high profile on gender was instrumental in influencing legislation on equity of access via the Ministry of Social Welfare: Finnish support via the Eden Centre contributed to the inclusion of education for children with disability in the national education law.</p>
Social sectors	<p>oPt: Finland’s contribution to the education sector’s Joint Funding Arrangement enabled it to contribute to policy dialogue in the education sector, which had demonstrable effects on institutional capacity building in the sector.</p> <p>Somalia: Finland successfully influenced the World Bank’s Multi Partner Fund to have social workers’ salaries paid from the Fund.</p>
Environment/ climate change	<p>Myanmar: Analysis conducted by the Finnish Environmental Institute (SYKE) was instrumental in preparing the Environmental Conservation Law passed in December 2018.</p>
Peacebuilding/ reconciliation	<p>Somalia: Within Reconciliation, where Finland’s political support was considered much more important than the amount of dollars provided, Finland successfully convinced other donors, such as Sweden and Norway, to join the agenda and associated co-ordination forums.</p>

By contrast, in Syria/Iraq, several partner donors noted scope for Finland to leverage its position more politically, given its status as an independent neutral broker (see Volume 2: Syria/Iraq Case Study).

Results in policy dialogue and informal consultations were enhanced by MFA’s employment in Somalia and Myanmar particularly, of politically experienced Development Specialists

No specific linkages were found to Finland’s agency-specific multilateral influencing plans in the five environments. Results in policy dialogue and informal consultations were enhanced by MFA’s employment in Somalia and Myanmar particularly, of politically experienced Development Specialists managing the development portfolio. In complex operating environments, where separating development and political concerns is often unrealistic, this experience and expertise significantly enhanced Finland’s reputational capital. It reflected a generally held sense by partners of Finland ‘punching above its weight’ as a small donor (interviews) and reflected a widely-held perception of Finland as a principled donor, with a strong stance on HRBAs, gender and non-discrimination. However, the demands for such advisers’ expertise created extreme burdens for overstretched staff (interviews). In Syria/Iraq, for example, although an objective of the regional Strategy was to undertake policy advocacy in five areas, this was not possible due to insufficient human resourcing – constraining potential results.

Unanticipated effects: The evaluation also observed a very few unplanned effects of Finland’s interventions, both positive and negative, set out in Table 13 (though as elsewhere, these were not linked to the Country Strategy):



Table 13 Unanticipated effects

Positive	Negative
Somalia: Engaging in the Reconciliation agenda resulted in the passing of a national strategy and roadmap for the national reconciliation processes.	In Afghanistan, Finland's strong focus on women and girls in some initiatives risked distraction from vulnerable men who were at risk of violent extremism.
Myanmar: Felm unexpectedly became a mediator between UNDP and the Karen National Union, one of the two main ethnic armed groups in the country. Felm was requested to resolve a conflict between the two organisations regarding the Ridge to Reef Forest Program, which would affect a significant proportion of KNU's territory.	

Baskets of results rather than higher-level effects: In line with the dispersed approach to RBM as per section 5.2.1, results produced were largely 'baskets' of different results, generated by individual projects and programmes. Valuable in their own terms, they were nonetheless neither geared to, nor delivering against, clear overarching Finnish goals for development assistance in the context. This is discussed further in section 5.3 on Coherence, but overall, results generated did not aggregate to 'more than the sum of the parts' to generate a cohesive set of overarching achievements for Finland in the five fragile contexts. Widely documented elsewhere (e.g. MFA 2015c), this is particularly important in fragile situations where gearing results to statebuilding and peacebuilding aims is key (see section 5.4; OECD 2016; MFA 2014).

Results generated did not aggregate to 'more than the sum of the parts' to generate a cohesive set of overarching achievements for Finland

Constraints to results: Three main factors constrained the generation of results within country portfolios:

- *Portfolio breadth:* In contexts where portfolios were comparatively dispersed, scope for results generation was also constrained. In Afghanistan, oPt and Somalia, for example, Finland's engagement in large multi-donor initiatives bought it a 'seat at the table' in key policy dialogue forums – important for a small donor in contexts of major international investment. However, managing diverse portfolios was constrained by extremely limited human resources at Embassy level in Syria/Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia particularly, requiring staff to prioritise portfolio management rather than strategic or policy dialogue. This limited the scope for higher-level results. By contrast, a more focused portfolio in oPt enabled MFA staff to engage in strategic advocacy in e.g. the education sector.
- *Rigid financial procedures:* As noted in section 5.1.6 above, unsupportive financial systems constrained the achievement of results, with country programmes not always able to adapt or respond swiftly in programmatic terms where needs arise. This created missed opportunities where tangible results could have been created, for example in maximizing reconciliation work in Somalia.
- *Staffing gaps/lack of sector expertise:* Additionally, staffing gaps and lack of expertise in key sectors also had negative effects on results. For example, in Afghanistan, there is no education sector specialist in the Embassy, despite education being a stated priority. For Somalia, there is no expert on peacebuilding, despite Finland's emerging portfolio here. Sector expertise did not appear to play a role in continuity of Embassy staffing; in Myanmar, for example, the Embassy lacks forestry sector expertise, which combined with the complex setting has slowed down the process of beginning cooperation with FAO.



5.2.3 Delivery of results for gender equality, non-discrimination and climate change

As section 5.1.3 shows, results for non-discrimination, gender equality and climate change are crosscutting objectives under Finland's DPP 2012–2016 (MFA 2012a) as well as a fundamental part of Finland's human rights-based approach (MFA 2013a; MFA 2014; MFA 2016a; MFA 2020b). They are a particularly important focus for working in fragile situations leading to humanitarian crises, where human rights violations may be frequent (OHCHR 2020).

Presence of gender equality but not non-discrimination and climate change in results frameworks: All five Country Strategies included objectives and intended results on gender equality, though as section 5.1.3 notes, this is mainly presented as the relatively blunt categorisation of 'women and girls'. Beyond this, only the Syria/Iraq Strategy includes reference to Persons with disabilities and then only in the 'assumptions' column of the results framework. Only the Myanmar results framework addresses climate change, within Impact Area 1 (though environment and/or land use related matters are discussed in the Strategies for Afghanistan (in relation to natural resources and drugs) and oPt (in relation to water supply) also).

Results delivered for women and girls: In line with the programmatic and results focus on women and girls, above, most of the results against crosscutting objectives relate to this area (Box 4). No tangible results were available for non-discrimination or climate change, though Finland was adopting a progressive approach in some of its policy dialogue/informal consultations, below.

Box 4 Gender equality results

- Provision of SRH services to women (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria/Iraq)
- Reductions in Gender Based Violence (Somalia)
- Reduced maternal mortality (Somalia)
- Enhanced female participation in local decision-making processes (Afghanistan, Myanmar)
- Reduced violations of women's rights (Afghanistan)
- Enhanced access to education for girls/women (Syria/Iraq, oPt)
- Improved livelihoods for women (Syria/Iraq)

Example:

In Myanmar, gender has been mainstreamed into most Finnish-supported interventions in the country. For example, the Joint Peace Fund's overall goal of allocating at least 15% of funding to gender related activities was surpassed in 2019, with approximately 17% of funding across the entire Fund allocated to gender.

Policy dialogue and advocacy on crosscutting objectives: Despite the limited results available, Finland was perceived across all five examined countries as taking a strong and principled stance on gender and non-discrimination, though less so on climate change. Linked to its strongly human-rights oriented approach (section 2.2) this manifested in Finland's policy dialogue/informal consultations in key co-ordination and other forums in the context.

Finland was perceived as taking a strong and principled stance on gender and non-discrimination, though less so on climate change



This approach was universally praised across contexts by national governments and development partners and was considered fundamental to the ‘Finnish donor identity’. Where employed, Finland’s strong human rights oriented approach provided it with strong reputational capital. Box 5 provides examples:

Finland’s strong human rights oriented approach provided valuable reputational capital in politicised and sensitive operating environments

Box 5 Advocacy for gender equality and non-discrimination

In Myanmar, the Finnish Embassy played a central part in promoting a gender equality/ non-discrimination agenda in multilateral project settings, in relations with government stakeholders and in donor coordination meetings (especially EU).

In oPt, Finland successfully advocated for gender disaggregated monitoring in the Multi Donor Trust Fund in the WASH sector. The Representation Office is also coordinating a network ‘Women in International Security in oPt’ that brings together Palestinian and international women working on peace and security issues.

5.2.4 Contributions to any reductions in fragility

Section 5.2.3 above has outlined the baskets of results generated. However, given the RBM challenges signalled therein, the translation of these into results in contributions to reduced fragility or conflict propensity, is more challenging.

Varied trajectories of stability: Overall, in the period since 2012 (see Volume 2: Case Studies) conditions in the five contexts have been notably unstable. Specifically, peace settlements have been lacking in Afghanistan, OPt and Syria/Iraq, and in Somalia, the unresolved dilemmas of resource-sharing have created tensions between the Federal government and member states. In Myanmar, the ongoing complex governance issues have been intensified by outbreaks of conflict since 2018 (see Table 3 and Table 9 above).

Finland’s – and those of other international actors – contributions to reduced fragility/conflict propensity therefore need to be set in this context of weak/declining governance and stability and increased conflict propensity in some areas of the relevant contexts. Contributions identified have been as follows:

Some limited contributions to reduced fragility – but many caveats and little linkage to the Country Strategy approach: Applying results data from project analysis and fieldwork to the Theory of Change in section 1.2, some limited contributions to the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals (new Deal 2020a) were identified. These are reflected in Table 14 (for more detail, see Volume 2: Case Studies). The greatest density of results lies in PSG 1 (supporting inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution, e.g. through peacebuilding work in Myanmar and Afghanistan) and PSG 5 (building capacities for accountable and fair service delivery), notably through support to the education sector (e.g. in OPt and Afghanistan) and the health sector (e.g. in Somalia).

Some limited contributions to the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals were identified



Table 14 Contributions to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals

	Afghanistan	Myanmar	OPt	Somalia	Syria/Iraq
PSG 1: Inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution fostered	++	++	+	+	
PSG 2: People's security established and fostered	++	+			
PSG 3: People's access to justice increased		+	+		
PSG 4: Employment generated and livelihoods improved	+	+	+	+	+
PSG 5: Capacity for accountable and fair service delivery built	++	+	++	++	
Key:					
++	significant contributions made with demonstrable results of a sufficient scale to tangibly support peacebuilding and statebuilding goals				
+	Some contributions made but of a small scale/few demonstrable results to tangibly support peacebuilding and statebuilding goals				
Clear	No contributions identified				

However, in addition to the methodological concerns flagged in section 5.2.1, a number of strong caveats to these contributions arise, including:

- Contributions are at different levels, ranging from large scale trust funds and budget support, e.g. in OPt, Afghanistan and Somalia, to smaller scale NGO projects;
- While individual gains are significant, they are (as per section 5.2.3) dispersed rather than aggregate-level contributions to fragility reduction;
 - All contexts remain highly fragile and Finland's contributions are small, comparatively. Therefore, Finland's contributions need to be viewed as smaller-scale contributions to the wider statebuilding and peacebuilding process over the medium term.

Critically, other than in Afghanistan, where the status of the White Paper determines Finnish political and policy engagement, none of the above contributions to reduced fragility (other than very indirect chains) could be robustly linked to the Country Strategy (see also Folsher et al 2016) – calling into question its role as a strategic determiner of results.

None of the contributions to reduced fragility could be robustly linked to the Country Strategy approach

5.2.5 Role of the aid co-operation modality in supporting delivery of results

As section 4.2 above makes clear, for the five examined contexts, the vast majority of Finnish ODA resources – both within and beyond the Country Strategy – are channelled through the multilateral system, as per commitments in the Fragile States Policy (MFA 2014), and reflect the subsequent priorities of the Finnish Government Programme (Government of Finland 2019). This section of the report assesses the relevance and appropriateness of this choice.

Logical rationales for modality choice: Analysis across evidence streams found logical rationales/opportunities for selecting either multilateral agencies or civil society partners for delivering development assistance across the five contexts (Table 15):

Table 15 Rationales for modality choice

Modality	Rationale
Multilateral channel e.g. contributions to EU/UN Trust Funds, World Bank managed Multi Partner funds; contributions to UN agencies either 'soft earmarked' or multi-bi projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment/harmonisation with key international/EU agreements among development partners • Opportunity to engage in key policy dialogue forums in the management structures around e.g. Trust Funds • Shared risk-taking among partners in volatile and uncertain contexts • Enabling outreach through large-scale programmes • Enhancing efficiency through scale • Facilitating a strategic choice e.g. to engage on peacebuilding in Myanmar • Where core contributions for humanitarian assistance, provision of flexibility to enable swift reaction
Civil society channel, most commonly dedicated projects but also Programme Based Support through the Civil Society Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunity to target a specific area or population covered by NGOs • Lack of UN overheads • Agility/adaptive capacity suited to volatile conditions • Scope to innovate or pilot • Closeness to the ground permits feedback to MFA on population conditions and concerns

Appropriate balance of aid modalities for the context: Overall, in all five cases, the balance of aid modalities through which Finnish ODA was channelled was appropriate for the different contexts (see Volume 2: Case Studies). Specifically:

- In Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq, the structuring of the international response in both contexts around internationally-agreed frameworks and programmes, combined with extreme access challenges and limited human resources, meant that delivery through multilateral programmes was the only feasible option.
- In Somalia, CSOs assume geographical responsibility for implementation and deliver large proportions of multilateral assistance (e.g. 47% of UNOCHA assistance and upwards of 60% of UNICEF assistance (see Volume 2: Somalia Case Study). A combination of multilateral and civil society delivery is therefore logical in the context.
- In Myanmar, the longstanding presence and historical engagement of high-capacity Finnish CSOs provides an appropriate channel for politically sensitive peacebuilding work, while UN organisations remain the main vehicle for Finland's engagement with the Myanmar government in a context where direct bilateral support to/policy dialogue with government is currently unfeasible.
- In OPT, although the Country Strategy delivers its assistance mostly through three core multilateral programmes, the presence of Finnish CSOs provides the opportunity -albeit limited - to engage in peacebuilding and civil society engagement work.

Civil society organisation- implemented programmes were not necessarily small-scale, e.g. Felm manages two multi-million peace programmes in Myanmar and under the Syria/Iraq portfolio (see Volume 2: Myanmar Case Study). Some larger civil society organisations may also receive funds from three MFA instruments at the same time, namely, project-based support under the regional department; PBS; and humanitarian assistance where available/required. Indirectly, CSOs may also receive funding from UN agencies supported through Finland's multilateral channel.



Finland's choice to direct the bulk of its assistance via the multilateral channel in fragile environments was validated in these five contexts

Advantages of multilateral channel: Finland's choice to direct the bulk of its assistance via the multilateral channel in fragile environments is validated in these five contexts. The relative opportunities of engaging via the multilateral system, identified in Rationales/Opportunities above, was considered by stakeholders to offset some of its disadvantages, including UN overhead costs of 7% (reflected in the 'administrative costs' element flagged in section 4.2); reduced control over decision-making; and frequently-cited poor quality results reporting (interviews). However, concerns were voiced by MFA stakeholders in Somalia and Myanmar particularly regarding the perceived efficiency of UN agencies (MFA 2019 October interviews). No specific links were found to multilateral influencing plans at country level.

Advantages of the multi-bi modality were confirmed

Confirmed advantages of multi-bi modality: The frequency of multi-bi agreements, where Finland provides bilateral assistance from Regional Departments to a multilateral agency to implement a discrete initiative, has increased in the five contexts over time, as Table 16 shows (though noting that some grant agreements are in fact multiple grants agreements to the same organisation for the same project title in the same or successive years):

Table 16 Multi bi project agreements in the five contexts

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	TOTAL
2	5	7	5	11	8	13	51

Discounting for multiple project agreements to the same partner/initiative, a total of 22 multi-bi projects were implemented 2012–2018, concentrated in Myanmar and Syria/Iraq (MFA 2019b).

Table 17 Number of multi-bi projects implemented per country

Country	Number of multi-bi projects implemented
Myanmar	9 interventions implemented by 7 UN agencies
Syria/Iraq	8 interventions implemented by 7 UN agencies and the World Bank Group
Somalia	3 interventions implemented by IOM and UNFPA
OPt	2 interventions implemented by UNICEF and UNDP

Advantages of multi-bi initiatives, as indicated by analysis of 14 sample multi-bi initiatives in Myanmar, Somalia, OPt and Syria/Iraq, were:

- The ability to engage in specific sectors/on specific initiatives/target identified population groups or geographical areas, such as Gaza in oPt
- The scope to implement at scale using well-established multilateral systems
- The possibility of tangible results reporting to MFA on specific initiatives generates enhanced accountability (though such reporting did not always materialise in practice)
- Efficiency advantages, with reduced burdens on MFA
- The ability to demonstrate results for money disbursed

Disadvantages mainly related to a comparison with more flexible soft-earmarked multilateral support, and included:

- Limited scope to influence the multilateral agency beyond the specific initiative e.g. to implement the content of Finland's multilateral influencing plans
- Comparatively high overheads compared to CSOs



Clear rationales for partner selection: Beneath the choice of modality, the selection of specific organisations for implementation, whether multilateral or CSO, had clear rationales. For the 46 projects for which data was available, 36 (79%) contained a clear rationale for partner selection. Choices were determined by:

- Mandate and expertise
- Capacity/leadership in the specific area of intervention
- Presence and outreach within the context
- Ability to target a specific area or population
- Satisfaction with prior results
- Occupying a specific niche

The selection of specific organisations for implementation, whether multilateral or CSO, had clear rationales

5.3 Coherence

Summary narrative

The widely documented siloed model of MFA assistance was strongly evident in Syria/Iraq, Somalia, Myanmar and oPt, with little internal coherence across financing streams and poor communication across MFA departments. Afghanistan illustrated the potential for improved coherence, where the White Paper provided an MFA-wide framework for the internal co-ordination of assistance.

Finland's assistance was strongly coherent with external frameworks and initiatives, rendering it a committed and conscientious development partner at country level. However, this commitment permeates the Finnish aid management system at many levels; the role of the Country Strategy in promoting it was doubtful at best.

DPP priorities had greater prominence and resonance for stakeholders in the five contexts than the Country Strategy or its intended results. Programmes and projects financed both within and beyond the Country Strategy contributed to the realisation of Finland's DPP priorities in the five contexts, but the Country Strategy had little role in the generation of these results, neither supporting nor impeding their achievement.

5.3.1 Internal coherence: Role of the CS in enabling coherent MFA assistance

The importance of aligning ODA to fragile or conflict-affected contexts across donor government departments and units, to reduce burdens in delivery, has been widely documented (OECD 2016). The 2012 New Deal emphasises coherence of international assistance, to avoid uncoordinated and fragmented provision to countries which are already under major burdens (New Deal 2020b). The MFA Policy on Fragile States (MFA 2014) reflects this concern, and new Country Strategy preparation guidance has responded with a greater emphasis on internal coherence (MFA 2020b) (section 3.5).

At the same time, the 'siloed' nature of Finnish development and humanitarian assistance has been widely documented elsewhere (OECD 2017; Rassmann, et al 2018; Zetter et al 2019). In the five contexts examined, it is reflected in the proportions of assistance directed beyond the Country Strategy approach (section 4.2).



The White Paper in Afghanistan was intended to enhance the coherence of assistance within MFA departments, aligning development, humanitarian, military and political assistance within a common framework. To a lesser extent, the experience of the Country Strategy in Somalia – which covered only development assistance managed by the Unit for the Horn and East of Africa but where other flows of assistance such as civil society support are considerable (see section 4.2) – served as a ‘learning process’ for MFA (MFA 2019 October–November interview).

Few synergies occurred across MFA departments

Other than for Afghanistan, few synergies across MFA departments: As section 4 above indicates, the five countries continue to receive development, humanitarian, CSO, and trade financing and project interventions separately, as well as support from the Political Department.

Only in Afghanistan was there intended complementarity through the vehicle of the White Paper. However, both the Myanmar and Somalia Country Strategies contain statements of intent to work across MFA units, and the 2016 Management Response to the oPt Country Strategy emphasizes the need for joined up working and synergies. However, there were evident gaps in this intended ‘joining up’. For example, in Syria/Iraq and Somalia, where the volume of interventions is high, few stakeholders interviewed were aware of either the range of Finnish-funded interventions nor the extent of ‘other’ forms of assistance outside the Country Strategy, particularly trade (Finnpartnership). For Syria/Iraq, the Strategy does not provide a cohesive framework for a regional approach, but simply an umbrella for a group of largely autonomous programmes, with little to no regional co-ordination or steering towards common results (see Volume 2: Case Studies).

These weaknesses were recognised in 2018/19 Self-assessments, such as those for Somalia and Syria/Iraq (Volume 2: Case Studies).

Improving internal communication but still some gaps: Communication across MFA departments and units was improving from a limited basis in all five contexts. However, gaps remained; Embassy staff in at least one country stated that they often did not know in advance which projects had been approved/were planned for implementation by other departments in ‘their’ country context. At times, project lists were shared from Helsinki, but only once approval had occurred (MFA 2019 Oct November interview). At Helsinki level, communication between the Political, Development Policy and Regional Departments was repeatedly cited as less than optimal. Positive changes include: since 2019, the political department has been invited to Quality Assurance board meetings; and stakeholders reported greater sharing of information between the Civil Society unit and the Humanitarian Aid unit (MFA October–November 2019 interviews).

Limited internal coherence was observed in Regional Department assistance

Limited internal coherence within Regional Department assistance: The Country Strategy approach’s intent to improve coherence within the more limited sphere of development co-operation managed by the Regional Department has similarly remained unrealised. Fieldwork found projects and programmes delivered through respective Regional Departments notably discrete (see Volume 2: Case Studies). The main overview of the range of Finnish-funded interventions in the context sat with the Country Desks (Helsinki-based and Embassy-based team members); implementing partners interviewed had little knowledge of other projects and initiatives. Other than in Myanmar, where the Embassy had organized Finnish CSO meetings, very few initiatives had taken place to ‘join up’ assistance through information-sharing on the range of Finnish-financed projects in the context or conduct e.g. joint learning events. Most shared knowledge had been informally generated among professional partners, rather than occurring through MFA interventions.



Systemic constraints to internal coherence: Similar findings have been widely documented in other evaluations of Finnish development assistance (Rassmann, et al 2018; Zetter et al 2019) including the previous Country Strategy evaluation (Fölscher et al 2016). They are far from new, but systemic features of Finland's aid management system, arising in part from the different motivations, incentives and intent of different MFA departments (e.g. Political vs. Humanitarian units). In both Helsinki and at Embassy level, human resource limitations constraining strategic oversight/direction (see section 5.2.2) exacerbate the challenges, as does a country-level approach which encompasses only partial Finnish ODA to a given context but is labelled a 'Country Strategy'.

Burdens on national partners: In fragile countries, where absorptive capacity is often low and governments frequently lack sufficient capacities to manage extensive aid streams, the burdens of un-co-ordinated assistance on national authorities are high (OECD 2016). This was reflected in interviews conducted for this evaluation, where Government stakeholders, e.g. in Somalia, voiced strong opinions about the unmanageability of poorly co-ordinated external assistance delivered on their territories, and the need for increased coherence in planning and delivery to reduce burdens.

No instances of 'harm done' by dispersed or fragmented Finnish assistance were identified by the evaluation. Nonetheless, the strain internally on MFA staff at least was apparent. The issues were widely recognised by MFA stakeholders, and 2020 revised guidance on Country Strategies promises a stronger recognition of internal coherence, even if it retains discrete approaches to Regional Department-managed assistance (MFA 2020).

Synergies in Afghanistan: Finally, Afghanistan's White Paper, by contrast, indicates considerable efforts and, and some realised progress in, internal coherence. Field study found strong examples of internal co-ordination and coherence across interventions and financing streams (Box 6):

Box 6 Internal coherence in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's White Paper provides the strategic basis for taking a Whole-of-Government approach to Finland's support to Afghanistan and to coordinating modalities and financing streams. There are examples of coherence between development and immigration interventions (led by Ministry of the Interior) and assistance with the dual purpose of advancing trade and providing aid.

While a White Paper for every fragile context would be far from desirable, the achievements made in articulating and implementing stronger internal coherence, reflects the potential available.

5.3.2 External coherence: Role of the Country Strategy in supporting alignment with the plans and policies of other key donors/ international actors in the context

Ensuring well-harmonised external assistance is a fundamental principle of working in fragile environments (OECD 2016). Both MFA's guidance for working in fragile states and successive Country Strategy guidance (revised January 2020) emphasise the importance of external synergies (MFA 2014; MFA 2016a; MFA 2020).

The feasibility of ensuring coherent international responses varies according to the degree of (and potential for) harmonisation in the context. The five fragile and conflict-affected contexts examined here all have clear structures in place for aid co-ordination (Table 18):



Table 18 Features of aid co-ordination

Afghanistan	The international community coalesce around aid effectiveness commitments agreed by the international community in almost annual Conferences with the Afghan government
Myanmar	Government leads a range of aid co-ordination forums including the Aid Management Central Committee and the Foreign Aid Management Working Committee, which ensure the deployment of aid resources is consistent with national priorities and strategies. Annual Myanmar Development Cooperation Forums (MDCF) form a high-level mechanism for coordination between government and donors (Government of Myanmar 2014).
Somalia	Somalia's well-established aid co-ordination structures include the Somali Partnership Forum. Chaired by the President, the Forum provides the key forum for dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners. The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility has both a co-ordinating and a financing function (Federal Republic of Somalia 2013).
Syria/Iraq	The international community organises assistance around UN Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans, as well as collective Syria Humanitarian Response Plans. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on Migration forms part of efforts to reduce migration.
OPt	The Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) supports local aid coordination structures in providing coherent secretariat support to national and international stakeholders who are engaged in development activities in oPt.

Field study found Finland occupying a valued role in relevant donor co-ordination forums

Commitments honoured to supporting donor co-ordination: Country Strategies in all five contexts state a clear intent to participate in the relevant structures and systems for donor co-ordination (see Volume 2: Case Studies). Field study also found Finland occupying a valued role in relevant donor co-ordination forums (Ibid.). The value added Finland brought to such forums was evidenced in three areas: (1) Assuming leadership in sectoral and policy dialogue/informal consultations; (2) Deploying reputational capital to engage in sensitive areas such as reconciliation and governance and (3) Using comparative advantage to leverage results for

co-ordination (Table 19):

Table 19 Finland's added value to co-ordination forums

Added value	Examples
Assuming leadership in sectoral and policy dialogue/informal consultations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Somalia: Finland co-chairs with UNFPA the Health Sector Working Group and the donor Friends of Reconciliation; it co-chairs with Ministry of the Interior on Subgroup on Federalisation and Reconciliation Afghanistan: Co-chair of the Women Peace and Security working group Myanmar: Finland co-chaired the Fund Board of the Joint Peace Fund in the second half of 2019 and resumed a six months presidency of the Fund Board in January 2020; management of World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund Also: Finland is co-facilitator of the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Coordination Group (GEWECG) OPt: Deputy co-chair of the Palestinian Education Sector Working Group; Chair of UNRWA sub-committee
Deploying reputational capital able to engage in sensitive areas such as reconciliation and governance.	Partner perceptions of Finland include 'constructive', 'mature' and 'measured' (Somalia/Myanmar). In Somalia, Myanmar and OPt, Finland is one of very few actors whose perceived neutrality and 'measured' approach enable it to engage bilaterally in sensitive areas such as reconciliation and governance
Use of comparative advantages to leverage results for co-ordination	In Somalia, Finland successfully convinced other donors, such as Sweden and Norway, to join the Reconciliation agenda



Close alignment with EU co-ordination efforts: In Myanmar and oPt, the EU assumes leadership of coordination efforts on behalf of the relevant parts of the donor community, while relevant States also conduct bilateral dialogue in the other three contexts. In all contexts, Finland supports EU policy dialogue by participating in relevant forums, but in Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq, it also channels financial support through key EU mechanisms, such as the PEGASE mechanism in oPt; the MADAD Trust Fund for Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon; and EU Budget Support in Somalia. Finland also contributes to EU civilian crisis management mechanisms in Afghanistan, Somalia and oPt.

Emphasis on delivering through major multilateral programmes: The high proportions of Finnish assistance delivered through joint initiatives managed by multilateral agencies (see sections 4.2 and 5.2.5) provides evidence of strong external coherence. In each of the five fragile/conflict-affected contexts, Finland engaged in the major multi-stakeholder instruments in the context for statebuilding and, in Myanmar, peacebuilding (Table 20):

Table 20 Finland's engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives

Afghanistan	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Myanmar	Joint Peace Fund
Somalia	Multi Partner Trust Fund; EU Budget Support
Syria/Iraq	EU FriT; EU MADAD; UNICEF No Lost Generation; UNDP Sub-Regional Response facility, UNDP Funding facility for Stabilisation in Iraq; Lebanon Syria Crisis Multi Donor Trust Fund
OPt	EU PEGASE; World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund for the water sector in Gaza

Uncertain role of the Country Strategy in supporting external coherence:

Although the external coherence of Finnish assistance in the five contexts was strong, the role of the Country Strategy approach – beyond Afghanistan – in stimulating this coherence is uncertain. Many of the major contributions to multi-donor or multi-lateral mechanisms pre-date the Country Strategy, as per section 4.2; and the limited external awareness of the Strategy itself (section 4.2) and the Strategy's limited role in gearing interventions to overarching results (section 5.2) render any linkages doubtful. Nonetheless, Finland's role as a conscientious and committed development partner permeates its country-level activity; the Country Strategy has not impeded – but also not determined – its honouring of this role.

Finland's role as a conscientious and committed development partner permeates its country-level activity

5.3.3 Role of the CS in contributing to wider Development Policy priorities

The Development Policy Programme (DPP) forms the main 'spine' of Finnish development co-operation during defined periods of time (section 0). Country Strategy guidance and approach are not only aligned with its priorities, but aimed at ensuring Finnish contributions towards them, realised at country level (MFA 2016a; MFA 2020).

Explicit alignment of Country Strategies with DPP priorities but interpretation for context:

All five Country Strategies are explicitly or implicitly aligned with the DPPs, as reflected in impact areas which cohere with DPP 2016-2019 objectives (Table 21). The strongest areas of alignment are DPP Priority 1: The rights and status of women and girls; and 3. (essential for fragile contexts): Democratic and accountable societies.

All five Country Strategies are explicitly or implicitly aligned with the DPPs



Table 21 Alignment with DPP priorities

	1. The rights and status of women and girls	2. Reinforcing developing countries' economies	3. Democratic and effective societies	4. Food security and natural resources, including access to water and energy.
Afghanistan	✓	✓	✓	
Myanmar	✓		✓	✓
OPt	✓		✓	✓
Somalia	✓		✓	✓
Iraq/Syria	✓		✓	✓

DPP priorities as a key reference point for the Country Strategies: Reflecting the limited external awareness of the Country Strategy (section 4.2), many implementation partners (particularly Finnish CSOs) at country level had greater familiarity with Finnish DPP priorities than with the relevant Country Strategy – perhaps arising from the required alignment with DPP priorities as a condition of funding. DPP priorities are perceived as a) having broader relevance across Finnish assistance, beyond the development assistance covered within the Country Strategy and b) as a constant point of reference above the Country Strategy, which is perceived as having been transcended by contextual change in contexts such as Somalia. Some country-level MFA stakeholders also referenced the DPP as the key reference point for dialogue and articulating Finnish priorities in a given context, rather than the Country Strategy (Palenberg et al., 2019); MFA 2019 interview).

Specific contributions identified to DPP priority results: Results in support of DPP objectives (Table 22) mostly reflect those in section 5.2, with a particular emphasis on gender. As previously, however, the limited awareness and use of the Country Strategy approach outside MFA, combined with the limited results gearing explained in section 5.2, renders the role of the Country Strategy in delivering these contributions very limited.

Table 22 Contributions to DPP priorities

DPP	DPP priorities for the period	Specific areas of contribution
DPP 2012–2015	1) Democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights	Support for UNDP on governance issues (Somalia)
	(4) Human development;	Access to education (oPt, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Syria/Iraq) and health (Somalia) Access to livelihoods (Syria/Iraq)



DPP	DPP priorities for the period	Specific areas of contribution
DPP 2016–2019	(1) Women's and girls' rights	As per Table 17: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of SRH services to women (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria/Iraq) • Reductions in Gender Based Violence (Myanmar, oPt, Somalia) • Reduced maternal mortality (Somalia) • Enhanced female participation in local decision-making processes (Afghanistan, Myanmar) • Reduced violations of women's rights (Afghanistan) • Enhanced access to education for girls/women (Myanmar, Syria/Iraq, oPt) • Improved livelihoods for women (Syria/Iraq)
	(3) Governance and democracy	Peace building (Myanmar, Somalia) Improving democratisation (Somalia)
	(4) Food security and natural resources, including access to water and energy.	Access to water (oPt, Syria/Iraq, Somalia) Building a forestry inventory and information management system (Myanmar)

Accordingly, the Country Strategy has less supported the realisation of these results, than not impeded their realisation. It has neither prevented nor constrained their achievement.

5.4 Connectedness

Summary narrative

Country Strategies articulated a strong commitment in a broad sense to HRBAs across all Finland's development co-operation, in line with its foundational approach within the Finnish aid management system. Finland also prove a consistently strong and principled articular of human rights concerns within its policy dialogue and informal consultations in the five fragile contexts. Programmatically, however, attention to human rights concerns was unsystematic, with specific rights targeted not identified or systematically addressed. Attention to the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations within humanitarian assistance was partner-dependent, with accordingly variable attention in programming.

Attention to statebuilding and peacebuilding concerns, as part of the 'triple nexus' approach to development, was prominent within Country Strategies, though a clear conceptual approach to statebuilding was lacking. Funded programmes, however, lacked a consistently medium or longer-term view in their designs. A focus on resilience was apparent in Syria/Iraq and oPt, which had high proportions of refugees, but only one example of 'triple nexus' working, in Myanmar, was identified across the portfolios, which had not yet delivered tangible results across the spectrum.



5.4.1 Adherence to commitments on Human Rights, the IHPs, Do No Harm and AAP

Complex issues surrounding human rights and related frameworks in fragile environments: As per section 2.3, Finland’s overarching framework of human rights based approaches underlies all its development assistance. At the same time, a human rights-based approach in fragile or conflict-affected situations can be highly complex. Conditions in these environments provide scope for a wide array of human rights abuses, such as Gender Based Violence (UNHCR 2015). At the same time, the position and role of national authorities vis-à-vis conflict and fragility may complicate the engagement of external actors, and the provision of international assistance; and in some contexts, external actors may themselves be accused of being parties to human rights abuses (see for example UNSG 2012; Lister et al 2017; Human Rights Watch 2019). National authorities may have a high degree of sensitivity to human rights-based language.

MFA stakeholders interviewed across the five contexts openly acknowledged the challenges but stated that their task in such complex operating territory was to try to uphold and adhere to human rights frameworks, and those guiding humanitarian assistance, ‘as far as feasible given the complexities here.’ (MFA 2019 October interview).

Mostly explicit attention to HRBAs within Country Strategies: All five Country Strategies use human rights language of ‘duty bearers’ and ‘rights holders’ in their formulations. Notwithstanding the complexities, all five (though with some caution in Myanmar) articulate a strongly human rights-based approach at a broad level (Table 23):

All five Country Strategies use human rights language of ‘duty bearers’ and ‘rights holders’ in their formulations

Table 23 Human rights language in Country Strategies

Explicit	
Syria/Iraq	Explicit commitment to ensuring accountability for those responsible for human rights violations.
Somalia	Explicit adoption of HRBAs as the ‘cornerstone’ of assistance, with a focus on the five principles of equality and non-discrimination, participation, transparency and accountability.
Afghanistan	Explicit commitment to promote human rights and the position and rights of women as one of the key goals of Finland’s development cooperation.
OPT	Explicit recognition of a deteriorating human rights context and HRBAs applied in justifications for sectoral interventions in education particularly.
Implicit	
Myanmar	HRBA referenced but due to sensitivities, linked to women’s rights and the right to education rather than monitoring of human rights abuses.

However, linked to the weak analytical basis described in Section 5.1 above, none of the five Strategies provide any further specification, such as which areas of rights are especially challenged in the context, and which ones Finland intends to prioritise. Nor, other than in Somalia, are commitments to the key HRBA principles identified by MFA in its human rights policy (MFA 2013a) and guidance (MFA 2015b) – namely universality; non-discrimination: the right to participation; accountability; and transparency – explained in terms of their intended realisation.

Table 24 captures the main parameters of application of HRBAs in Country Strategies.



Table 24 HRBAs in Country Strategies

	Targeting specific groups on a rights basis	Accountability for HR violations	Monitoring and capacity building on HR
Afghanistan	✓	✓	✓
Myanmar	✓	✓	✓
OPt	✓	✓	✓
Somalia	✓	✓	✓
Iraq/Syria	✓	✓	✓

Finland, strongly articulates human rights in policy dialogue and other consultations: Despite this vagueness, partners across the five contexts universally confirmed that Finland articulates a strong and progressive approach to human rights in policy dialogue/consultations across co-ordination forums (see Volume 2: Case Studies). Where conditions permitted – as in Somalia and Afghanistan – its approach was described by partners as ‘progressive’ and ‘principled’, with a strong focus on gender and exclusion particularly. In Myanmar, for example, Finland was considered professional and diplomatic in its consultations and discussions about human rights issues around the Rohingya crisis.

Finland articulated a ‘progressive’ and ‘principled’ approach to human rights in policy dialogue/consultations and across co-ordination forums

Varying degrees of emphasis by partners: Finland’s HRBA Guidance note (MFA 2015b) states that, programmatically, HRBAs are operationalized through relevant aid modalities and partners (multilateral agencies, CSOs, private sector actors, etc.). While all bilateral projects are appraised by the MFA, projects through multilateral partners are not systematically reviewed (though human rights-based approaches are included in multilateral influencing plans e.g. for UNICEF and the African Development Bank (Mikkolainen 2019).

Several Finnish civil society organisations interviewed had conducted extensive trainings on HRBAs (e.g. FCA; SCI; VIKES; ISF, LSV-PSR). UN agencies and international financial institutions interviewed reported that attention to HRBAs was determined by their organisational mandate, being particularly prominent in UNDP, UNICEF, UNDP and IOM, and determined by safeguards policies within the IFIs, as Finland’s own HRBA Guidelines reflect (MFA 2015b). All implementing partners interviewed stated that Finland raised human rights issues in dialogue with them and pushed strongly for clear strategies for their programming treatment; however, this was framed as a general principle of Finnish development programming, rather than a requirement of the Country Strategy.

Variable attention to human rights in programming: Desk review of 53 projects for which information was available found partial or comprehensive references to human rights approaches in 27 (51%). This comparatively low level of attention reflects a) the findings of self-assessments for 2018, with 2/4 (Somalia and OPt) providing only ‘developing’ ratings against human rights criteria and b) the findings of a recent review of HRBA approaches in project and programme evaluations (MFA 2018e), which found that despite the centrality of human rights to Finland’s development policy, a majority of projects analysed lacked a clear statement of the human rights considerations that the intervention aims to address, as well as definition of duty bearers and rights (MFA 2018e).

Despite the centrality of human rights to Finland’s development policy, a majority of projects analysed lacked a clear statement of human rights considerations

The majority of programmes (22 or 81%) with an explicitly human rights approach were implemented by civil society organisations. Examples of strongly human-rights focused initiatives to which Finland has contributed, include (Box 7):



Box 7 Human Rights Based approaches

In Afghanistan, Finland supports the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to monitor the human rights situation in Afghanistan and provide support and training to citizens.

In Myanmar, Finland's support to FAO aimed to develop a globally relevant approach to a National Forest Inventory and a National Forest Monitoring Information System within the framework of HRBA and a conflict sensitivity approach.

In some major co-operation programmes, a human rights lens was notably lacking, such as the EU PEGASE programme in oPt. Moreover, in some of the five contexts, Finnish CSOs are implementing through local partners who may not have mature systems or practices for human rights, as for example in Myanmar and OPT. This is a particular risk factor for Finland, given its trust-based model of support to implementing partners.

No consistent monitoring on HRBA application: In line with the trust-based approach, no Finnish partners reported requests or requirements by MFA to report on application of HRBAs generally, other than through Civil Society grant mechanisms. Rather than formally monitoring the operationalization of the HRBA, therefore, Finland relies on its partners to use their own systems and processes to incorporate a human rights approach – an assumption which is not borne out by the findings of this evaluation or other studies (MFA 2018e) but which bears crucial importance for fragile situations, given the increased potential and heightened climate for human rights abuses.

International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations not well reflected in programming: For humanitarian assistance outside the Country Strategy approach, frameworks such as the International Humanitarian Principles have proven far from straightforward for external actors to uphold in complex operating environments of fragility and conflict, as several studies and evaluations have shown (Maunder et al 2018; UNEG 2016).

For humanitarian assistance provided across the five concerned countries (outside the Country Strategy), international Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm approaches and Accountability to Affected Populations are key fundamental principles. However, as for human rights-based approaches, Finnish procedures place trust in its humanitarian partners to ensure their application. There are no stated requirements for funded interventions or humanitarian partners to apply these concepts in any context.

No humanitarian partners interviewed stated that Finland raises these concerns, or requests or requires adherence to them. Analysis of 12 humanitarian assistance projects and programmes in Somalia and Syria/Iraq, all implemented by UN agencies/ the IFRC, found reference to these frameworks in only two of them.

While UN humanitarian agencies state that their own guidelines require these issues to be addressed programmatically, recent organisational assessments have highlighted institutional shortcomings (MOPAN 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). As for HRBAs, Finland places considerable trust in its multilateral partners to implement these internationally-agreed principles and approaches; yet also as for HRBAs, a lack of consistency and follow through by Finland and its partners, risks weakening application in practice.

Finland places trust in its multilateral partners to implement the international humanitarian principles, Do no Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations, but a lack of consistency and follow through by Finland and its partners risks weakening application in practice



5.4.2 Consideration of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile states (New Deal 2012b), which Finland signed in 2012, emphasizes the centrality of peace-building and statebuilding to fragile states' way out of their fragility. Since then, the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus has risen to prominence since the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 (UNGA 2016). Although Finland's guidance for working in fragile contexts pre-dates this terminology, the principle of linking even short-term humanitarian assistance to medium and longer-term concerns is reflected in prior international guidance (OECD 2016). Finland's own Fragile States Policy stresses the importance of removing gaps between humanitarian and development support (MFA 2014).

The recent Evaluation on Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy (Zetter et al 2019) found that Finland had not yet established a strong framework for coherence between its humanitarian and development policies. It recommended that Finland strengthen internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting. Evidence from this evaluation mostly coheres with this finding.

Country Strategies link development assistance to longer-term change but uncertain programmatic follow-through: None of the five Country Strategies – understandably given their timing – explicitly reference the 'nexus', nor specify exactly how development assistance being provided under Regional Departments will intersect with humanitarian assistance also provided by MFA. However, all five Country Strategies clarify an intended *relationship* between development assistance and longer-term development through statebuilding, stabilization, sustainable peace, resilience, and capacity strengthening.

The treatment of these nexus concerns varies, however, across Strategies, in relation to contextual conditions:

- In Myanmar and Somalia, the Country Strategy places a strong emphasis on medium and longer-term statebuilding approaches
- In Afghanistan, the focus of policy dialogue is on development goals while recognizing the need for short-term assistance to highly vulnerable populations
- In Syria/Iraq and oPt, the Country Strategy articulates the intention to move past the 'relief first and development later' approach.

Programmatically, however, this intention was not reflected in initiatives funded. Of a total of 48 projects with available data, only around half, or 26 (54%) articulated in their designs a focus on longer-term goals, whether development, statebuilding or peacebuilding (though of those remaining, a significant proportion had only short-term intent). Moreover, the continued 'silo'd' approach to assistance described in 5.4.1 above, and the limited role of the Country Strategy in providing overarching guidance, meant that humanitarian assistance delivered in the relevant contexts – Afghanistan, Syria/Iraq and Somalia – was done so separately from development assistance. No humanitarian partner interviewed in Somalia, for example, was aware of Finland's development-focused initiatives in the country.

Strong emphasis on statebuilding in Country Strategies but less consistent attention to peacebuilding: As international and Finnish guidance points out (OECD 2016, MFA 2014), gearing assistance to statebuilding and peacebuilding intentions is critical in fragile contexts, while continuing to serve beneficiary needs. The Government Programme for 2019 also emphasises peacebuilding as a key priority for Finland's foreign policy (Government of Finland 2019).

All five Country Strategies clarify an intended relationship between development assistance and longer-term development through statebuilding, stabilization, sustainable peace, resilience, and capacity strengthening

Programmatically, however, this intention was not reflected in initiatives funded



Country Strategies explicitly direct Finland's assistance towards statebuilding in Afghanistan, oPt and Somalia; however, understandings of and approaches to statebuilding are diverse

The first generation of Finnish Country Strategies and programmatic assistance articulate a consistently strong approach to statebuilding – though with different models adopted – but less consistently target peacebuilding, despite its centrality as a strategic priority and even though Finland has considerable comparative advantages and reputational capital here.

Statebuilding: Country Strategies explicitly direct Finland's assistance towards statebuilding in Afghanistan, oPt and Somalia, framing it as an impact area in Afghanistan and Somalia and as aspects of outcome areas (e.g. in education) in oPt. However, understandings of and approaches to statebuilding are diverse, with no clear conceptual framework or consistent model employed. Consequently, programmatic approaches are diverse:

- In Somalia, the approach adopted to Statebuilding is largely functionalist, focused on 'capacity building' and public financial management reforms in a technicist sense.
- In oPt, Finland's support for the EU's PEGASE initiative provides salary support for Palestinian Authority staff in the West Bank, forming part of the political message around international community support to the statebuilding agenda in oPt.
- In Afghanistan, the ARTF is the main vehicle for statebuilding, targeting 80% of support to NPPs that span five sectors, and supporting basic service delivery as part of the state-citizen contract.

Finland's strategic intentions in the five countries were less explicitly geared to peacebuilding

Peacebuilding: Finland's strategic intentions in the five countries were less explicitly geared to peacebuilding. Only in Myanmar and Afghanistan was the issue made explicit in the Country Strategy/White Paper respectively, with the documents acknowledging the need to involve all conflict parties in the peace process and providing a framework for government stakeholders, (other) parties to the conflict and civil society to be equally supported and to interact with each other. Programmatically, however, and as noted in other evaluations (Zetter et al 2019), several projects in these countries encourage or facilitate dialogue or cooperation between conflict parties, such as through the Joint Peace Fund in Myanmar and the facilitation of

dialogue between the Taliban and national authorities in Afghanistan;

In Somalia, peacebuilding was not articulated as an intent of the Country Strategy. However, Finland has seized the opportunity to work on Reconciliation concerns (Box 8):

Box 8 Reconciliation engagement in Somalia

In 2018, the opportunity arose for international actors to become involved in Reconciliation approaches in Somalia. Separately from the Country Strategy, Finland's Political Department seized this opportunity, funding an adviser within the Ministry of the Interior and working to develop a national strategy and programme of action on the agenda.

Finland is considered by partners to have a strong capacity and reputation for its reconciliation work in Somalia, linked to its perceived 'neutral' status – something few external actors in Somalia share. Finland's partners stressed a strong desire for Finland to do more in this arena, since it can potentially achieve more bilaterally than e.g. the EU can multilaterally, because of the need to share information across all EU Member States if a multilateral approach is adopted.



Additionally – and outside the Country Strategy other than in Afghanistan, – Finland supports specific initiatives led by the European Union to support peacebuilding, including police missions and rule-of-law missions in Afghanistan, OPT, Syria/Iraq and Somalia.

‘Resilience’: The Syria/Iraq regional strategy employs the concept of ‘resilience’, reflecting its adoption of satisfactory living conditions and economic prospects for refugees (see UNHCR and UNDP, 2020). Programmatically, this was applied in Iraq as stabilisation/reconstruction/livelihoods work under the UNDP Funding for Stabilisation. For OPT, while the resilience concept is not defined (see Volume 2: oPt Case Study), it is applied programmatically as interventions to provide public services and infrastructure for populations in need e.g. through UNRWA. Some more recent initiatives in country portfolios also adopt an explicitly ‘nexus’-focused approach. For example, in Syria/Iraq, Finland has supported the UNDP sub-regional response facility, which has explicitly applied humanitarian-development nexus initiatives.

Few examples of triple nexus working: The ‘humanitarian-development-peace’ ‘triple nexus’ is understandably not reflected in the current generation of Country Strategies, and there are few examples programmatically. Only in Myanmar, where Finnish assistance spreads the range of humanitarian, development and peace assistance, was an example encountered, in the form of UNFPA Women’s rights intervention, which supports the triple nexus through pooled development, peacebuilding and humanitarian funding. Results beyond provision of services for Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) and Gender Based Violence (GBV) have proven challenging, however, particularly in terms of strengthening the access to justice for GBV survivors.

The ‘humanitarian-development-peace’ ‘triple nexus’ is understandably not reflected in the current generation of Country Strategies



6 Conclusions

This evaluation has assessed the role and value of a corporate approach – the Country Strategy – in supporting Finland’s assistance to fragile environments. In the lead up to developing ‘second generation’ Country Strategies for similar environments worldwide, and in the light of new Country Strategy guidance issued in January 2020, this evaluation asks: Did Country Strategies prove their intended worth, in supporting Finland to deliver relevant and effective, coherent and connected, assistance to highly complex and fragile environments?

Main conclusions

Conclusion 1: The purpose of the Country Strategy in fragile contexts would benefit from clarification, particularly in relation to adaptive management.

The role of the Country Strategy, as indicated by the evidence from this evaluation, requires definition. Despite its title as a ‘strategy’, the first generation of Country Strategies did not cohesively direct Finnish assistance either to prioritised needs in fragile contexts, nor defined or geared assistance to strategic intent. Nor did they encompass the many forms of Finnish assistance in any given context. Rather, they constituted a generalised overview for development assistance provided by Regional Departments. In this, the first generation of Country Strategies provided a valuable conceptual umbrella – but not (other than for Afghanistan) a strong strategic steer.

Country Strategies served various – though mainly internally-focused – uses, notably as an internal management and accountability tool for MFA. They brought Finland’s frequently dispersed assistance under a single corporate ‘umbrella’ and provided a useful reference point for articulating Finland’s strategic position to external actors. They articulated generalised needs in the context, and no dissonance arose between the needs targeted by programmatic assistance and those articulated in Country Strategies. However, the Strategy approach was mainly shaped around existing programmes and projects in the context; that is, it mostly reactively developed.

New guidance issued in January 2020 does not specify precisely the intended purpose and function of the Country Strategy – whether to broadly guide assistance; or to more directly steer it; and how this is intended to influence programming choices. Yet, the purpose of any strategy document determines its scope and intended results. Setting this out more clearly, including the links from strategic direction to criteria for investment, will help maximise utility for MFA and partners.

Finally, the role of the Country Strategy approach in supporting adaptation – so badly needed in highly volatile and unpredictable operating environments – was not explicitly set out in their first generation. Yet, the approach has the potential, if supported by appropriate corporate systems, to play an important role here.

Conclusion 2: The Country Strategy approach has further scope to support internal and external coherence.



A core aim of the Country Strategy approach was to enhance the coherence of at least a portion of MFA assistance to Finland's partner countries. The importance of this in heavily burdened fragile environments cannot be overstated.

In this, the first generation of Country Strategies – with the notable exception of Afghanistan – did not achieve its full potential. Even within Regional Department units, assistance and interventions remained largely discrete, and consistent and strategic efforts to join up or even mutually inform interventions of each other, were few. Informal connections, while present, do not substitute for a wider approach to cohesion, nor facilitate a systematic whole-of-Regional-Department, far less a whole-of-MFA, approach. The fragmentation of assistance which occurred during the first generation of Country Strategies was not only contrary to international and Finland's own guidance for engagement in fragile environments, but actively increases risk.

Recent guidance (MFA 2020b) seeks to reduce this fragmentation, and shift towards a more cohesive approach. The need for this adjustment is strongly validated by the evidence encountered by this evaluation, with even further (MFA-wide) cohesion a logical future goal.

Finland's core commitment to its partner countries, and its principled and partnership-focused approach to development co-operation, is reflected in its strong external alignment, with assistance geared to support national and international priorities and strategies in these five contexts. However, the Country Strategy approach, once again, has not played a determining role here. Rather, the intrinsic values of the Finnish aid model provided the main momentum, facilitated by mature aid co-ordination mechanisms at country and regional level.

Conclusion 3: While Finland's assistance to fragile contexts was broadly relevant to needs, the first generation of Country Strategies played a benign but largely passive role.

In contexts of extraordinary need, such as those suffering the effects of conflict and/or fragility, relevant and appropriate assistance is key. Managing external assistance places a major burden on hard-pressed national authorities, transmitted in turn to those on the ground suffering the tangible effects of upheaval.

Finland's assistance in the five fragile contexts examined here did not lack relevance. It supported those in need, whether affected populations suffering the effects of conflict, or national authorities whose structures, systems and capacities require rebuilding. It partially adapted to changing conditions in challenging and often-volatile conditions and prioritised women and girls, if only bluntly disaggregated. Moreover, Finland's policy dialogue priorities – informed by politically-experienced advisers in some contexts – targeted relevant issues and policy agendas in the concerned environments.

However, the first generation of Country Strategies played little determinative role in achieving these aims. Other than the White Paper for Afghanistan, which articulated a sharper and more explicitly political response to needs, and a more directive approach to programming, the role of the approach in supporting relevance was benign, but largely passive. In particular, the limited analytical basis – though subsequently enhanced – was inadequate to inform the choice of Finnish strategic priorities in the context. This central disconnect between identified needs, and proposed response, essentially compromised the grounding of Finnish strategic choices in a thorough understanding of the key drivers of fragility and conflict in the context. It also prevented a clear articulation of where and why that is, based on which comparative advantage – Finland is best placed to intervene.



Programmatic appropriateness to context therefore occurred by default rather than design. It relied on partners' deep knowledge of the context, their ability to identify priorities in relation to their own capacities, and their openness to close engagement with MFA. Assistance was also constrained by relatively inflexible financing approaches. Consequently, the first generation of Country Strategies did not constrain Finnish assistance – but nor did they explicitly help maximise potential.

Conclusion 4: Finland has a valuable role as a principled and neutral actor in fragile states, which has potential for further leverage to contribute to statebuilding and peacebuilding, pending additional human resources.

Finland's powerful reputational capital as a principled donor, who takes a progressive and proactive stance on gender and human rights, helped deliver some strong results within its policy dialogue and other forms of consultation in the five fragile contexts. Although not directly shaped by Country Strategies, and constrained by limited human resources, the results achieved have created a widely-held perception of Finland 'punching above its weight' in operationally-complex environments.

This stance, along with its perceived neutrality and 'measured' approach, bought Finland credibility and capacity to engage in the multiple co-ordination forums of fragile environments, and opened doors to other areas, such as peacebuilding/reconciliation. Here – pending badly needed additional human resources – there is scope to significantly build on Finland's comparative advantage and engage in areas where other donors may encounter more barriers to entry.

However, in addition to increased staffing, any such engagement needs to be guided by clear use of appropriate approaches and modalities for working in fragile contexts. The limited recognition and use of the 2014 Fragile States guidance undermined a more consistent approach; moreover, the guidelines themselves, while highly relevant for 2014, can better reflect current fragility discourse and thinking.

Conclusion 5: Results based management processes allied to the Country Strategy approach demonstrated a high value in a siloed organisation but still have potential to mature.

From a results-based perspective in fragile contexts, the Country Strategy approach revealed both strengths and weaknesses. Positively, the minimum conditions – results at different levels, indicator frameworks, reporting and review mechanisms – of an RBM approach are now in place and met. Growing maturity since 2016 is evident.

The processes surrounding the Country Strategy – not least the Political Economy Analysis and Self Assessments, as well as annual reporting requirements – showed an important intrinsic value. In highly volatile environments, they required a process of reflection, consideration and review. They forced both pause for thought and a country-level view; valuable for overstretched MFA staff managing often dispersed portfolios.

However, technical weaknesses in results frameworks persist, as do the challenges of a 'linear' RBM approach in contexts of cyclical fragility and conflict. This is exacerbated by the absence of international-level fragility indicators within results frameworks – a missed opportunity for conflict and fragility-sensitivity. A clearer focus on, and more defined role for, statebuilding and peacebuilding aims, and the intended results to which Finland is best positioned to contribute,



will avert risks of over-engineering. Moreover, while risk systems are growing in maturity, they remain undermined by the lack of an MFA-wide Risk framework or strategy.

Conclusion 6: Valuable results have been delivered in fragile contexts through the Country Strategy approach, but do not yet comprise ‘more than the sum of the parts’.

Some valuable results were delivered in the five examined fragile contexts, most of which cohere with MFA’s broad aims as articulated in Country Strategies. However, performance against intended impact areas – in highly challenged environments – was patchy, and results delivered largely individualised. They also stood largely uninfluenced by the first-generation Country Strategy approach or process. The limited contributions made to statebuilding and peacebuilding – despite their citing as impact areas within several Country Strategies – were not driven by a clear ‘fragility reduction’ agenda, operationalised through the Strategy, but rather realised through more indirect connections.

Overall, in the absence of a strong overarching framework, which guides assistance directly towards a common goal, achievements made were fragmented rather than cohesive. They did not aggregate up to comprise ‘more than the sum of the parts’ in a given context.

Finland’s strategic focus on ‘rights of women and girls’ permeated down to country-level results, though achievements mainly arise from providing services and outreach rather than from a more empowerment-focused perspective. The more limited attention to other marginalised groups, arising from the constrained analytical base above, brings into question the depth and quality of realisation of Finland’s Human Rights Based Approach at country level.

Choices and balance of aid modalities were appropriate for needs in each of the five examined contacts. Finland’s choice to direct the bulk of its assistance to fragile contexts via the multilateral system (in line with the priorities of the Finnish Government Programme (Government of Finland 2019)) was validated, given its demonstrated advantages in reach in high-need environments. Where conditions were right, the multi-bi modality also demonstrated its utility, though few connections were evident between multilateral influencing plans and country engagement.

Conclusion 7: The Country Strategy approach can further support the linking of assistance to the medium term/guide assistance towards nexus concerns.

Connecting current aid to future development lies at the heart of ‘good donorship’ in fragile situations, as Finland’s Fragile States guidelines (MFA 2014) reflect. Country Strategies recognise this in their articulations, but – as for human rights approaches – carry-through into programming was more limited.

The first generation of Country Strategies recognised the importance of a peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda (though requiring a clearer conceptual approach). However, Finnish assistance in these fragile contexts was not yet fully geared to the medium term. Procedural limitations – such as annual financial planning and the requirement for internal approval for each programme – combined with human resource shortages, led to compromised strategic relevance in some cases. The ‘triple nexus’ has yet to take hold programmatically, though Finland – in line with its demonstrated comparative advantages – is making significant inroads into peacebuilding in a number of contexts, from a position that few other donors, in the highly complex, politically-fluid and fast-paced environments of fragile situations, can hope to occupy.



Conclusion 8: The Country Strategy approach can further support Finland in the delivery of a human rights-based approach.

The Human Rights Based Approach, so fundamental to all Finnish development co-operation, was strongly reflected at a broad level in the first-generation Country Strategies examined here. Finland prove a standard-bearer for human rights in policy dialogue within several fragile contexts, taking a principled stance even in highly complex and sensitive settings.

Going beyond dialogue, and into the realisation of human rights, in politically complex and highly fluid environments, is highly testing. Here, despite its prominence in the Fragile States Guidelines (MFA 2014), Finnish aid co-operation revealed some shortcomings in its practical implementation, with the largely trust-based approach to partners resulting in patchy approaches. Varying degrees of attention to rights and their interpretation in specific contexts, again compromised by staffing constraints, were compounded by a lack of definition of ‘whose rights’ ‘what rights’ and ‘how and why’ the identified rights were intended to be targeted.



7 Recommendations

While this evaluation report was being drafted, the Country Strategy development process was ongoing. New Country Strategy guidance was issued to MFA staff in January 2020 (MFA 2020b).

Accordingly, the recommendations which close this report do not aim to provide a directive ‘path forward’ for MFA in revising its Country Strategy guidelines. The presence and role of the Country Strategy is not in doubt. Rather, building on learning since 2012, they offer some suggestions to improve the relevance of the Country Strategy approach at corporate level, including potential updates to the 2020 Guidance, for its use in fragile environments going forward. They are formulated in two groups; (i) structural and (ii) procedural recommendations.

(i) Structural recommendations

Recommendation 1: Explicitly conceptualise the Country Strategy approach as a tool for adaptive management in fragile contexts, building links between humanitarian and development assistance where possible.

This recommendation builds on Conclusions 1 and 2, proposing that the Country Strategy approach is clearly and explicitly defined in fragile contexts as a tool for adaptive management. Specifically, this would require:

1. Specify the purpose of the Country Strategy within the fragile/conflict-affected context, geared to its role as a provider of strategic direction; internal and external accountability; and learning for MFA and partners.
2. Clearly define the specific intent of Finnish assistance employing an explicitly political lens, arising from its comparative advantage in relation to the specific features of the fragile context. Gear intended contributions to fragility and conflict reduction/specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims (the PSGs) for the operating context.
3. Specify the intent of the Country Strategy as a tool for adaptive management in the context, with the intent to provide as flexible assistance as feasible according to contextual needs, and with RBM systems intended to support adaptation as needs arise.
4. Clearly state the degree of risk anticipated (encompassing strategic and political risks and their likely effects on programming) and provide a clear statement of Finland’s risk awareness, and degree or risk tolerance, in the operating context,
5. As per the 2019 Government Programme (Government of Finland 2019) provide a clear statement of intent on the pursuing of a closer relationship between humanitarian and development programmatic streams.

Recommendation 2: Ensure adequate human resources to enhance the technical rigour of Country Strategies in fragile contexts, geared to specific peacebuilding and statebuilding aims in the context and with strong attention to risk.



This recommendation also arises from Conclusions 3 and 4, which identified some technical weaknesses in the preparation of Country Strategy documents and particularly Conclusion 5, which identified Finland's unrealised potential for engaging more closely in peacebuilding and statebuilding issues, as defined for context.

Additional human resources are needed to enhance the technical rigour of Country Strategies for fragile contexts. Specifically: The analytical basis of Country Strategies should be enhanced. Specifically, this should focus on strengthening, extending and regularising PEA analysis conducted. The conduct of PEAs should be better resourced; updated annually; and conducted collectively between Helsinki and Embassy staff.

Conflict/fragility sensitivity: Additionally, as Country Strategy revision takes place, all documents (whichever model of the Strategy is identified) require review for conflict and fragility sensitivity, with a particular focus on statebuilding and peacebuilding goals. MFA should consider developing broad guidance on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in fragile situations, specifying Finland's comparative advantages in this area (and reflective of Government Programme priorities (Government of Finland 2019), and subsequently ensuring that new-generation Country Strategies cohere with this guidance. The Guidance should note that peacebuilding and statebuilding are highly context-specific issues, which require appropriate specification per country.

The principles of conflict and fragility sensitivity should be embedded into Country Strategy Guidelines with reference to an updated Fragile States Policy (see Recommendation 6), emphasising the importance of gearing Finnish assistance to peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

More programmatically, for funded programmes in fragile situations, all Civil Society organisation PBS and project grants should require conflict and fragility-sensitive approaches. For multilateral programmes, conflict and fragility sensitivity should be embedded into Multilateral Influencing Plans.

Finally, MFA assistance should be geared, as articulated in the Country Strategy, to medium term development aims in fragile contexts. All Country Strategy revisions in fragile contexts, whatever the model selected, should include a) A clear vision of the medium term for the context b) Clear articulations of statebuilding and peacebuilding requirements in the contexts c) Clear indications of how and where Finland is best placed to intervene for the medium term, with a particular view to considering peacebuilding/reconciliation engagement.

For interventions funded by the Regional Departments, MFA should require clarity on how those in fragile environments will adopt a peacebuilding and statebuilding lens, and how they will contribute to Finland's peacebuilding and statebuilding aims in the context/how they will address the concerns of the triple nexus.

Recommendation 3: Increase financial flexibility for work in fragile contexts and develop appropriate financing modalities for fragile contexts.

This recommendation responds to Conclusions 6 and 7 and the well-documented need for flexible and responsible assistance in volatile country environments.

MFA may consider two mechanisms to enhance flexibility in its financial processes:

6. Approve the Country Programme, including its respective financial allocation (subject to Parliamentary approval of the budget), for its duration (four year period) in advance, in order that programmatic assistance can be rapidly deployed or reoriented as strategic win-



dows open up (or conversely, where they close or shrink due to conflict outbreaks); and so that bureaucratic procedures can be more swiftly navigated.

7. Consider thematic windows for assistance to fragile contexts, specifically geared to providing rapid assistance to qualifying environments, and which explicitly link humanitarian and development funding streams. Deploy programmatic resources responsively throughout the year as needs arise (and providing they contribute to MFA's overall intent in the context).

Additionally, MFA may wish to consider providing a Helpdesk function around the issue of fragility and conflict, with scope to respond to requests for assistance from MFA staff on e.g. fragility and conflict analysis; PEA support; technical advice on fragility and conflict issues; and reviews of programme proposals for fragility and conflict sensitivity.

(ii) Procedural recommendations

Recommendation 4: Enhance the RBM systems allied to the Country Strategy to maximise their value with a specific emphasis on risk in fragile contexts.

This recommendation arises from Conclusions 5, in turn stemming from the clearly-identified technical limitations in RBM frameworks and constrained attention to fragility reduction in RBM frameworks. It focuses on RBM as a system rather than a document.

The RBM approaches within the five fragile contexts – reflection, review and reporting – have demonstrably proven their worth in a comparatively siloed environment. They have potential for further leverage, to join up dialogue and discussion across MFA, and to generate an understanding of results as collectively generated. Often, the worth of RBM is in the dialogue rather than the reported results; understanding it as a system will enhance coherence.

Operationally, this implies reviewing and revising RBM frameworks as timing requires. For fragile contexts, as per Recommendation 1, MFA should ensure a) a cohesive statement of Finnish intent in the country at impact level, centred firmly on fragility/conflict reduction and b) that all supporting outcome statements are also geared to peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

Additionally, results-setting should clarify in narrative text that all Finnish co-operation in the context is expected to contribute to fragility/conflict reduction in these terms. Within results frameworks, assumptions should be reviewed and revised on an annual basis, to ensure continued relevance for context. MFA should apply relevant international indicators on fragility as a reflection of progress, recognising that Finland's contributions will only be measurable at a much lower (output) level.

To support a systems approach, MFA should formalise Self Assessments into Mid Term Review processes, occurring annually or bi-annually. It should also require independent evaluations of Country Strategies on a four-year cycle, managed by Embassies.

Depending on the model of Country Strategy adopted, all RBM processes should be collective, bringing stakeholders together around a common table to discuss and agree collective achievements, under-performance and future aims.

Finally, MFA should ensure that risk management directives within the revised Country Strategy guidance (MFA 2020a) are fully implemented, with analysis of – rather than information about – relevant categories of risk (including strategic and political) and identifying specific anticipated effects for programming, and how risks will be managed/mitigated.



Recommendation 5: Refresh or revise the key policy frameworks for working in fragile contexts.

This recommendation arises from Conclusion 6 and 7, which reflects experience of international best practice for working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, including on risk.

The key framework for working in fragile situations – the 2014 Fragile States policy (MFA 2014), is not widely known or utilised within MFA in designing and planning its programming in fragile contexts. While much of this guidance remains relevant, some of its content would benefit from updating.

At the same time, with risk a key factor in fragile context engagement, MFA's risk procedures are – while gaining momentum – not yet fully mature. No MFA-wide Risk Policy exists.

Consequently, to support staff with adequate guidance in strategizing and planning for fragile context engagement, the Fragile States guidance would benefit from refreshing and/or revision. At the same time, MFA would benefit from developing an MFA-wide Risk Policy, which specifies Finland's degree of risk tolerance, and clearly sets out risk categories, including those related to conflict-affected and fragile situations.

Recommendation 6: Ensure more rigorous treatment of the Human Rights-Based Approach in fragile contexts.

Arising from Conclusion 8, and also requiring enhanced human resources, this recommendation reflects the centrality of the human rights-based approach in Finnish assistance and also the shortcomings and limitations identified in the addressing of human rights in fragile contexts (notably an over-generalised approach, with insufficient specification of which rights and why).

MFA may consider integrating a robust human rights context analysis into the strengthened PEA, and requiring all revised Country Strategies to include a clear statement, based on analysis, of which specific rights are being targeted in the context; why Finland is well positioned to address them; and how (alone/in partnership; through funded initiatives or policy dialogue; etc.

Additionally, MFA should require all Country Strategy revisions in fragile environments to review the relevant human rights body/architecture in the context and present a feasibility assessment for support.

CSO-financed initiatives should clearly demonstrate the use of human rights-based approaches, including clear rationales for targeting specific rights. For multilateral initiatives, where relevant, the use of safeguarding mechanisms should be clearly verified.

Linking to Recommendation 4 above, MFA should embed within Mid Term Review processes the requirement to provide a short statement of progress against human rights realisation through financed programming, whether from Regional Department alone, or from across MFA depending on the model of Country Strategy adopted.



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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of selected Finland's country strategies and country strategy modality for development cooperation with focus on fragile contexts

1. Introduction and background

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) wishes to commission an evaluation of Finnish country strategies in fragile or conflict-affected situations, with a view to considering the role of the country strategy instrument in supporting planning and implementation.

Finland introduced results-based Country Strategies in 2012 to replace country engagement plans and to manage development cooperation interventions programmed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs itself in its long-term partner countries. Country Strategies² cover bilateral programmable assistance, and are public documents. In 2017 country strategies accounted for 27% of Finland's development cooperation; currently, 13 country multiannual plans are documented in Country Strategies.

The evaluation will assess the applicability and feasibility of the Country Strategy instrument in fragile contexts, given their specific challenges and requirements. It will draw evidence from the experience of Country Strategies in five countries, namely Afghanistan, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia and the Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, to draw wider findings and conclusions. It will cover the period 2012-current, and be conducted by an independent evaluation team. The evaluation will take place during the period March 2019–March 2020.

1.1 International context

Despite many different attempts to define 'fragility', few reflect its complexity and multifaceted nature. In policy terms, Finland applies the OECD list/classification of fragile states as its main reference point.³

The **International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)**,⁴ of which Finland is a member was created in 2008. It brings together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners, and civil society actors, with the mandate to develop international peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives and an action plan for effective engagement in fragile states. The early findings of the Dialogue resulted in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, with specific commitments to implement its provisions.

² For simplicity, these Terms of Reference refer to country strategies, although in the case of Afghanistan the priorities of Finland's assistance were determined in the Government's Afghanistan Report, adopted by the Parliament in 2018 (available only in Finnish as Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle Suomen tuesta Afganistanilla ja Suomen osallistumisen lisäämisestä Resolute Support -kriisinhallintaoperaatioissa) completed by a separate results framework.

³ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/listofstateoffragilityreports.htm>

⁴ The International Dialogue is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the G7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states, and member organisations of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).



The New Deal was signed by Finland in 2012. It requires development partners to support nationally-owned and led development plans and greater aid effectiveness in fragile situations (the TRUST principles), while G7+ governments committed to inclusive planning processes, grounded in context (the FOCUS principles). Both parties committed to pursuing the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs): legitimate politics, justice, security, revenue and services and economic foundations.

The 2016 Independent Review of the New Deal found that, despite achievements made, a considerable amount remained to be done to translate policy commitments into concrete results on the ground.⁵

Subsequently, the Stockholm Declaration of April 2016 reiterates commitment to New Deal principles in the operationalisation and implementation of the 2030 Agenda, taking into consideration the specific context of countries in fragile situations. It also reiterates the importance of the IDPS given its comparative advantage as a distinctive forum where development work and diplomatic efforts come together to prevent conflict and build sustainable peace. It committed to stepping up its support to peacebuilding and statebuilding at the national level and increasing its active participation in global policy discussions on peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

The 2018 INCAF report *States of Fragility* links the challenge posed by fragility to the goals of the 2030 Agenda, as well as to sustainable development and peace. It describes twelve key trends in fragility, and points to the multidimensional nature of fragility, which includes political, societal, economic, environmental and security elements. It points out that, without action, 80% of the world's poorest people will be living in fragile situations by 2030, whilst only 2% of gross ODA went to conflict prevention and associated activities in 2016. To strike the balance between fragility's inherent complexity and the simplicity required for efficient policy and decision making, the study advocates systems-based thinking; longer-term, consistent aid plans; the financing of peacebuilding activities; and a persistent focus on human beings.

Recent IDPS dialogue has focused on the implementation of Agenda 2030 in fragile situations. Other key relevant international policy processes and frameworks include:

- OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian – Development – Peace Nexus,⁶ adopted in February 2019.
- The High-level Political Forum in September 2019, which will review progress on the SDGs, including those in fragile situations.

1.2 National context

Following its 2012 commitment to the New Deal, Finland issued guidelines for cooperation with countries in fragile situation in 2014.⁷ These include the use of conflict analysis and a conflict-sensitive approach; ensuring co-operation, co-ordination and influence; strengthening local ownership; ensuring strong risk management; and the use of specific funding and support channels, particularly multilateral co-operation.

The Country Strategy Modality (CSM) and related planning and management processes have been constantly updated and improved in Finland's development co-operation. In 2016 an evaluation report on the feasibility of the CSM was published. Its findings and recommendations were applied when formulating new and/or updating existing country strategies. Revised guidance

⁵ http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/e1/c7/e1c7ff17-bc14-40ce-b769-d04b45c56332/ir.pdf

⁶ <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019>

⁷ Available at https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/finlands_development_policy_in_fragile_states



was issued in June 2016, with reporting guidelines provided 2017, with a view to the first comprehensive development policy results report to Parliament published in 2018. Attention in 2018 focused on improvements in the quality of political economy analysis. Recently, internal self-assessments, known as Mid Term Reviews (MTR), have helped review progress to date and improve the quality of planning during forthcoming cycles.

2. Purpose, objectives and rationale of the evaluation

The **purpose** of the evaluation is to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the country strategic planning instrument as a mechanism to guide Finland's co-operation in fragile contexts.

The **specific objectives** of the evaluation are:

- To assess the coherence between the five country strategies and MFA internal strategies and multilateral influencing plans, as well as with the Finnish Development Policy Programme 2016;
- To assess the relevance of Finland's co-operation in fragile situations, as reflected in country strategic plans, to the needs of beneficiaries and to the complexities of the context, including adaptation over time (e.g. the 'triple nexus');
- To assess the appropriateness and feasibility of Finland's policy dialogue in relation to the country strategies
- To assess the appropriateness of multi-bi cooperation as the main channel for delivery in fragile contexts,;
- To assess the extent to which Finnish development priorities are prioritised within planning and implementation of multi-bi co-operation, including in ensuring that the crosscutting objectives (the rights of the most vulnerable, gender equality and climate change preparedness and mitigation) are integrated as appropriate/feasible;
- To assess the extent to which the co-operation provided has been conflict sensitive and adhered to international commitments relevant to fragile situations, such as the international humanitarian principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations;
- To assess the results achieved by the co-operation, as far as they can be determined;
- To assess Finland's approach to partnership (including relationship-building, predictability and the adoption of a principled approach) in fragile contexts, particularly as perceived by external partners.

The **rationale** for the selection of the five case studies is partly because of their diversity, which will provide insights into a wide range of fragile situations in which Finland is engaged; and partly since programmed cooperation with these countries has not been previously assessed. Country teams will therefore benefit from both the results of the wider evaluation and Lessons/Implications from their own studies when drafting Country Strategies for the next programming period, which varies by country from 2020–2023 to 2021–2024.

At corporate level, and when assessing for example coherence between the five country strategies and MFA strategies and multilateral influencing plans, relevant departments include the Department for Americas and Asia, Department for Africa and the Middle East, Department for Development Policy and its various units that deal with CSO cooperation, sector policies, humanitarian aid and private sector cooperation and cooperation with IFIs and UN organizations. The Political Department is in charge of issues that relate to human rights issues, peacebuilding, peace mediation, civil and military crisis management, etc.



3. Intended use of the evaluation

The results of the overall and country specific evaluations are expected to be used by the MFA in the formulation of the next development policy programme that will be drafted end of 2019, and will be influenced by the vision and programme of the government that will take over in spring 2019.

Most of the country strategies have been drafted for a period ending in 2019 or 2020. The results of the evaluation, together with the results of self-assessment, are expected to help departments in charge of country programming further develop the country strategy modality and the implementation of country strategies in fragile contexts.

The results will also be used by the Development Policy Committee that is appointed by the Government to monitor and evaluate Finnish development cooperation and policy on a systematic and broad basis.

4. Description of the evaluand

All five countries which are the subject of this evaluation are affected by armed conflicts and other forms of instability. However the diverse underlying causes and manifestations of fragility is reflected in their different contexts.

Some features are nonetheless common to all five. These include:

- High risk-propensity and high levels of unpredictability, making risk management a challenge and calling for a higher risk tolerance than cooperation in other partner countries.
- The channelling of resources through multinational organizations and international development finance institutions, (a.k.a multi-bi cooperation), with monitoring and reporting conducted according to partner agency procedures;
- The five country strategies do not include explicit objectives for foreign and security policy (with the exception of Afghanistan), nor for trade policy. However, given the sensitive and often highly politicised processes surrounding aid decision-making in fragile contexts, Finland's objectives for country-level dialogue necessarily take into account these wider aspects of political and policy engagement;
- Country strategy based co-operation with Afghanistan, Myanmar, Palestinian territory, Somalia and Syria/Iraq has not been previously assessed as a modality for planning, implementation, follow-up and reporting on results (though some individual project evaluations are available);
- Synergies between country strategies, i.e. programmable aid and the other development policy and development cooperation activities, as well as other policy measures taking place in the same countries, would benefit from further enhancement, though some measures have been taken.⁸
- Some political issues and policy measures, e.g. those related to peace- and statebuilding or peace mediation, are both highly sensitive and difficult to express in a format of a results framework.

⁸ For example, the Afghanistan Country Strategy covers also crisis management measures and Syria/Iraq strategy includes also humanitarian assistance in addition to programmable cooperation. Also, when e.g. call for proposals for CSO-projects was launched in 2018, the principal assessment criteria took into account country specification (favoring least-developed and fragile countries) and the secondary assessment criteria observed linkages to the respective country strategy.



Annex 2 contains a matrix summarizing the volume, policy coverage, thematic focuses of both policy dialogue and development cooperation interventions, and key implementation partners in each country under current Country Strategies.⁹ These are summarised in the following table:

Country	Period of Country Strategy	Value	Focus areas
Somalia	2017–2020	25.7M€	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Women's and girls' right including increased availability and use of maternal, sexual and reproductive health services; improved national response to gender-based violence 2. Strengthening of core state functions including strengthened public administration and increased public revenue
Afghanistan	2017–2020	111 M€ (2017–2020) Incl. 28 M€ (2018) Hum.aid: 400,000 € (2018)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Justice, security, good governance and human rights 2. Improved basic public services 3. Diversified economic base
Occupied Palestinian territories	2016–2019	21,0 M€	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Children's rights to equitable and quality education (SWAP) 2. Resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas (Area C, Gaza, East Jerusalem) through better access to clean water and wastewater services and support to local development projects
Syria and Iraq	2017–2020	Annual pledges, e.g. 35 M€ in 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conditions for inclusive transition and sustainable peace in Syria 2. Dignified life for affected populations in Syria and improved conditions for the safe return of refugees and IDPs in stabilized areas 3. Dignified life for Syrian refugees and host-community affected populations in Syria's neighbouring countries.
Myanmar	2016–2019	34M EUR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Good forest governance /Climate resilience 2. Sustained peace and improved democratic governance / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups 3. Quality education for all / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups

Key features of Finnish assistance to the five case study countries are as follows:

Finland has been participating in stabilisation, reconstruction and development operations in **Afghanistan** since 2002. Finland's involvement in Afghanistan began soon after the fall of the Taliban regime and, in line with the comprehensive approach principle, it consists of military and civil crisis management and development cooperation

In **Myanmar**, Finland re-initiated its development cooperation in 2012. The three programmatic focus areas for Finland's cooperation are: 1) support to sustainable forest management, 2) support to peace, democratisation and women's rights and 3) support to basic education. The second focus area of the country programme is the widest in scope providing a foundation for all other work in Myanmar.

⁹ This table will need to be expanded for the full evaluation, to extend back to 2012.



As regards the cooperation with the **Occupied Palestinian territory**, the political and development cooperation agenda have always been closely linked, both aiming contribute to a peaceful, negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by supporting Palestinian state-building. The cooperation has lasted over 20 years and it was last evaluated in 2014. The first country strategy covers the period 2016–2019, and focuses on enhancing childrens’ rights to equitable and quality education and on strengthened resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas (Area C, Gaza, East Jerusalem).

The **Somalia** country strategy covers the period 2017–2020 and it is the first of its kind. The drafting of the strategy was carried out after overall country programming. Somalia is one of the early members of New Deal and Aid architecture in Somalia includes Worldbank, African Development Bank and UN organizations. Worldbank Multipartner Trust Fund has been operational since 2016 as well as the UN Multi Partner Fund.

The Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts in **Syria and Iraq** covers the period 2017–2020. The strategy stands out as the first country strategy that is developed in cooperation between the regional department and the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy. The strategy covers Finnish humanitarian administered by the later and the development/resilience funding by the former. The strategy attempts to demonstrate how the unpolitical, needs-based humanitarian action and other funding can be used in a complementary manner. Issues related to immigration and refugees and related approaches of Finland and partner countries will not be addressed in this case study since an evaluation on forced displacement and Finnish development policy was recently carried out (though may provide valuable background information).

5. Results of previous evaluations

Overarching findings and recommendations from recent evaluations commissioned by the Unit for Development Evaluation include:

- The need for further development of, and more effective implementation of, results based management approaches
- Improved cooperation across different funding channels and development cooperation instruments
- A more strategic approach to development cooperation, in line with the available human and financial resources.

In 2016 Finland published an evaluation report on the performance of the country strategy modality in developing and monitoring the strategies. The evaluation also assessed the performance of the interventions managed through the strategies against the strategy objectives in six countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.¹⁰ The evaluation found the assessed interventions relevant to the partner countries and Finland’s development policy objectives. When implemented, many interventions in the six countries delivered results, some sustainably. Finland’s policy influence was a major factor in this performance. However, implementation was often delayed, so that the full allocation of Finnish resources to the strategies was not used efficiently to produce results over the strategy period. The evaluation identified four main factors that detract from making the modality more effective. Firstly, the strategic planning model used was not fully conducive to strategic management of country portfolios, with excessively long results chains, unclear logical frameworks and narrow results tracking, as well as capacity limitations in results based management.

¹⁰ Finnish Development Cooperation with Kenya was evaluated in 2015.



A 2018 review to assess the evaluability of the human rights based approach (HRBA) concluded that the plausibility of MFA interventions leading to intended HRBA results was medium to low, given limited analysis of the wider human rights situation in the country; little consideration of the factors that contribute to the infringement of rights and whether these are targeted by the MFA-supported intervention; and a lack of clarity on whether projects aimed to contribute to the recognition of rights holders and duty bearers/ their corresponding rights, responsibilities and obligations.

The evaluation of the “Improvement of Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Finland’s Development Policy and Cooperation” found that Finland had contributed to good practices and lessons learnt for promoting gender equality across all aid modalities. It concluded that these strategies can inform policies and programming, e.g. through incorporation in gender analyses early in the programme planning. However, the evaluation identified also gaps in Finland’s new gender Theory of Change (ToC), as well as in gender monitoring and evaluation capacity and systems.

A 2019 Evaluation on Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy, which includes case studies on Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/Iraq, stressed the need for appropriate policy guidance and changes in the programming of cooperation to support an integrated approach for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, with strengthened internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting, as well as reinforcing policy influence and complementarity with other donors/PIPs/programme and country strategies.

Currently, MFA regional departments are in the process of completing the Medium Term Review of each Country Strategy through self-assessments. These will be available to the evaluation team, allowing the evaluation to identify key common bottlenecks and challenges as identified by internal stakeholders. Guidelines to prepare country strategies are also available, and their relevance/feasibility in fragile contexts will need to be assessed.

Future relevant studies include an ongoing evaluation of RBM & Knowledge management, the recommendations of which will be available during the first half of 2019; and a forthcoming evaluation (to be implemented in 2019) which will assess the extent to which Finland has succeeded in influencing its multilateral partners and pursuing its development policy and cooperation priorities through co-operation with them. Recommendations from all relevant evaluations should be taken into account during the design and implementation of this exercise.

6. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will cover the period 2012-current. Based on review of corporate-level information, and on case study assessment of the five Country Strategies in the relevant period, it will assess the Country Strategy Modality as an instrument for the planning and management of cooperation in fragile contexts. Considering the observations of the 2016 evaluation and its recommendations, the evaluation will assess, at strategic/corporate level, whether the Country Strategy approach is feasible and adequate to deliver results in such environments, considering their specific conditions and requirements.

The five individual Country Strategies vary in terms of comprehensiveness and coverage of policy areas. As a corporate-level study, the evaluation will not provide discrete country-level evaluations of the five Country Strategies, which would be beyond its scope. Instead, the five case studies, while appropriately tailored for context, will provide evidence contributions to the overarching synthesis report, which will produce overarching findings and recommendations. Country case study reports will, while applying the overarching evaluation questions, nonetheless tailor their analysis for the country level, and produce Lessons/Implications to support country stakeholders in their subsequent programming.



The evaluation will assess the criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Coherence and Connectedness. It will not assess Efficiency, Impact or Sustainability, due to the specific conditions and demands of working in fragile operating contexts, as well as anticipated data paucity, particularly for Efficiency and Impact.

Finally, the evaluation will focus on the specific issues surrounding the use of the Country Strategy Modality in fragile situations only, drawing on the experience of five country case studies. It will not seek to make general statements about Finland's aid co-operation as a whole, e.g. in more development-focused contexts.

7. Evaluation questions and criteria

The evaluation will apply the following criteria and questions, both at overarching (Synthesis) level and country level. Evaluation criteria¹¹ will be specifically defined for the evaluation during the Inception Phase. Within case studies, analysis will enable context-specific responses to the evaluation questions.

The three principal evaluation questions are:

1. To what extent has the country programming instrument promoted Finnish and partner country policy objectives and guided Finland's cooperation in fragile contexts? (Relevance)
2. To what extent does the country programming support policy coherence? (Coherence)
3. How can the country programming instrument be further developed for use in fragile situations? (Learning for the future)

The evaluation sub-questions, aligned against key criteria, are as follows:

Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent was Finland's assistance to the country relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, considering available resources? • To what extent was the assistance relevant to the needs of key stakeholders, including government, civil society and others? • To what extent did the assistance adapt appropriately over time, including in relation to volatile conditions?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What results for beneficiaries and other stakeholders were delivered in the context? • What results were delivered for non-discrimination, including gender equality and the empowerment of women, and climate change? • How well has Finland succeeded in incorporating policy dialogue into its country strategies? • To what extent was the selected modality, particularly multi-bi co-operation, effective in the context? • To what extent did assistance delivered through multi-bi co-operation take account of Finnish development policy, including cross-cutting objectives?
Coherence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did Finland's assistance provide a coherent approach to the country, e.g. across MFA departments and multiannual plans of action and funding? • To what extent did development programming assistance contribute to the realization of wider Development Policy objectives?
Connectedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did Finland's co-operation adhere to international commitments on the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and AAP? • To what extent did Finland's co-operation take into account long-term and interconnected problems, through the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus?

¹¹ OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria (currently under adaptation) and ALNAP Adaption of OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria for Humanitarian Action



8. Approach and methodology

The evaluation will need to be designed and implemented in a manner which takes account of the specific working approaches required for engagement in fragile contexts, namely:

- A politically aware approach
- Flexibility, to adapt to changing conditions on the ground
- Ensuring a contextually-sensitive approach
- Ensuring a minimal footprint for busy stakeholders

The evaluation should adopt a systematic approach with the use of structured tools, as appropriate for data-poor environments. It should also emphasise learning, for MFA, staff and partners.

In accordance with the principles of gender equality, particular attention should be paid to the inclusion of women and girls and individuals/groups that are marginalized and/or discriminated against. The evaluation design should also adhere to all relevant ethical standards, including cultural sensitivity, and respecting the confidentiality and anonymity of those interviewed.

The evaluation should be theory-based, seeking to define the theory of change for Finland's overall Country Strategies in fragile situation and in relevant operating environments. It should adopt a mixed-method approach, to be developed during the Inception Phase of the evaluation, but recognizing that data paucity is likely to prove a significant challenge. Secondary sources will be used to generate results data. The evaluation design should demonstrate how triangulation of methods and multiple information sources will be used to generate findings, as reflected in an evaluation matrix. The evaluation design should also consider that, given the multi-bi approach to co-operation, much data will rest with delivery partners such as multilateral institutions. The OECD DAC's Quality Standards for Development Evaluation will be applied.

The Terms of Reference will be developed as part of the SO1 in consultation with the Team Leader, Evaluation Department and EMSC. A mission to Helsinki will be required, to conduct interviews at HQ level. Fieldwork to countries will require 1–2 week country missions, and will focus on the overall Finnish portfolio of co-operation, rather than individual projects. To ensure that the field visits bring maximum value added, a careful desk study of the programme related documentation is essential before undertaking field missions.

The evaluation inception report will include a review of key documentation, the conceptual and theoretical basis of the evaluation, the indicative theory of change (which will be further developed during the evaluation process); the intended methodology; the evaluation matrix and tools; and fieldwork plan as well as the overall intended schedule for the evaluation.

The main document sources of information are earlier evaluations and studies, policy influencing plans for multilateral organizations, meeting documents, MFA reports and project/programme related material. The documents will be identified in the desk study during the inception phase. It is important to note that some material is available only in Finnish (e.g. meeting documents). Online translators cannot be used with MFA document materials classified as restricted use (classified as IV levels of protection in the MFA or confidential in any other organization).

Limitations include:

The multi-bi delivery channel means that the evaluation will be heavily dependent on access to, and data from, these organisations (including planning and results data especially). Thus, the evaluation design will need to take account of possible data paucity.



Other potential limitations include:

- The feasibility of fieldwork in volatile and challenging operating contexts, which may be affected by security risks and/or changing conditions
- Lack of stakeholder engagement, which is a common factor in highly demanding operating contexts

The Inception report should set out how these, and any other intended limitations, will be addressed.

The planning of field visits shall take into account holiday periods such as Idd and weather conditions, such as rainy season that will make relocation within the country difficult. Security and access permissions will also need to be addressed within each country context. The Inception report should set out how these concerns have been considered and addressed.

9. Management of the evaluation

EVA-11 will be responsible for the overall management of the evaluation process. EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the MFA and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

A reference group for the evaluation will be established and chaired by EVA-11. The reference group is constituted to facilitate the participation of relevant stakeholders in the design and scope of the evaluation, raising awareness of the different information needs, quality assurance throughout the process and in disseminating the evaluation results. The mandate of the reference group is to enhance the quality through advisory support and inputs to the evaluation, e.g. through participating in the planning of the evaluation and commenting deliverables of the consultant.

The use of a reference group is a key step in guaranteeing the transparency, accountability and credibility of an evaluation process and in validating the findings.

The members of the reference group will include:

- Representative of each country team
- One advisor from each regional department
- Representative(s) of the the Department for development policy
- Representative of the Political Department

Other members may be added during the evaluation if needed.

The tasks of the reference group are to:

- act as source of knowledge for the evaluation;
- act as an informant of the evaluation process;
- participate in the planning of the evaluation (providing inputs to the ToR, identifying key external stakeholders to be consulted during the process etc.);
- assist in identifying external stakeholders to be consulted during the process;
- participate in the relevant meetings (e.g. start-up meeting, meeting to discuss the evaluation plan, debriefing and validation meetings after the field visits);



- comment on the deliverables of the consultant (i.e. inception report, draft final report) to ensure that the evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the subject of the evaluation and
- play a key role in disseminating the findings of the evaluation and support the implementation, dissemination and follow-up on the agreed evaluation recommendations.

10. Evaluation process, timelines and deliverables

During the evaluation process particular attention should be paid to strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team. Communication between EVA-11 and Team Leader and Evaluation Management Service (EMS) Coordinator is crucial. It is highlighted that a new phase is initiated only when the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by EVA-11. The revised reports have to be accompanied by a table of received comments and responses to them.

The evaluation will commence in March 2019. The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. A summary of the deliverables defining each phase is listed here, with more details below:

- Phase A: Planning phase [start in mid-February and end by 22.3.2019]: Submission of Team Leader's comments on ToR and discussion with the MFA
- Phase B: Start up phase [start in the end of March and finish end April]: Start up meeting in Helsinki foreseen 24.4.19.
- Phase C: Inception phase [late April 2019 and end June 2019]: Submission of Draft Inception Report and and Final Inception Report
- Phase D: Implementation phase [start July 2019 and end in early November 2019]: Implementation of field visits
- Phase E: Reporting/Dissemination Phase [start November 2019 and finish end January 2020]. Team analysis workshop in late November followed by a validation workshop in Helsinki in January 2020. Draft Final Report submission by mid February and Final Report by mid March 2020; final Presentation in end March.

It should be noted that internationally recognised experts may be contracted by EVA-11 as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole evaluation process or for some phases/deliverables of the evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (inception report, draft final and final reports). In case of peer review, the views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

The language of all reports and possible other documents is English. Time needed for the commenting of different reports is 3 weeks. The timetables are tentative, except for the final reports.

A. PLANNING PHASE

Initial timetable: [15.2.-22.3.2019]

EVA-11 will finalize the ToR of the evaluation in consultations with the team leader. Therefore, the EMS will provide the Team Leader of the evaluation already in planning phase. Service order 1 will describe the required services of the EMS for the planning phase in details.

The following meetings will be organized during the planning phase. Meetings can be face-to-face or video meetings.

- A planning meeting with the EMS coordinator on required services, especially the qualifications and skills of the team leader.



- A planning meeting with the team leader on evaluation approach and methodological requirements (with TL and EMS coordinator) – Skype meeting early March
- A meeting for finalizing the ToR and identifying the skills and qualifications of the rest of the team (with TL and EMS Coordinator, liaison with the reference group)

Deliverable: TL suggestions on how to finalize the ToR (an issue paper and revisions to the ToR as track changes)

B. START-UP PHASE

The service order 2 (to be issued by end of March 2019) will describe the required EMS services in detail.

The following meetings will be organized during the start-up phase:

1. **The start-up meeting with the reference group** will be held right before the administrative meeting and its purpose is to establish a community to enable dialogue and learning together as well as to get to know the evaluation team and the reference group. The purpose is also to provide the evaluation team with a general picture of the subject of the evaluation. The Team Leader/evaluation team will present its understanding of the evaluation, the initial approach of the evaluation and the evaluation questions.

Participants in the start-up meeting: EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session), reference group, Team Leader and EMS coordinator of the Consultant in person.

2. **The administrative meeting** will be held with the EMS consultant in Helsinki in April). The purpose of the meeting is to go through the evaluation process, related practicalities and to build common understanding on the ToR and on administrative arrangements. EVA-11's possible participation and role in the field visits will also be discussed and agreed. Agreed minutes will be prepared by the consultant.

Participants in the administrative meeting in Helsinki: EVA-11 and the Team Leader and the EMS coordinator of the Consultant in person. Other Team Members can participate in person or via electronic means.

Deliverables: Presentation of the approach and methodology by the Team Leader, Agreed minutes of the two meetings by the consultant.

C. INCEPTION PHASE

The Inception phase includes desk analysis and preparation of detailed evaluation plan (see the current evaluation manual).¹² The desk study includes a comprehensive context and document analysis. It shall also include mapping of programmes and their different sources of funding and the development of the theory of change.

Before full inception report is drafted there will a consultative process to agree on the core evaluation team members. Other team members can also be presented if feasible. In addition the consultant will present a draft work plan and a refined budget.

The inception report consists of the evaluation desk study and evaluation plan which include the following

- context analysis
- initial findings and conclusions of the desk study, including hypotheses
- constructed theory of change

¹² <https://eoppiva.zapter.io/evaluationmanual2018>



- finalization of the methodology and summarized in an evaluation matrix including evaluation questions, indicators, methods for data collection and analysis
- final work plan and division of work between team members
- tentative table of contents of final report
- data gaps
- detailed implementation plan for field visits with clear division of work (participation, interview questions/guides/notes, preliminary list of stakeholders and organizations to be contacted)
- budget.

The inception report will be presented, discussed and the needed changes agreed in the inception meeting in June 2019. The inception report must be submitted to EVA-11 two weeks prior to the inception meeting.

Plans for the field work, preliminary list of people and organizations to be contacted, participative methods, interviews, workshops, group interviews, questions, quantitative data to be collected etc. must be approved by EVA-11 at least three weeks before going to the field.

Participants to the inception meeting: EVA-11, reference group and the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session), and the EMS Coordinator in person. Other team members may participate in person or via electronic means.

Venue: MFA, Kirkkokatu 12, Helsinki.

Deliverables: Inception report including the evaluation plan, desk study and the minutes of the inception meeting by the Consultant

D. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

The Implementation phase will take place in July – November 2019. It includes collection of preliminary and secondary data and their analysis. A gender- and human-rights sensitive approach should be adopted.

Field visit timing will depend on country conditions, but missions may last up to two weeks. Remote interviews should also be conducted with key stakeholders in Helsinki, and in-country interviews should be conducted with MFA stakeholders and key partners, including national government representatives; multilateral agency representatives; civil society partners; and others. The purpose of the field visits is to triangulate and validate the results and assessments of the document analysis; full ethical standards, including those of confidentiality and anonymity, should be observed. The MFA and embassies will not organize interviews or meetings with the stakeholders on behalf of the evaluation team, but will assist in identification of people and organizations to be included in the evaluation. It should be noted that a representative of EVA-11 may participate in some of the field visits as an observer for learning purposes.

To support learning, a debriefing/validation workshop at the end of each country visit, and country case study reports will be prepared. These will respond to the overarching evaluation questions from a country-specific perspective, providing tailored responses which take full account of the specificities of country conditions. They will provide relevant and useful Lessons/Implications for country-level programming, though not full Recommendations, which will be provided in the overarching synthesis report. Country case studies will be prepared to a standard format, to a maximum of 25 pp.



Deliverables/meetings: At country level, a validation/learning meeting will be held, providing powerpoint presentations on the key themes emerging. At overarching level, a debriefing workshop will be held on initial findings and conclusions in Helsinki, also to support validation and learning.

Participants in the country workshops: The team members of the Consultant participating in the country visit (responsible for inviting and chairing the session) and the relevant stakeholders/beneficiaries, including from the Embassy of Finland and relevant representatives of the local government. EVA-11 and responsible desk officers of the regional departments may participate via Skype, when possible.

E. REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION PHASE

The reporting and dissemination phase will take place in [November 2019 – April 2020] and produce the Final report. Dissemination of the results is organized during this phase.

The report should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report must follow writing instructions and template provided by EVA-11 and it should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. The logic between those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be sent for a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors. The time needed for commenting is 3 weeks.

The final draft report must include abstract and summaries (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations). It must be of high and publishable quality. It must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the content and language.

The report will be finalised based on the comments received and must be ready by April 2020. The final report must include abstract and summaries (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The Finnish speaking senior evaluator will be responsible for Finnish translations of good quality. The final report will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats.

As part of reporting process, the Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control has been addressed during the evaluation.

In addition, the MFA requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

At corporate level, following the completion of field missions and evaluation team's internal synthesis of findings, a debriefing/validation workshop will be arranged in Helsinki in January 2020. The purpose of the workshop is to share and validate initial findings and discuss preliminary conclusions and recommendations, as well as to support learning across MFA. Participants in the workshop will include: EVA-11, reference group, other relevant staff/stakeholders, the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session), team members and the EMS Coordinator

Deliverables: Final report (draft final report and final report) and methodological note by the quality assurance expert.



A management meeting on the final results will be organized in Helsinki tentatively late March/early April March 2020 and the Team Leader and the EMS Coordinator must be present in person.

A public presentation on the results will be organized on the same visit as the final management meeting. It is expected that at least the Team leader and deputy TLs are present.

A public Webinar will be organized by EVA-11. Team leader and other team members will give short presentation of the findings in a public Webinar. Presentation can be delivered from distance. Only a sufficient internet connection is required.

The MFA will prepare a management response to the recommendations.

11. Expertise required

There will be one Management Team, responsible for overall coordination of the evaluation. The EVA-11 Evaluation Manager, Team Leader and the EMS coordinator will form the Management Team. The Team Leader, Deputy Team Leaders and EMS Coordinator will represent the team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the evaluation results.

One Team Leader level expert will be identified as the Team Leader of the whole evaluation. The Team Leader will lead the work and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team Leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation.

The minimum criteria of the Team Leader and team members is defined in the EMS Consultant's tender which is annexed to the EMS Contract. The required expertise of the evaluation team will be as follows:

- Experience of bilateral agency planning and implementation in fragile context
- Knowledge of MFA systems, approaches and working modalities
- Knowledge of multilateral agency implementation in fragile contexts, particularly the UN, and also CSOs
- Relevance sector expertise as per country strategies (especially education)
- Experience in the countries of study (or similar contexts)
- Relevant language skills including Finnish
- Knowledge of the IHPs, gender, protection and AAP

At country level, team members are expected to have work experience in/knowledge of the specific countries under assessment, as well as knowledge of RBM and HRBA and integrating cross-cutting objectives in project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Fragile states experience is essential. At least one Junior Expert should be included in the team and her/his role should be clearly defined in the proposal. Local consultants may also support country case study teams; their skills and experience should correspond or exceed the minimum requirements of the evaluation team members. The EVA-11 will approve the experts.

The competencies of the team members shall be complementary. All team members shall have fluency in English and at least one senior evaluator must have fluency in Finnish. MFA document material classified as restricted use (classified as IV levels in the MFA, or confidential in other organizations) cannot be saved, processed or transmitted by any cloud services or unsecured emails. Google translators or any other unsecure web based translators cannot be used to translate these documents.



The Team Leader and the team have to be available until the reports have been approved by the EVA-11, even when the timetables change.

12. Quality assurance of the Consultant

Internal quality assurance

The internal QA System put in place will aim at ensuring that the individual studies are implemented in a timely manner, with rigour and impartiality, and fully respecting MFA's evaluation principles and standards, including ethical standards.

The TL and the EMS Coordinator play a key role in making sure that the system is adequately applied, especially for each product prepared by the team. Where deemed necessary by the EMS Coordinator (e.g. to enhance the QA of some crucial products or identify solutions to unexpected challenges), she will mobilise in-house senior advisors with extensive track record in complex evaluation. If required, corrective measures will be initiated by the EMS Coordinator at an earliest possible stage to avoid the accumulation of quality deficiencies that may be hard to remedy at a later stage. Internal QA is an incremental process which, in particular, requires adequate efforts in the initial stages of the process (both planning and inception phases).

External quality assurance

In order to complement the internal QA, an External Quality Assurance Expert (EQAE) will be recruited. The EQAE will carry out an independent review of the deliverables. If deemed feasible, the EQAE could be engaged in the evaluation process early-on rather than only commenting completed documents. This approach ensures that the evaluation is able to benefit from his/her expertise and guidance given the complex nature of the assignment. S/he is also in charge of the formal quality assurance of the evaluation deliverables, and submits comments in a written form by using a peer review template (EVA-11). EQAE will be presented as part of the evaluation team for the approval by the EVA-11.

If deemed useful the MFA will organize a peer review or other potential external quality assurance to support evaluation process and learning.

In the beginning of the evaluation, all team members involved will be briefed on and will need to subscribe to a confidentiality agreement which will comply to MFA norms for information security (including the different levels of protection of MFA's internal information management system).

13. Budget

The evaluation will not cost more than [€ 950,000] (VAT excluded).

14. Mandate

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organisations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland or the Ministry. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the end result under Creative Commons license in order to promote openness and public use of evaluation results.



15. Authorisation

[Helsinki]

Anu Saxén

Director

Development Evaluation Unit

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland



Annex 1: Reference and Resource material

General guidelines and policies

<https://um.fi/policies-and-guidelines>

<https://um.fi/development-policy-and-development-cooperation>

<https://um.fi/publications>

Government report on development policy 2016

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/government_report_on_development_policy_2016

Development Policy Programme 2012

https://um.fi/publications/-/asset_publisher/TVOLgBmLyZvu/content/suomen-kehityspoliittinen-toimenpideohjelma-2012?curAsset=0&stId=47307

Development policy programme 2007

https://um.fi/publications/-/asset_publisher/TVOLgBmLyZvu/content/kehityspoliittinen-ohjelma-2007?curAsset=0&stId=47307

Bilateral partner countries

<https://um.fi/bilateral-partner-countries>

MFA Manual for Bilateral Programmes (2018)

https://um.fi/publications/-/asset_publisher/TVOLgBmLyZvu/content/manual-for-bilateral-programmes?curAsset=0&stId=47307

Results based management (RBM) in Finland's Development Cooperation (2015)

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/results_based_management__rbm__in_finland_s_development_cooperation

Human Rights Based Approach in Finland's Development Cooperation (2015)

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/human_rights_based_approach_in_finlands_development_cooperation___guidance

Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Democracy Support Policy (2014)

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/ministry_for_foreign_affairs__democracy_support_policy

Finland's Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States (2014)

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/finlands_development_policy_in_fragile_states

Finland's Humanitarian Policy (2012)

https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/finlands_humanitarian_policy

Humanitarian Aid

<https://um.fi/humanitarian-aid>

Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy (2017)

https://um.fi/policies-and-guidelines/-/asset_publisher/NgyU5oMVA9rg/content/kehityspoliittinen-kansalaisyhteiskuntalinjaus-2017?curAsset=0&stId=47307

Evaluation guidelines

Evaluation Manual of the MFA (2018)

<https://eoppiva.zapter.io/evaluationmanual2018>

UNEG Manual: Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations (2014)

<http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1616>



UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation

<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/download/547>

UNEG Ethical Guidelines

<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/download/548>

Evaluations and reviews

All evaluation reports (comprehensive evaluations)

<https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations>

Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation Country Strategies and Country Strategy Modality (2016)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointi-suomen-kehitysyhteistyön-maahjelmista/384998

Evaluation on Finland's Development Cooperation with Kenya in 2007–2013 (2015)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointi-kenian-maahjelmista-2007-2013/384998

Evaluation of Finnish Aid to Afghanistan (2008)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointi-suomen-kehitysavusta-afganistanille/384998

Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland's Development Cooperation (2014)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointiraportti-2014-5-rauha-ja-kehitys-suomen-kehitysyhteistyössä-synteesi/384998

Evaluation: Finland's Development Policy Programmes from a Results-Based Management Point of View 2003–2013 (2014)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointi-suomen-kehityspoliittiset-toimenpiteohjelmat-tulosjohtamisen-nakokulmasta-2003-2013/384998

Improvement of Women's and Girls' Rights in Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation (2018)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluation-improvement-of-women-s-and-girls-rights-in-finland-s-development-policy-and-cooperation/384998

Evaluation of Finland's humanitarian mine action (2015)

https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations/-/asset_publisher/nBPgGHSLrA13/content/evaluointi-suomen-humanitaarisesta-miinatoiminnasta/384998

Independent Review of Finnish Aid (2015)

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=328296&nodeid=15145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>



Other reports

Development cooperation results report (2018)

https://um.fi/current-affairs/article/-/asset_publisher/iYk2EknIImNL/content/kehityspolitiikan-tulosraportti-2018?p_p_auth=V1AtI8g1&curAsset=0&stId=44227

100 results of Finnish development results

<https://kehityislehti.fi/en/100-kehitystulosta/>



Annex 2: Summary of Country Strategies

Country/Region	Duration	Policy areas covered	Focus of policy dialogue	Focus areas for development cooperation/Crosscutting objectives	Budget	Type of cooperation/instruments included in the strategy
Afghanistan: Government report to the Parliament on the Finnish support to Afghanistan and on the increase of Finnish participation in "Resolute Support" – crisis management operation	2017–2020	Policy dialogue; Bilateral relations; Military (RS-Operation) and civil crisis management; Management of immigration (repatriation arrangements); Development cooperation;	Peace and stability (priority of foreign, security and development policy); Human rights (annual HR dialogue with Afghan gov.; women's rights)	Justice, security, good governance and human rights Improved basic public services Diversified economic base	Military crisis management: 11 M€ (5,6 M€ MFA) Development cooperation: Planned: 111 M€ (2017-2020), i 28 M€ (2018) Hum. aid: 400,000 (2018)	Multi-bi: ARTF (10 M€/ year) UNDP: LOTFA UNICEF UNESCO UNODC UN Women AIHRC INGO support: Marie Stopes International; ICRC
Myanmar: Country Strategy for Development Cooperation	2016–2019	Development cooperation	Inclusivity, non-discrimination, democracy; Equality, accountability and transparency of legal and governance systems; HR, with emphasis on minorities and persons with disabilities: Rights of women and girls/GBV	Good forest governance /Climate resilience Sustained peace and improved democratic governance / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups Quality education for all / Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups	Planned: 34 M€ (2016-2019) Peace & democracy: 43 % Women's rights: 13% Education: 19% Forestry: 25%	Multi-bi/UN: FAO UNDP UNESCO UNFPA UNODC Multi: - Joint Peace Fund - WB: Multi-donor Trust Fund/ Education programme DFSP Support to NGOs (Education sector) Institutional Cooperation Instrument (HEI and research institutions)



Country/Region	Duration	Policy areas covered	Focus of policy dialogue	Focus areas for development cooperation/Crosscutting objectives	Budget	Type of cooperation/instruments included in the strategy
Country Strategy for Occupied Palestinian territory	2016–2019	FI participates in EU CCM missions and UN operations monitoring peace or ceasefire arrangements. Activity is mentioned but strategy covers Dev.coop only	Peaceful two-state solution to I-P conflict; democracy, RoL; better donor harmonization; advocacy for the rights of women and vulnerable groups (people in vulnerable situation, incl. geographical vulnerability)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Children's rights to equitable and quality education (SWAP) 2. Resilience of Palestinians living in vulnerable areas (Area C, Gaza, East Jerusalem) through better access to clean water and wastewater services and support to local development projects. 	Planned: 21,0 M€ of which 69 % on education sector (excludes Hum. Aid, PS, CSOs);	Multi-bi: UNICEF Institutional cooperation instrument; Peer support to Palestinian pre-school administration UNDP Trust Funds Core support to UNRWA WB Finnish NGOs working in the region are not included in the strategy, but better coordination is foreseen
Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq	2017–2020	Humanitarian and development needs, covering also Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt in terms of spill-over effects of the conflicts	<p>Aligned with and implemented through European Union policies adopted in various Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions.*</p> <p>Finland's themes of dialogue and advocacy have to match the resources available. Finland's strategic advocacy themes are</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) inclusiveness of the peace and dialogue processes; 2) women's political participation and attention to their specific needs in conflict response; 3) further development of the concept of resilience and strengthening the humanitarian development nexus; 4) the special needs and rights and the protection of vulnerable groups, especially persons with disabilities in the conflict response; and 5) the innovative role of the private sector in bringing new solutions to the humanitarian and resilience challenges and in creating jobs. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conditions for inclusive transition and sustainable peace in Syria 2. Dignified life for affected populations in Syria and improved conditions for the safe return of refugees and DPs in stabilized Areas 3. Dignified life for Syrian refugees and host-community affected populations in Syria's neighbouring countries. 	Annual pledges, e.g. 35 M€ in 2017	UN Agencies International Red Cross/Red Crescent WB EBRD



Country/Region	Duration	Policy areas covered	Focus of policy dialogue	Focus areas for development cooperation/Crosscutting objectives	Budget	Type of cooperation/instruments included in the strategy
Somalia	2017–2020		<p>1) Promotion of women's and girls' rights;</p> <p>2) Conflict-sensitivity, including a fair and equitable sharing of resources between the central government and the interim regional administrations.</p> <p>3) Economic recovery and increased domestic revenue collection.</p>	<p>1. Women's and girls' rights</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased availability • and use of maternal, sexual and reproductive health services. • improved national response to gender-based violence <p>2. Strengthening of core state functions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strengthened public administration and increased public revenue 	25,7 M€	<p>1. Multi-bi:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNFPA, IOM, • CSOs: Finnish MFA-funded CSOs in Somalia <p>2. WB managed Multi-Partner Fund to Somalia (MPF)</p>



Annex 2 Detailed methodology

The evaluation adopted a highly systematic approach, prioritising transparency and traceability of evidence. This Annex provides the methodological approach applied and its realisation in practice.

A. Operating principles

The nature of the evaluation object – Country Strategies and associated Portfolios in fragile contexts – demanded strong attention to the evaluation process as well as to its products. Accordingly, the evaluation design was shaped around six operating principles, appropriate for working in fragile contexts. These were tested and validated during the Inception phase and subsequently applied during the evaluation. Table 25 below explains them, and how they were built into the evaluation design.

Table 25 Operating principles


Principle	Explanation	How built into evaluation design
Flexibility	The need to adapt not just to the fluid conditions of the five fragile contexts, but also ensuring that the evaluation design responds appropriately to the objectives of the Country Strategies in these situations	Woven into /adopted by the evaluation approach to date, e.g. in the revision of evaluation questions for greater contextual sensitivity; ongoing refinement of Country portfolio data and adaptation of methods. A flexible approach was adopted throughout implementation.
Minimal footprint	To reduce pressures on busy MFA staff and partners, particularly at country level, the evaluation needed to ensure that maximum value is gained from time spent with busy stakeholders	The design made efforts to ensure that available documentary data is shared/made maximum use of, and that time spent with MFA staff both in Helsinki and in fieldwork was maximized for its value (e.g. high levels of preparation, to ensure that questions did not cover ground already available from documentation).
Prioritizing independence & impartiality	Critical to uphold the international standards of evaluation and ensure this study's credibility particularly given its sensitive nature	Section O contains a statement on how independence and impartiality was ensured, including through the transparency and traceability of evidence (within the boundaries of ethical standards, below).
Systematic approach	To ensure methodological rigour given the transnational nature of the evaluation, but also to reinforce the evaluation's credibility amid a wide range of stakeholders.	A fully systematic approach adopted, prioritising the use of structured tools for data gathering and analysis Section K provides further detail.
Communicating throughout	To maximise utility to stakeholders in Helsinki and at country level, the evaluation process needed to be treated as a substantive part of the exercise.	The evaluation team were committed to working with Evaluation Unit on communicating the findings of the evaluation, and a separate Communication plan for the evaluation was developed by EVA-11.
Ethical standards	To ensure, particularly when conducting interviews and fieldwork in highly sensitive contexts, that informed consent was secured; interviewees are assured of their ability to speak in confidence; and that no harm would come to those who provide information.	Section Q contains a full statement on the ethical standards of the evaluation



B. Conceptual approach

Overall, the evaluation design sought to apply a model which is contextually-sensitive to diverse fragile contexts, as well as speaking to MFA's own operating model and culture. To achieve this, the design combined theory-based evaluation with elements of contribution analysis (referenced in section A above) and a utilisation-focused approach (Figure 9):

Figure 9 Conceptual Approach



These comprise:

- **Theory-based evaluation**, which focuses on context, and the highlighting of causal mechanisms – i.e. understanding why events (including results) occurred as they did. This approach was appropriate for an evaluation whose object is the Country Strategy approach and associated Portfolios, but whose strategic nature required an aggregate level overview, and where the political features of engagement in fragile contexts required attention.
- **Approaches to contribution analysis** (Mayne, 2001). Whilst full contribution analysis was not feasible for this evaluation, given anticipated challenges around results data (section 3.4), the design recognized that direct 'attribution' of results from a Country portfolio to a Country Strategy in volatile fragile environments was likely to be unfeasible. Contribution analysis can help build up 'contribution stories' of the links from the results achieved to the Country portfolio and the overarching Country Strategy approach. This approach was appropriate for an evaluation focused on the Country Strategy approach, rather than having the aid co-operation as the primary object.
- **Utilization-focused evaluation** (Patton, 2008). Utilization-focused evaluation stresses that evaluations should be conducted in such a way as to promote the use and operationalisation of findings. It is reflected in the operating principle of 'Communicating', above. For this evaluation, it also implied focusing on forward-looking analysis that could contribute to future planning, an approach adopted throughout.

The intersections between these three areas shaped the evaluation design. For example, the intersections between theory based evaluation and contribution analysis are well documented (Mayne 2001). The "joint surface" of theory-based and utilization focused evaluation is manifested within organisations in terms of corporate theories of change (for example, the theories of change developed for Finland's Development Policy Priorities).



C. Theoretical framework


In line with the use of a theory-based approach (section B), a theoretical framework (Figure 10) was developed for the evaluation. This centred on the role of the Country Strategy approach in delivering results in fragile contexts, and ultimately reductions in fragility.

The theoretical framework drew on the sources identified in sections A and B above, including: Country Strategy Guidance; the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States; Theories of Change for Finland's four Development Policy Priority Areas; the five Country Strategies (and management responses) and Country Strategies Syntheses Reports. In particular, it is guided by the 2014 Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States guidelines, which emphasizes that cooperation in fragile states should focus on long-term preventive measures as well as on peace- and statebuilding, as far as possible applying the framework provided by New Deal.

The theoretical framework situated the Country Strategy approach within these wider ambitions. It was tested and refined as the evaluation proceeded. It functioned at aggregate level for the evaluation, as appropriate for a transnational study of a central object (the Country Strategy approach and associated Country Strategies). Since the five fragile context case studies did not comprise individual evaluations, it was not appropriate to develop separate theoretical frameworks at country level. Instead, the five case studies applied the global theoretical framework, and, through the case study process, specified, validated and interrogated this for the wider evaluation. The theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 10.




Figure 10 Theoretical framework





Contributions of Country Strategy modality to results





D. Hypotheses developed

The following hypotheses were developed, geared to the theoretical framework above. They informed the development of the evaluation questions (section F).

The emerging hypotheses (Table 26) were operationalised through the evaluation questions (section F). They were tested through evaluation implementation, and responses to them are provided within the main evaluation report.

Table 26 Hypotheses developed

Number	Emerging hypothesis	Explanation
Hypothesis 1	The Country Strategy approach provided a valuable reference point and potentially a strategic umbrella for Finnish Regional-Department-managed programmable assistance in fragile contexts but had a limited role as a strategic <i>driver</i> to inform programme choices within the CSM	Initial analysis suggested this to be the case, and enquiry considered whether and how the role of a Country Strategy was the optimal instrument for planning in fundamentally volatile and risk-prone operating contexts
Hypothesis 2	The Country Strategy approach improved the internal coherence of Finnish assistance provided, but had limited broader effects in shaping aid co-operation in fragile contexts, including across MFA departments and divisions (i.e. full Country Portfolios)	Apparently variable uses of Country Strategies at country level meant varied utility for stimulating coherence. The evaluation assessed whether, overall, coherence had improved (or had the potential to improve) and whether the Country Strategy approach had the scope to inform broader aid co-operation across MFA.
Hypothesis 3	The Country Strategy approach helped improve results management and reporting in fragile situations through the use of a common results framework and requirements for aggregate-level reporting	The evaluation assessed not only results-based reporting, but the relevance and utility of the systems applied to support aid management in fragile situations
Hypothesis 4	The Country Strategy approach, through the logic set out in the evaluation's theoretical framework, enabled Finland to contribute to reductions in fragility in the five identified contexts, both through policy dialogue and programming.	This prove highly uncertain due to the weak links between the Country Strategy and fragility reductions in examined contexts.

E. Evaluation criteria

The evaluation criteria identified for the study were contextualized for the evaluation (Table 27).

Table 27 Contextualised valuation criteria

Criterion	Interpretation for the evaluation
Relevance	The extent to which the Country Strategy approach enabled Finnish Country portfolios and policy dialogue to be tailored to local needs, and to adapt to meet changing needs over time.
Coherence	The extent to which the Country Strategy approach supported the provision of internally coherent assistance to the country, including assistance beyond the coverage of the Country Strategy, and supported the realisation of Finland's wider Development Policy objectives
Connectedness	The extent to which the Country Strategy approach supported the adherence of Finnish assistance to international commitments and the consideration of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus



Criterion	Interpretation for the evaluation
Effectiveness	The extent to which the Country Strategy approach supported Finnish assistance to achieve its intended results in fragile situations, and/or to contribute to wider results beyond its original intentions.

Source: Evaluation team

F. Evaluation questions

The initial set of evaluation questions presented in the ToR is available at Annex 1. These were subsequently refined during the Inception Phase in line with the theoretical framework (section C) and the hypotheses developed (section D).

The three principal evaluation questions remained unchanged. These were:

1. To what extent has the Country Strategy approach promoted Finnish and partner country policy objectives and guided Finland's cooperation in fragile contexts?
2. To what extent does the Country Strategy approach support policy coherence?
3. How can the Country Strategy approach be further developed for use in fragile situations?

The refined evaluation sub-questions, aligned against the contextualised evaluation criteria set out in section E, were as follows (Table 28):

Table 28 Evaluation Questions

Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the alignment of Finland's Country portfolios and policy dialogue to address the causes of fragility? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland's assistance to the needs of stakeholders and beneficiaries, considering available resources? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland's assistance to the needs of key stakeholders, whether government, civil society or others? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach enable assistance to adapt appropriately over time, including in relation to volatile conditions?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the orientation of initiatives to best deliver results for key stakeholders and beneficiaries in the context? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach provide an enabling environment for results in non-discrimination, including gender equality and the empowerment of women, and climate change? • To what extent did the selected aid co-operation modality, particularly multi-bi co-operation, support the delivery of results in the context? • To what extent have Finnish Country Strategies/Portfolios contributed to any reductions in fragility?
Coherence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How/or does the Country Strategy approach support Finland in providing coherent assistance to the country, e.g. across MFA departments and multilateral influencing plans and funding? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support alignment with the plans and policies of other key donors/international actors in the context? • To what extent did the Country Strategy approach contribute to the realization of wider Finnish Development Policy objectives?
Connectedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did Country Strategies adhere to international commitments on the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations? • To what extent did the Country Strategies take into account long-term and interconnected problems, e.g. through the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus?

Source: Evaluation team



G. Evaluation Matrix

The Evaluation Matrix is supplied at Annex 3. It was geared to the theoretical framework above and formed the main analytical ‘spine’ of the evaluation, against which all data was gathered and analysed. It was shaped around the evaluation questions, which were in turn informed by the emerging hypotheses presented in section D; and embedded the contextualised evaluation criteria in section E.

The Matrix has the following features:

- Under Effectiveness, which addresses results, the Matrix contains two sequential layers, reflecting the results logic described above. The first layer, a column on Progress Markers – Country Strategy, contains progress markers related to the Country Strategy approach. The next layer, presented as a column on Progress Markers – Results, applies evidence of the results generated. This approach supported the evaluation to construct the connections between the Country Strategy/Portfolio and the results generated, as per the logic above.
- The overarching evaluation questions are presented as ‘conclusions’ questions, with evidence from the sub-questions aggregated to inform their analysis.

More specifically, the Evaluation Matrix also includes:

- The methods applied;
- Data sources identified;
- Progress markers to enable performance assessment;
- The International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations as well as gender and human rights concerns.

All other enquiry tools, such as structured tools for data gathering and analysis (see section K below), were geared towards the Matrix.


H. Evidence-building approach

The overall design of the evaluation adopted a sequential approach, aiming to develop the evidence base through progressively deeper analysis as the evaluation proceeded. This approach was structured through a series of evidence streams, which built on each other, and enabled deeper enquiry into specific themes identified, as they emerged during data gathering and analysis.

Figure 11 provides an overview of how the evaluation criteria and questions linked to the different evidence streams and use of structured tools described below, to ensure the fully systematic approach adopted to the evaluation:



Figure 11 Evidence-building approach




Source: Evaluation team

I. Evidence streams

The evidence-building approach comprised six ‘evidence streams’ (Figure 12), which were combined through a mixed-methods approach. This model combined quantitative and qualitative data, set against the backdrop of the conceptual framework described in section B, to answer the evaluation questions. Procedures for analysis are explained in section N below.

Figure 12 Evidence streams





Stream 1: Portfolio analysis: This pillar comprised two dimensions: a) aggregate level analysis of Finland's investments in the five identified countries since 2012 and b) country-level portfolio level analysis.

- **Aggregate level analysis:** This dimension built on the initial analysis conducted in the Inception Phase to provide verified analysis of the overall portfolio of Finland's investments in the five countries, exploring patterns of investment over the period 2012-2018. Analysing aggregate-level investments under the Country portfolio enabled the evaluation to track trends in investment by volume, partner, investment modality etc over time.
- **Country level analysis:** Verification and in-depth analysis of country level data enabled mapping of the Country portfolio against events, for example upsurges in violence or conflict, to provide a deeper analysis of relevance. It also enabled analysis of the extent to which programmable co-operation as reflected in the profile per fragile context cohered with the intentions set out in the Country Strategy.

Stream 2: Desk review of projects: This stream, based on country-level portfolio analysis undertaken, identified a sample of 64 projects total within the five fragile contexts. These were then analysed in more depth according to a structured tool. This complemented the broad overview of Finland's investment in the context generated by the country-level portfolio analysis, above, through a deeper analysis of a structured sample of projects, providing insights against the evaluation questions which were then further explored through field study. The sampling methodology is set out in section J below, and the constructed sample per country at Annex 4.

Stream 3: Field study: The evaluation implemented field missions to each of the five fragile contexts, of a duration of ten days to two weeks in the period September-November 2019. Primary data collection focused on collecting the perspectives and experiences of staff in Embassies/Representative Offices of Finland as well as other stakeholders and partners. Since the evaluation was strategic-level, rather than conducting in-depth analysis of individual activities, it did not involve direct observation of Finland-funded interventions or focus groups with primary beneficiaries but sought this information as secondary data from partners. A particular emphasis was placed on collating any literature unavailable centrally, especially on results, and on understanding policy dialogue concerns.

Stream 4: Institutional systems analysis: This stream reviewed Finland's systems, procedures and decision-making processes around its Country Strategy approach, as well as the guidance available for their preparation. It reviewed the content of the respective Country Strategy, policy dialogue and programming, and considered the role of internal aid management systems in supporting the translation of Country Strategies into country programming. It also considered wider sources of assistance outside Country Strategies and multilateral influencing plans for relevant organisations; and knowledge management and learning systems. It asked how, why and on what basis Finland made its strategic choices for engagement in fragile situations as reflected in Country Strategies, and how it accordingly translated these choices into programmatic engagement.

Stream 5: Stakeholder perspectives: To ensure a balanced approach, it was important to capture diverse views and understandings regarding how and why Finland made its strategic choices in fragile situations; the constraints it faced, and opportunities seized and/or missed. Overall a total of 387 stakeholders were interviewed during the evaluation. Where face to face interviews were unfeasible, such perspectives were gathered remotely, e.g. through telephone interviews. It was considered especially important to gather views from partners who have engaged with Finland in the five fragile contexts.



Stream 6: Learning from other countries: With its specific policy priorities, and its own operating model, comparison or benchmarking with other bilateral agencies was not considered appropriate. Some lessons and areas of good practice were sought from other bilateral agencies, notably the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), but in the event, aid management systems were so different that little comparability or opportunities for learning could be identified.

Analytical processes are set out in section N below, but in summary: Evidence from across these six streams were combined in a mixed-methods approach to ensure full triangulation. Findings from each stream were mapped against findings from other areas, to ensure that overarching findings were solidly-built on a range of evidence sources. For example, overall findings on Relevance combined individual findings from the project desk review, field study, institutional systems analysis and stakeholder perspective streams to ensure their solidity.

J. Sampling parameters/constructed sample

Given the breadth of Finland's portfolios in the five contexts, sampling of interventions was necessary. Under the evaluation design, this was mostly required for Stream 3, above: project desk review.

The construction of the sampling parameters for this evidence stream was based on the broad portfolio analysis, above. It was also informed by the priorities and concerns of country teams as recorded by Evaluation unit (MFA, personal communication, February 2019). It did not constitute a 'limit' for review by the evaluation team, since other initiatives will also be reviewed at field level. However, it did seek to provide insight as follows.

The core principle of the sampling parameters was its purposive rather than representative, intent. Based on the portfolio analysis and expressed priorities by country teams, it sought to provide the best illustrative overview available of Finnish contributions in a given context, reflecting the main balance of the overall portfolio in the country (e.g. if the majority of investments were directed through UN partners, the intervention sample reflected this). The sample covered the period 2012-2017 and where appropriate, 2018 interventions were added as data became available.

The sample mainly focused on assistance provided under the Country Strategy approach (i.e. bilateral assistance). However, in some cases, and particularly where they formed a significant proportion of the Country portfolio, humanitarian and civil society support was also included. This enabled the evaluation to have a wider grasp of Finnish-funded activities in a country than those funded through the Country Strategy approach alone.

The main parameters for sampling were:

- Time period: spread across years 2012–2018
- Scale in EUR – selecting major investments/supplementing with any smaller-scale interventions which may be particularly strategic/provide leverage
- Partner – ensuring a balance of multilateral organisation, NGOs/civil society organisations, other partner as per the portfolio profile
- Sector – ensuring that the breadth of sectors is covered, but with due consideration of requests from country teams
- Modality – type of co-operation



Additional features of the sample set included:

- Where investments were multi-year, the latest year was identified for sampling, on the basis that this was more informative than the early years of implementation;
- Individual projects funded under the Fund for Local Co-operation were mostly not included in the main sample set, since these were relatively small-scale and could prove challenging to individually review against the evaluation questions. However, the FLC is an important instrument in terms of permitting flexibility and relevance for fragile situations. Therefore, component Case Studies analysed the use of the FLC where relevant, in terms of the initiatives funded, partners involved, expenditure, results etc, in order that its role in supporting relevance and effectiveness could be assessed.
- The exception to the above was the Occupied Palestinian Territory, where the Embassy of Finland country team requested an emphasis on how development cooperation could contribute to peacebuilding, and specifically how grassroots level cooperation could promote mutual understanding between the parties. Since many such initiatives were funded through FCL co-operation, these were included in the sample set accordingly.

Numbers of projects selected varied slightly per country depending on the profile of the investments. For Afghanistan, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Somalia, these number 14. For Syria/Iraq, 24 projects were identified, since the Country Strategy also covers regional projects and those in neighbouring countries affected by the Syria regional crisis.

The core document set applied for desk review was:

- Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes)
- Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial)
- Any relevant evaluations/ reviews (mid-term, final as relevant)
- MFA quality assurance board minutes
- (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports

Annex 4 provides the full constructed sample.

K. Data Collection Methods

The evaluation design applied a mixed-method approach. The use of structured tools was prioritised, to maximize validity and reliability through the fully systematic approach identified as an operating principle in section A. Specific methods and data sources are provided in more detail in the Evaluation Matrix, but included the following for HQ and country case study level (Table 29):

Table 29 Methods per evidence stream

Portfolio analysis
<i>Quantitative analysis</i> using pivot tables to analyse the profile of the portfolio at a) aggregate and b) country level. Key parameters included: aid co-operation modality; partner type; sector of investment, etc. Portfolios were analysed over time, to map trends and any changes; themes emerging were then tracked and followed up in the desk review of projects (Stream 4) and field study (Stream 5).
Desk review of projects
<i>Structured documentary analysis of a sample of MFA projects in each country</i> applying a structured tool geared to the Evaluation Matrix. A common set of information per project was identified; and teams completed an analytical framework (the structured tool). This stream was complemented by interviews during fieldwork (Stream 6).



Field study
Field observation built on the quantitative analysis of the portfolio and the desk analysis of projects to enquire more deeply into the themes arising. Methods included: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Timeline construction</i>, including of key decision points in relation to contextual change (partly undertaken during the Inception Phase)• <i>Semi-structured interviews</i> with key MFA staff and partners field-based partners including cooperating partners, government partners; UN partners/officials, civil society partners and others;• <i>Mapping the investment profile against</i> the timeline to note any changes in regard to relevance etc.• <i>Structured analysis</i> of documentation not available at central level
Institutional systems data
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Systematic analysis using structured tools</i> of Finland's systems, procedures and decision-making processes around its Country Strategy approach, as well as the guidance available for Country Strategy preparation and knowledge management systems internally.• <i>Semi-structured interviews</i>, in-person or by phone of MFA staff, partners and other relevant stakeholders.
Stakeholder perspectives
<i>Semi-structured interviews</i> , in-person or by phone of MFA staff, partners and other relevant stakeholders, using semi-structured tools. Particular effort was made to seek out former postholders who had worked in the give relevant countries. A strong emphasis was placed on triangulation by including the perspectives of those outside MFA.
Learning from other agencies
This evidence stream recognised that Finland has its own policy priorities for working in fragile situations and also its own organisational culture and ways of working. It did explicitly not seek to compare. However, initial review of aid systems of other Nordic donors was conducted, which revealed only limited data of value for the evaluation.

Source: Evaluation team

These methods were confirmed as appropriate during the Inception Phase of the evaluation because:

- They were appropriate for the sort of tailored and nuanced approach required for a complex evaluation occurring in fragile contexts;
- Combined, and when set against the conceptual framework described in section B they promised ensure a relatively effective means of triangulation and therefore to support validity and credibility.

Other methods that were considered and discarded for use in this specific study included:

- An electronic survey, due to concerns regarding low response rates, particularly given the high time pressures on MFA staff both in Helsinki and in the five fragile contexts;
- Primary data collection in each of the five contexts (unfeasible due to time and resource pressures and unsuited to a strategic-level evaluation whose object is the Country Strategy instrument).

L. Structured tools

To ensure the fully systematic approach described under Operating Principles (section A above), data gathering applied the use of structured tools across all data streams. Data from each evidence stream was plotted into the relevant tools, so that findings were based on sound and transparent evidence.



These tools (available on request) were fully geared to the theoretical framework presented in section C above and to the Evaluation Matrix presented at Annex 3. To enable a fully systematic approach, they applied the common questions of the evaluation, but were tailored analytically for the specificities of the five country contexts.

This approach ensured that data was collected transparently and systematically, but also in a manner which was sensitive to context. It also facilitated later systematic analysis to support the synthesis process (section N).

M. Data collation

The process of data collation against structured tools resulted in a set of completed analytical frameworks, prepared for each of the five country studies, programmatic analysis and other evidence streams. This enabled transparent preparation of data prior to analysis (section O and table 30), and ensured that the Evaluation Matrix was fully carried through from evaluation design to implementation (Figure 13).

Figure 13 Example of completed analytical frameworks

Evaluation Criterion	Sub-questions	Progress markers	Project 1 – FinChurch Aid (FCA) (11998)	World Bank Trust Fund (85906215)	PEGASE (EU Trust Fund) (2014–2015; 2015–2018; 2018–2020) (85905201)
RELEVANCE	1. To what extent did the Country Strategy modality support the alignment of Finland's Country Portfolios to address the causes of fragility?	Reference in design to country-level fragility assessments conducted/used	IOPT context analysis in list of references of IOPT 2018 strategy but not quoted or referenced in strategy itself. Web-link to context analysis was not accessible.	Concept notes and design documents include analysis of country context, as well sectoral and institutional context. Good analysis of the water sector; progress made by PA; challenges being faced.	Evaluation reports and multi-annual action plans include context and country analysis; and analysis of the different sectors receiving support under the PEGASE mechanism.
		Evidence of links to/commonality with any fragility assessments/ fragility issues presented within the CS	No references to MFA CS, or conflict – fragility assessments in FCA strategy.	Analysis of the water sector includes various assessments of the water sector with reference to the effects on vulnerable communities.	No reference to Finland in PEGASE documents; except for the budgets indicating Finland's contribution.



Evaluation Criterion	Sub-questions	Progress markers	Project 1 – FinChurch Aid (FCA) (11998)	World Bank Trust Fund (85906215)	PEGASE (EU Trust Fund) (2014–2015; 2015–2018; 2018–2020) (85905201)
RELEVANCE	2. To what extent did the Country Strategy modality support the relevance of Finland’s assistance to the needs of beneficiaries, considering available resources?	Reference in design to needs assessments in the context (institutional capacity needs, humanitarian needs etc)	Limited context description and identification of needs in FCA strategy. More assessment – but still limited – in FCA annual planning and reporting documents.	The WB Multi-Donor Trust Fund was established in 2012; to coordinate the support for infrastructure development (emphasis on water, energy and urban development). Yes, good analysis of the water sector; institutional challenges, analysis of the Strategic Development Plans prepared by the PA.	Yes, all multi-annual action plans include context analysis and needs overview for the targeted sector. (but no info on baseline surveys, etc)
		Disaggregation of needs in design by gender/ vulnerable group	Limited, remains general. No analysis of who the vulnerable groups are and how they will be reached. Same for gender issues.	Yes, includes also indicators and criteria based on which areas are being targeted (vulnerability, poverty, challenges in water services provision...) Gender was raised by most donors during the Evaluation exercises as it is seen as not being systematically addressed in-depth in the PID MDTF portfolio. (evaluation 2017) Sex-disaggregated data on the beneficiary population in reports.	Limited in earlier action plans. As of 2018–2020 gender highlighted as important.
		Use of appropriate differentiation in project design & implementation according to different needs and contexts (e.g. gender, varied institutional capacities etc)	Absence of a proper gender analysis does not allow for a differentiated approach. Weak organisational capacity of partners highlighted in reporting but unclear on strategy for addressing this.	Yes, to institutional capacities. Good analysis of the available capacity. To a lesser extent the differentiation when it comes to gender. More a general analysis.	Not evident. Main emphasis is on budget support; to keep PA afloat.
		Evidence of links to/commonality with any needs assessments/ disaggregation by vulnerable group presented in the CS	No needs assessment included in design or annual plans.	Gender disaggregation in reports. Analysis of infrastructure, water sector needs in Area C and Gaza. Less of a vulnerability analysis at population level.	Not evident from the available documentation. There is however strong focus on aid to vulnerable families, especially for Gaza. But needs overview is limited.



Evaluation Criterion	Sub-questions	Progress markers	Project 1 – FinChurch Aid (FCA) (11998)	World Bank Trust Fund (85906215)	PEGASE (EU Trust Fund) (2014–2015; 2015–2018; 2018–2020) (85905201)
RELEVANCE	3. To what extent did the Country Strategy modality support the relevance of Finland's assistance to the needs of key stakeholders, including government/national authority, civil society and others?	Evidence of alignment of project design with partner policies and plans (UN country/humanitarian response plans, donor policies and plans, civil society partner country level policies and priorities)	FCS strategy for IOPT has no reference to other partners' strategy (including UN, etc).	Strong alignment with priorities identified by the PA. Not clear how priorities are set for Gaza if the local Gaza government's priorities would differ from the Gaza authority. While the design is reflective of needs and priorities identified in government plans, the WB Trust Funds leads its own life with not much government ownership. PA engages more with the donors contributing to the fund; less so with the WB TF directly.	Yes, identifying how the support provided under PEGASE is in support of policies and strategic priorities of PA, multi-lateral actors.
		Evidence of alignment of project design with CS priorities re: partner policies and plans (UN country/humanitarian response plans, donor policies and plans, civil society partner country level policies and priorities)	FCA supports education, resilience, targeting vulnerable population groups/ areas in line with CS. Addressing violence in education – but no link with UNICEF programme supported by MFA. The 2018 strategy indicates that the education interventions will be further supported by synergies with the Finnish MFA country strategy with focus on education sector.	The interventions/design of the TF included a strong emphasis on the reconstruction and support to the water sector in Gaza and WB; reaching the vulnerable communities. These are target areas for Finland's CS.	No reference to Finland's priorities or CS. PEGASE and Finland are aligned with the support for the 2-state solution. PEGASE's language in docs becomes more pragmatic linked to the feasibility of the 2-state solution.
	4. To what extent did the Country Strategy modality enable assistance to adapt appropriately over time, including in relation to volatile conditions?	Evidence that the project has responded over time to the evolving nature of the context/ capacity changes etc	FCA's strategy has evolved moderately over time: rights education, livelihoods through skills training, humanitarian aid in Gaza (2012). Sustainable economic growth, quality education and learning, promotion of rights to equitable service provision, social cohesion, capacity building of local civil society...	Post 2014 - the Trust Fund increased its emphasis on Gaza reconstruction of infrastructure. Allowed the incorporation of a Gaza emergency response.	Under PEGASE 2015–2018; and 2018–2020 emphasis is placed on the reconstruction of the private sector in Gaza.
		Evidence that the project has evolved to the direction set by the Country Strategy over time	No analysis for the changes, no reference to CS. But FCA strategy includes reference to themes included in CS: emphasis on Area C, Youth, economic development.	Trust Fund was set up before the CS was developed. Finland's CS did not really influence the set agenda/objectives of the WB Trust Fund (agreed upon by several donors).	Aid to vulnerable families; aid to Gaza was an emphasis as of 2014–2015.



b. Dissaggregation of needs (where appropriate, by gender/vulnerable group)?	
Adaption for Context	N/A
Documentary evidence	<p>Key vulnerable groups in Somalia (HNO, WFP Evaluation of Somalia Country Portfolio 2010–2017):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4.2 million in humanitarian need (HRP, 2019 data for 2020) • IDPs (2 million) • Women and girls • Minorities (not recognised by GoS) <p>CS does not flag vulnerability categories beyond women and girls (CS analysis)</p> <p>Project review finds relatively strong disaggregation with direct beneficiaries, though not required/requested by MFA (beyond emphasis dialogue on gender);</p> <p>CSO projects employed clearer disaggregation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VIKES: Beneficiaries' needs are identified in the project design (poor quality of journalism, poor technical equipment, lack of security of reporter, need for objective, good-quality public broadcasting to improve democracy in Somalia). • LSV/PSR: Targeting based on analysis of the TB situation and the institutional and human needs in this sector. • SCI/SCF: Targets children generally who are in need of self-defence training • ISF/GBV: Disaggregation targets women • SCI/SCF: Child sensitive protection in SL: The project addresses beneficiaries among the IDP population in Hargeisa, and work with the government (MOLSA) towards building child-sensitive social protection schemes. • Also UNFPA – contribution to JSHNP – disaggregated by vulnerable girls and women <p>Humanitarian interventions (support to CHF/WFP) not disaggregated beyond male/female of “those in humanitarian need” – relatively by targeting.</p> <p>MPF: Limited attention to disaggregation in design documentation, though monitoring does contain a commitment to disaggregate by gender and vulnerable group.</p> <p>Overall (perhaps due to political sensitivities): No reference to minorities in project documentation.</p>

N. Cross cutting objectives

The evaluation ToR includes an emphasis on the role of Finland’s cross-cutting objectives, which under the 2016–2019 DPP are gender equality; non-discrimination (with a focus on persons with disabilities); and (3) climate sustainability (see para. 12). Previous evaluations have concluded that while MFA has improved the inclusion of cross-cutting objectives in planning and implementation, Finland has not always adopted an ambitious approach (Adrien, Seppo, & Poutiainen, 2018; Rassmann, Poutiainen, Byron, & Mikkolainen, 2018; Silvestrini & et al., 2017).

While the current evaluation lacked the scope to conduct a comprehensive analysis of cross-cutting objectives in fragile context, which would be a separate exercise in itself, the exercise sought to generate useful insights into how cross-cutting issues can be interpreted and applied in fragile situations, including their very specific challenges and demands. This was operationalised in the evaluation design by:

- Reflecting these issues within the evaluation questions and Matrix (sections 4.6 and 4.7; Annex 7);
- Embedding cross-cutting objectives into enquiry tools (interview guides and analytical frameworks – Annexes 4 and 5)
- Committing to embedding crosscutting objectives into analysis and reporting;
- Disaggregating results data by gender and social group where data is available/feasible to apply.



O. Analysis and validity/reliability

The credibility of the evaluation depended on ensuring valid and reliable findings. The evaluation design ensured this in four ways, all geared to support the application of a systematic approach:

- Through the application of the Evaluation Matrix as the main analytical spine for the evaluation;
- Gearing all data collection tools and instruments to the same central instrument;
- Through the use of structured tools, geared in turn to the evaluation matrix, to ensure systematic data collection, and that any gaps were identifiable and transparent;
- Through extensive use of triangulation mechanisms and meta-level analysis at synthesis stage;
- Through the adoption of a consultative approach, with findings validated on an on-going basis with key stakeholders.

Findings and conclusions took into account comparatively limited funds of Finland’s development cooperation. Specific analytical processes for component case studies and the final Synthesis report included the following (Table 30):

Table 30 Analytical processes

Country case studies	Meta-level analysis
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When all the data was plotted into the analytical tools, common patterns, contradictions and areas of difference were sought out and explored across cases (though they were not directly compared); • The role of Country Strategies in shaping country programming was extracted and described; • Patterns of Finland’s contributions to results, and the role of Country Strategies within these, were identified in relation to the theory of change, above • Explanatory factors were identified, particularly as they related to results; • Findings were calibrated to the strength of the evidence, with limitations or gaps transparently reported. 	<p>The evaluation team came together at analysis stage to ensure full consolidation of evidence against the evaluation matrix; and to confirm/debate emerging analytical themes.</p> <p>Findings at the different levels of the theory of change were identified and tracked; and evidence gaps transparently reported.</p> <p>Triangulation methods included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Investigator triangulation</i>, or the use of different team members to explore the same aspect of the evaluation, particularly across the five diverse country contexts, to ensure that findings are fully endorsed by all team members rather than being the ‘province’ of one particular area of specialism; • <i>Methodological triangulation</i> (the use of different methods to explore the same aspect, and the use of multiple sources of data). <p>Validation also took place through dialogue with key stakeholders as part of the validation process, with findings tested, nuanced and discussed with the evaluation’s interlocutors throughout the evaluative process, and particularly through country- and Helsinki-level validation workshops (see section S below). The focus of these workshops was on testing and refining preliminary conclusions and recommendations, and considering how strategic recommendations could be implemented.</p>

Source: Evaluation team



P. Safeguards for independence and impartiality

Ensuring independence and impartiality of the evaluation is critical in substantive terms, to ensure validity, but is also key for the evaluation’s credibility. Mechanisms for ensuring this, as applied throughout the evaluation, included:

- Conducting the evaluation through an independent external team;
- Prioritising the systematic approach, including the use of structured tools;
- Ensuring transparency and traceability, with the use of structured tools ensuring that findings were directly traceable to evidence, and any tensions/contradictions within the evidence transparently recorded, so that they could be explored and assessed through the analytical process

Q. Risks, limitations and assumptions

Risks and adopted mitigation strategies are set out in Table 31 below. Assumptions which the evaluation made from the outset are also captured.

Table 31 Risks, limitations and assumptions

Risk/limitation (likelihood)	Mitigating Measure adopted
Incompleteness/unreliability of data (<i>high</i>)	The main delivery channel through multilateral agencies meant that the evaluation was heavily dependent on access to, and data from, partner organisations (including planning and results data especially). Data paucity could not be fully mitigated but concerted efforts were made to seek out data from partners, particularly at country level, on Finnish-funded initiatives, including results reporting, and by triangulating with stakeholder perspectives, particularly on achievements. The main evaluation report explicitly cites data paucity of results as a limitation.
Inconsistent availability of data across countries (<i>high</i>)	The risk of inconsistency in data availability was high, given challenges in access in contexts such as Somalia and Syria/Iraq, and prove substantive in practice. The regional nature of the Syria/Iraq portfolio also presented difficulties, as well as the autonomous nature of two regions of Somalia. Mitigation strategies included the use of a fully systematic and structured approach to reduce inconsistency; the calibration of country-level findings to the strength of the available evidence; and the transparent reporting of data gaps where these arose at analytical level.
Different aim and intentions across Country Strategies/programmes (<i>high</i>)	MFA opted to conduct a strategic-level evaluation, and as such the evaluation design sought an integrated approach across evidence streams, including from the five country contexts. Evaluation analysis and reporting has sought to highlight the distinct context and features of the five fragile contexts and aimed to ensure that the final set of recommendations, while corporately targeted, recognise and encompass the diversity of contexts to which they may apply.
Limited results data/few links to Country Strategies (<i>high</i>)	The use of contribution analysis to establish ‘contribution stories’ prove useful here, but a realistic approach to results reporting was also adopted. Results were identified where feasible, and chains of contribution sought as available; the evaluation also reported transparently on where/why these could not be robustly established.
Inability to secure travel permits/visas for e.g. Somalia or some areas of Myanmar (<i>medium</i>)	This issue did not arise, with all visas/travel permits secured as required.



Risk/limitation (likelihood)	Mitigating Measure adopted
Political challenges, instability or deteriorating security conditions in any of the countries targeted for field work (<i>medium</i>)	This issue did not arise, with all field missions conducted as planned.
Change in MFA country teams/key interlocutors throughout the evaluation period (<i>medium</i>)	The main mitigation measure here was communication throughout, ensuring that key MFA interlocutors were sighted on the evaluation's content, emphases and processes (communication from Evaluation Unit/the Evaluation team as required); and the use of validation processes following fieldwork at country level and with Helsinki-based stakeholders (section S).
Limited meaningful engagement by stakeholders (<i>low</i>)	Communication throughout, to ensure that opportunities for consultation and engagement were provided (communication from Evaluation Unit/the Evaluation team as required), including consultation/opportunities for comment on the evaluation design, the emerging narrative (e.g. post-fieldwork debriefs) and the draft evaluation report/conclusions and recommendations.
Assumptions	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of MFA Country Team, Reference Group and other Helsinki-based staff and partners targeted for meetings • Embassy teams based in countries support the fieldwork process by being available for interview; by helping arrange interviews with partners; and by providing documentation as required. • The evaluation team had the freedom to arrange for additional interviews with external stakeholder during field work, if required 	

Source: Evaluation team

Not a risk or assumption per se, but an expectation to be managed, was that of meeting the MFA Country Team and embassy staff expectations on field missions whilst conducting a strategic-level evaluation. Component case studies, as noted, do not comprise a specific evaluation of Finnish-sponsored activities in the country, nor do they report in detail on individual activities at country level. Instead, the evaluation's focus is on the wider aspects of the Country Strategy approach, as the evaluation questions reflect. This was mitigated by clear communication during the evaluation process including the involvement of Evaluation Unit at reporting and validation stage.

R. Ethical standards

The evaluation took place amid highly sensitive and volatile operating environments. Although its design did not include direct contact with vulnerable beneficiaries, ethical concerns nonetheless required particular consideration. The evaluation was conducted in full adherence to the OECD DAC evaluation ethical code and applied the UNEG Ethical code as set out in the MFA's Evaluation Manual (2018). Table 32 provides information on the specific standards applied:



Table 32 Ethical standards

Conflict of interest	The evaluation avoided conflicts of interest by using a fully independent team, and by ensuring that evaluation team members had no connection with the design or implementation of Finland's Country Strategies or Country portfolio in the five contexts of operation
Honesty and integrity	Evaluation team members committed to adherence to the UNEG Code of Conduct for evaluators in the UN system, and to accurately presenting procedures, data and findings, including ensuring that the evaluation findings are transparently generated, have full integrity and are unbiased.
Respect for dignity and diversity	The evaluation team respected differences in culture, local customs, religious beliefs and practices, personal interaction, gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity, whilst evaluation instruments (e.g. the structured tools created) were designed to be appropriate to the cultural setting.
Rights of participants	Prospective interviewees were given the time and information needed to decide whether or not they wished to participate. Informed consent was sought in all cases.
Anonymity and confidentiality	All those providing information for this evaluation were informed how that information would be used and how their participation would be reflected (e.g., how their anonymity would be ensured). Evaluation team members respected people's right to provide information in confidence and made participants aware of the scope and limits of confidentiality. The evaluation team ensured that sensitive information could not be traced to its source so that the relevant individuals were protected from any reprisals.
Avoidance of harm	The evaluation team sought to minimize risks to, and burdens on those participating in the evaluation; for example, by ensuring during field study that meetings took place in safe locations, with the team travelling to meet partners whenever possible
Data protection	All data generated by the evaluation team remains internal to the evaluation and will not be shared without the express consent of participants. All evaluation team members signed Non Disclosure Agreements as part of their contract with Particip, and Particip itself has several safeguards in place. These include: Encrypted hard disk drives (Truecrypt / Bitlocke), physical firewalls in all Particip offices and software firewalls activated on all computers and SSL encryption for e-mail traffic. This includes the use of Egnyte as a confidential repository for information-sharing and clear rules and regulations regarding the sharing of data. Finally, Particip appointed an internal Data Protection Officer to ensure compliance with the obligations pursuant to EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Source: MFA's Evaluation Manual 2018

S. Coordination and management

Particip, as lead firm, in partnership with Niras, took responsibility for managing the evaluation team and ensuring all deliverables were submitted in line with the terms of reference and the agreements made during the Kick-off Meeting with MFA.


The coordination and management of the evaluation had two perspectives: A) internal team management and coordination and B) liaison with EVA-11. This was operationalised by the management team of the evaluation, comprising EVA-11 evaluation manager, team leader, deputy team leader and EMS Coordinator.

Internal team management and coordination: The evaluation design adopted a collective approach among the evaluation team. Individual team members were not allocated solely to 'their' specific case study or area of expertise but understood their role as contributing to the overall construction of the evaluation, including the analysis and the resulting Synthesis report. In practical terms, this involved ensuring that all team members were sighted on different aspects of the evaluation, and the use of regular (virtual and actual) team meetings, particularly at analysis stage.



The overall team structure comprised a core team of three supported by country case study teams. Figure 13 shows the overall team structure, composition; and lines of responsibility.

Figure 14 Evaluation team structure and composition



T. Validation/consultation with stakeholders

Two main validation points were held with key stakeholders, as follows:

- A debriefing/validation workshop at the end of each field mission, providing PowerPoint presentations on the key themes emerging, to include Helsinki-based stakeholders where feasible (held following the closure of each field mission)
- At overarching level, a validation workshop on initial findings and conclusions in Helsinki, also to support validation and learning, one with country teams and one with the Reference Group for the study (held 11th February 2020).

The purpose of the validation meetings was: To share and validate initial findings; discuss preliminary conclusions; and refine the relevant Recommendations, as well as to support learning across MFA and consider the implementation of strategic recommendations.



Annex 3: Evaluation matrix

Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
Relevance				
1. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the alignment of Finland's Country programmes and policy dialogue to address the causes of fragility?	<p>Evidence of country-level fragility assessments conducted to inform the Country Strategy design</p> <p>Evidence of use of any such analysis in planning/decision-making within Country Strategies/Portfolios</p> <p>Evidence of use of Finland's specific comparative advantages within Country Strategies/Portfolios to help reduce fragility e.g. participation in structures or fora with scope to influence national or local authorities.</p>	<p>Systematic documentary analysis of Country Strategies</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects including design documentation</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff, particularly at country level</p> <p>Interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government/ other relevant authorities, implementing partners</p>	<p>Country Strategies and Guidance</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies and annual reports</p> <p>Local-level conflict/fragility assessments conducted</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data, including interview sources</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff, partners & authorities in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>2. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland’s assistance to the needs of key stakeholders and beneficiaries, considering available resources?</p>	<p>Country Strategy documents include analysis of beneficiary needs in the context (e.g. capacity needs assessments, humanitarian needs)</p> <p>Grant application procedures/ partnership agreements with MFA under the Country Strategy require the presentation of robust needs analysis, disaggregated by gender/ vulnerable group</p> <p>Sample projects within the Country Portfolio base their design on robust needs analysis, including disaggregation by vulnerable group, including gender</p> <p>Sample projects within the Portfolio present evidence of appropriate differentiation in project design & implementation according to different needs and contexts (e.g. gender)</p>	<p>Systematic documentary analysis of Country Strategies</p> <p>Systematic documentary analysis of Humanitarian Needs Overviews for the country</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff, particularly at country level</p> <p>Interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government/ other relevant authorities, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>UN Humanitarian Needs Overviews/other datasets on population needs over time</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data, including interview sources</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p> <p>Feedback from in-country partners</p>
<p>3. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the relevance of Finland’s assistance to the needs of key stakeholders including government/national authority; also civil society and others?</p>	<p>Evidence of Country Strategy alignment with key country plans, including national/local level strategies/policies and plans (per sector, for reconstruction as appropriate)</p> <p>Evidence of portfolio alignment with partner policies and plans (UN country/humanitarian response plans, donor policies and plans, civil society partner country level policies and priorities)</p>	<p>Systematic documentary analysis of Country Strategies</p> <p>Systematic analysis of national/local level strategies/policies and plans, as appropriate for the portfolio</p> <p>Systematic analysis of partner policies and plans, including those of donors, UN agencies and civil society organisations</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>National/local level strategies/policies and plans per country e.g. Education/ Health sector plans, reconstruction plans, economic planning strategies, etc</p> <p>UN Humanitarian Response Plans over time</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data, including interview sources</p> <p>Feedback from in-country partners including government/ national authority, civil society and others</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy		Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>4. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach enable assistance to adapt appropriately over time, including in relation to volatile conditions?</p>	<p>Evidence that Country Strategies allow for strategic evolution in response to the evolving nature of country contexts</p> <p>Relevance over time of Country Strategy to contextual conditions including changing patterns of conflict over time</p> <p>Evidence of responsiveness of Country Portfolio to the direction set by the Country Strategy over time</p>	<p>Evidence of portfolio adaptation over time in response to the evolving nature of country contexts</p> <p>Evidence of portfolio adaptation over time to changing needs of target groups</p>	<p>Mapping of context changes (e.g. conflict, disasters, policy changes, change of govt, etc).</p> <p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategies</p> <p>Mapping of Country Portfolio investment profile over time, in relation to key events in the context and to the Country Strategy</p> <p>Analysis of LCF modality in the context in relation to key events in the context</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS report and management responses</p> <p>Portfolio analysis</p> <p>UN Humanitarian Needs Overviews/Humanitarian Response Plans over time</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Analysis of Country Portfolio evolution over time in relation to the Country Strategy</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p> <p>Triangulation across data, including interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation	
Effectiveness					
<p>1. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support the orientation of initiatives to best deliver results for key stakeholders and beneficiaries in the context?</p>	<p>Quality of results framework of the Country Strategy including internal logic, realism of intended objectives, clear pathways to achievement and feasible targets</p> <p>Evidence that Country Strategy results framework influenced the intended results of component projects (within the Country Portfolio)</p> <p>Evidence that RBM procedures have been applied in Country Strategy performance monitoring and reporting</p>	<p>Achievement against Country Strategy objectives and intended results.</p> <p>Evidence of any unanticipated effects (positive, negative) particularly for vulnerable groups</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy objectives and results frameworks</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>2014 Development Policy and Development Co-operation in Fragile States</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>
<p>2. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach provide an enabling environment for results in non-discrimination, including gender equality and the empowerment of women, and climate change?</p>	<p>Recognition within Country Strategies of targeting non-discrimination and climate change</p> <p>Presence of non-discrimination and climate change within the objectives and results framework of the Country Strategy</p> <p>Evidence that the presence of non-discrimination and climate change within Country Strategy results frameworks influenced the intended results of country programmes/ portfolios</p>	<p>Evidence of achievement against Country Strategy objectives and intended results (outputs, impacts) related to non-discrimination and climate change, and/or results realised for non-discrimination and climate change not reflected in Country Strategy results frameworks</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy objectives and results frameworks</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy		Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>3. To what extent did the selected aid co-operation modality, particularly multi-bi co-operation, support the delivery of results in the context?</p>	<p>Evidence of a clear strategic rationale for choice of aid co-operation modality in Country Strategies</p> <p>Evidence that choice of aid co-operation modalities is appropriate for countries, given availability and capacity of partners</p> <p>Evidence that the choice of partner was associated with clear requirements for results delivery, including clear targets and objectives</p>	<p>Evidence that country programmes have tangibly realised their intended results as set out under partner agreements</p> <p>Evidence that projects financed within country programmes have demonstrably contributed to objectives as set out in Country Strategies</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements on aid co-operation modalities</p> <p>Stakeholder analysis at country level</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>UN/civil society partner co-ordinated strategies or policies in the country context</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy		Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>4. To what extent have Finnish Country Strategies/Portfolios contributed to any reductions in fragility?</p>	<p>Demonstrable contributions (as recorded in secondary results information) to reductions in fragility factors, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> More democratic political institutions Greater accountability of public institutions Strengthened Rule of Law Enabling environment for the civil society Improvement of rights and status of women and girls Quality of education improved Increased number of people have access to decent work, livelihoods and income Improved food security Increased access to water and energy 	<p>Demonstrable contributions to PSG goals including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSG 1: Inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution fostered PSG 2: People's security established and fostered PSG 3: People's access to justice increased PSG 4: Employment generated and livelihoods improved PSG 5: Capacity for accountable and fair service delivery built 	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy objectives and results frameworks</p> <p>Analysis of key corporate documentation for working in fragile contexts and of Finland's development policy priorities</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>2014 Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States – Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation</p> <p>Theories of Change for Finland's four Development Policy Priority Areas</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
Coherence				
<p>1. How/or does the Country Strategy approach support Finland in providing coherent assistance to the country, e.g. across MFA departments and multilateral influencing plans and funding?</p>	<p>Reference to/clear statement of alignment in Country Strategies regarding Finland’s other development assistance to the country e.g. in trade/security/civil society/humanitarian support</p> <p>Evidence of efforts to align Country Portfolios with other development assistance to the country e.g. in trade/security</p> <p>Evidence of alignment between relevant multilateral influencing plans and the CS (including multi-bi interventions in the country).</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements regarding other Finnish development assistance to the country</p> <p>Analysis of key corporate documentation regarding Finland’s development policy priorities</p> <p>Analysis of relevant multi-annual influencing plans</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>Documentation regarding other Finnish development assistance to the country, e.g. in trade, security</p> <p>Finland’s Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States – Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation</p> <p>Theories of Change for Finland’s four Development Policy Priority Areas</p>	<p>Triangulation across data</p> <p>Mapping across assistance types within MFA</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>
<p>2. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach support alignment with the plans and policies of other key donors/international actors in the context?</p>	<p>Alignment of CS (and results framework) with plans and policies of other key donors/international actors in the context</p> <p>Alignment of key country programme interventions with the plans and policies of other key donors/international actors in the context</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements regarding other Finnish development assistance to the country</p> <p>Analysis of key partner donor policies and plans</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>Key partner donor strategies and plans per context</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data sources</p> <p>Mapping of Country Strategies/Portfolios against Finnish development priorities, as expressed in annual Development Policy Priorities and the 2014 Fragile States Policy</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>3. To what extent did the Country Strategy approach contribute to the realization of wider Finnish Development Policy objectives?</p>	<p>Evidence of CS/country programme alignment with Finland’s wider Development Policy objectives, including cross-cutting objectives</p> <p>Evidence that results achieved from country programmes have demonstrably contributed to the realisation of Finland’s wider Development Policy objectives, as articulated in DPPs 2012–2015 and DPP 2016-2019</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements regarding Finnish Development Policy objectives</p> <p>Analysis of key corporate documentation regarding Finland’s development policy priorities</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>Finland’s 2014 Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States – Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation</p> <p>Theories of Change for Finland’s four Development Policy Priority Areas</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data sources</p> <p>Mapping of results achieved against Finnish development priorities, as expressed in annual Development Policy Priorities and the 2014 Fragile States Policy</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
Connectedness				
<p>4. To what extent did Country Strategies adhere to international commitments on the International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm and Accountability to Affected Populations?</p>	<p>Evidence of a clear statement within Country Strategies of the importance of adherence to the commitments on the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p> <p>Evidence that grant application processes/partnership agreements for projects financed within the portfolio require adherence to commitments on the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p> <p>Evidence that funded project designs take into account, and ensure adherence to, the commitments on the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements regarding the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>2014 Development Policy and Development Co-operation in Fragile States</p> <p>MFA documentation/statements regarding adherence to the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data sources</p> <p>Mapping of results achieved against Finnish commitments to the IHPs, DNH and AAP</p> <p>Mapping presence of adherence to IHPs, DNH and AAP within Country Portfolios</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>



Sub-questions	Progress markers – Role of Country Strategy	Methods / analysis	Data sources	Analysis/ triangulation
<p>5. To what extent did Country Strategies take into account long-term and interconnected problems, e.g. through the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus?</p>	<p>Evidence of recognition within Country Strategies of either the importance of linking assistance to longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or (post-2017) the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p> <p>Evidence that grant application processes/partnership agreements for projects financed within the portfolio require consideration of longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or (post-2017) the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p> <p>Evidence that the profile of the Country Portfolio includes a significant proportion of projects which focus on longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or (post-2017) the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p>	<p>Systematic analysis of Country Strategy statements regarding longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p> <p>Portfolio analysis</p> <p>Desk review of sample projects</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with MFA staff in country and at Helsinki level</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews with key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>	<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>Self-assessments of Country Strategies/Annual CS reports and management responses</p> <p>MFA documentation/statements regarding the 'triple nexus'</p> <p>2014 Development Policy and Development Co-operation in Fragile States</p> <p>Desk review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document (including budget, results framework and other annexes) • Completion report or the latest (annual) report (technical and financial) • Any relevant evaluations (MTR, MTE, final evaluation etc.) • MFA quality assurance board minutes • (If feasible) MFA field visit / monitoring reports 	<p>Triangulation across data sources</p> <p>Mapping of results achieved against Finnish statements/intentions on longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p> <p>Mapping presence of commitment in Country Portfolio to longer-term peacebuilding/development goals and/or the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus</p> <p>Feedback from MFA staff in Helsinki/country locations</p> <p>Feedback from key partners (UN agencies, donors, government, implementing partners)</p>
<p>Conclusions</p>				
<p>Synthesising and aggregating evidence from the above questions to generate overall conclusions on:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent has the Country Strategy approach promoted Finnish and partner country policy objectives and guided Finland's cooperation in fragile contexts? 2. To what extent does the Country Strategy approach support policy coherence? 3. How can the Country Strategy approach be further developed for use in fragile contexts? 				



Annex 4: Sample of projects for desk analysis

Afghanistan

Implementing organisation (by thematic priority)	Title of intervention	Project Number	Duration	Modality	Budget category	DAC Sector
Governance/security/Human Rights						
EC	Civilian Peace Building Operations	99900004	2012–2018	Multilateral	More than 10m	Govt/CS
UNDP	Afghanistan, UNDP, Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA)	62505101	2014–2018	Multilateral	More than 10m	Govt/CS
UNDP	AIHRC Financial Support to the Commission	62504401	2012–2018	Multilateral	1–10m	Govt/CS
UN Women	UN Women, Developing Afghanistan's National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Related Resolutions	62507317	2013–2018	Multilateral	<1m	Govt/CS
Basic services						
UNESCO	UNESCO Enhancing Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA Phase III)	62507336	2014–2017 (2018?)	Multilateral	1–10m	Education
UNDP	Support to Afghanistan Livelihoods and Alternatives to Migration SALAM	62507361	2016–2018	Multilateral	1–10m	Education
Operation Mobilisation	KADIEP: Kalakan and Dasht e Barchi Inclusive Education Project	62507341	2014–2017	Finnish NGO	<1m	Education
UNICEF	Support to Development Aid and Small Scale Projects	62504502	2014–2018	Multilateral	1–10m	Ed/WASH/Govt/CS
Marie Stopes Int	International project on reproductive health	62503501	2014–2017 (2018?)	INGO	1–10m	Health
World Bank Group	World Bank; Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund EQUIP/EQRA	62503301	2012–2018	Multilateral	More than 10m	Govt/CS/Recon
World Bank Group	World Bank; Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Citizens Charter/NSP	62503301	2012–2018	Multilateral	More than 10m	Govt/CS/Recon
Finnish Red Cross	Health and Care in Communities	625SP292	All	Finnish NGO	1–10m	Health
Economic Growth						
UNODC	UNODC/Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control	62505001	2012–2015	Multilateral	1–10m	
GTK	Geological Survey of Finland's support to Afghanistan Geological Survey	62507201	2012–2018	Finnish NGO	1–10m	Mining



Myanmar

Implementing Organisation	Title of Intervention	Project Number	Duration	Aid modality	Budget Category	DAC Sector
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Support to Democratic development and Rule of Law building in Myanmar	63501515	2013–2017	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Government
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	Support to Myanmar Peace Fund	63501519	2015–2018	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Government
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	National Forest Inventory and National Forest Monitoring Information Systems for Myanmar	63501523	Since 2016	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Agriculture
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Strengthening Teacher Education in Myanmar	63501525	2016–2018	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Education
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Women's rights in Myanmar	63501531	2015–2018	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Government
World Bank Group	Myanmar Decentralized Funding to Schools	63501535	Since 2017	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Education
Embassy of Finland	Support for IDPs in Dawei and Palaw, a pilot project in the context of the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI)	63501506	2013–2015	Local Cooperation Instrument (FLC)	< 1m	Government
Associates to Develop Democratic Burma/ Euro-Burma Office	Support to the Myanmar Peace process	63501516	2013–2015	Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI)	1–10m	Government
Finnish Refugee Council	Livelihood support in Myanmar border areas	A281	2013–2016	Finnish NGOs	< 1m	Education
Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (Demo Finland)	Myanmar School of Politics	95	2013–2016	Finnish NGOs	< 1m	Government
Finnish Red Cross	Disaster prevention and preparedness	635SP360	2014–2015	Finnish NGOs	< 1m	Disaster
Save the Children Finland	Early Childhood Care and Education in Myanmar	63501518	2015–2017	Finnish NGOs	1–10m	Education
Fida International	Community Development Programme	5131	2012–2016	Finnish NGOs	< 1m	Government
The Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (FELM)	Support to the Peace Process in Myanmar	63501530	2015–2018	Finnish NGOs	1–10m	Government



Occupied Palestine Territories (oPt)

Implementing Organisation	Title of Intervention	Number	Duration	Aid modality	Budget Category	DAC Sector
Multilateral						
European Commission (EC)	Civilian Peace Building Operations	99900004	2012–2017	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10m	Government & Civil Society
European Union	EU Pegase-mechanism	85906219	2014–2017	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10 m	Health
European Union Institutions	Support to Pegase mechanism)	85905201	2012–2014	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10 m	Other Social Infrastructure & Services
World Bank Group	Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund	85906215	2013–2016	Multilateral, earmarked	> 10 m	Water Supply & Sanitation
Recipient Government	Education Sector Support V	85906218	2014–2017	Partner government, other	1–10 m	Education
UNICEF	UNICEF – Non violence in school and child protection	85906237	2016–2017	Multilateral aid, earmarked	1–10 m	Education
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Land Administration Project II	85901002	2000–2017	Multilateral, earmarked	1–10 m	Other Social Infrastructure & Services
Palestinian Peace Coalition, Geneva Initiative		85906214		Bilateral programme	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
Finnish Civil Society Organisations						
FCA Finnish Church Aid	Frame Agreement	11998	2013–2017	Finnish NGOs	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
CMI Crisis Management Initiative	Promoting Palestinian dialogue and consensus	85906201	2011–2016	Finnish NGOs	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
Local Cooperation Fund						
Embassy of Finland Local Cooperation Fund	Liikkumisen oikeuden takaaminen Länsirannan maatalousalueilla	85400001	2011–2014	Local Cooperation Instrument (FLC)	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
PCHR Palestinian Center for Human Rights	Promoting and Protecting the Rule of Law	85906207	2012–2015	Local Cooperation Instrument (FLC)	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
MADA (The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms)	Palestinian`s right to Access information	85906233	2016–2018	Local Cooperation Instrument (FLC)	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
PASSIA Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs	Dialogue and Education for a Continued Palestinian Presence in East Jerusalem	85906234	2017–2018	Local Cooperation Instrument (FLC)	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society



Somalia

Implementing Organisation	Title of Intervention	Project Number	Duration	Budget Category (EUR)	Sector
UN Children's Fund	Somali Joint Health and Nutrition Programme (JHNP)	27311718	2014–2016	1–10 m	Health
UN Development Programme	Support to Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)	27310301	2012–2014	1–10 m	Emergency response
Finnish Red Cross	Humanitarian assistance, International Committee of the Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross	89892273	2013–2015	1–10 m	Emergency response
Finnish NGO, Viestintä ja kehitys -säätiö (VIKES)	SoFiTV – Freedom of Expression journalism and Public Service in Somalia	27311713	2013–2016	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
World Bank Group	Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia (MPF)	27311719	2015–2018	1–10 m	Government & Civil Society
Finnish NGO, Pelastakaa lapset ry	F.a: Strengthening Child Protection Systems for a Safe & Protective Environment for Children	54846	2013–2016	< 1 m	Other Social Infrastructure & Services
Finnish NGO, Finnish Church Aid	Strengthening Civil Society Engagement in Political Dialogue and Statebuilding Processes – Interim South West Administration and Banadir	27311750	2016	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
Finnish NGO, International Solidarity Foundation	F.a: Reducing and mitigating gender-based violence in Togdheer Region, Somaliland	273KSS71	2014–2016	< 1 m	Government & Civil Society
Finnish Red Cross	F.a: Integrated Health Programme	273SP298	2014–2016	< 1 m	Health
World Food Programme	Humanitarian assistance Somalia	27311728	2014–2017	1–10 m	Emergency response
UN Fund for Population	UNFPA Somalia Wellbeing of Women and Girls	27311775	2015–2018	1–10 m	Population Policies/ Programmes & Reproductive Health
International Organization for Migration	Somaliland Health Sector Support (MIDA Finnsom IV)	27311752	2017–2018	1–10 m	Health
Lääkäriin Sosiaalinen Vastuu ry	Public-Private-People: Joint and Inclusive Effort Against Tuberculosis in Somalia	27311763	2016–2018	< 1 m	Health
Pelastakaa lapset ry (Save the Children Finland)	F.a: CSSP in Somaliland	54853	2017	< 1 m	Other Social Infrastructure & Services



Syria/Iraq

Country	Implementing organisation	Title of intervention	Project Number	Duration	Modality	Budget category	DAC Sector
Regional Projects							
Middle East, regional	European Union	Madad EU Syria Trust Fund	85301029	2015	Multilateral	1–10m	Multisector aid for basic social services, 16050
Middle East, regional	UN Children's Fund	No Lost Generation – support to education in Jordan and Syria through UNICEF	85301037	2016	Multilateral	1–10m	Primary education, 11220
Middle East, regional	UN Development Programme	UNDP: Building Resilience in Response to the Syrian Crisis	85301028	2017	Multilateral	1–10m	Multisector aid for basic social services, 16050
Middle East, regional	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Syria crisis; humanitarian aid; UNHCR's regional operation in response to the Syrian crisis	85301002	2018	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Syrian Arab Republic							
Syrian Arab Republic	The Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission	Syria Initiative: Support to peacebuilding in Syria	57300413	2016	Bilateral	1–10m	Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, 15220
Syrian Arab Republic	Suomen Lähetysseurary	Syria Initiative: Support to peacebuilding in Syria	57300413	2017	Bilateral	1–10m	Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, 15220
Syrian Arab Republic	Finnish Red Cross	ICRC Finnish Red Cross	89892612	2017	Bilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Syrian Arab Republic	World Health Organization (WHO)	Humanitarian assistance through WHO to Syria	57300405	2015	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Syrian Arab Republic	UN Children's Fund	Humanitarian aid to Syria via UNICEF	57300420	2016	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Syrian Arab Republic	World Food Programme	Humanitarian food assistance to Syria/ WFP	57300401	2016	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency food response, 72040
Syrian Arab Republic	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Humanitarian assistance Syria (UNHCR)	57300427	2017	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Syrian Arab Republic	UN Fund for Population	Support to UNFPA for humanitarian activities in Syria	57300435	2018	Multilateral	1–10m	Emergency material response, 72010
Turkey							
Turkey	UN Children's Fund	Turkey No Lost Generation -strategy. Supporting education sector in Turkey through UNICEF	85501123	2015	Multilateral	1–10m	Primary education, 11220
Turkey	European Union	Facility for Refugees in Turkey	85501124	2017	Multilateral	>10m	Emergency food response, 72040



Country	Implementing organisation	Title of intervention	Project Number	Duration	Modality	Budget category	DAC Sector
Jordan							
Jordan	Finnish NGO, Finnish Church Aid	Humanitarian assistance, Finn Church Aid	89892619	2016	Bilateral	<1m	Emergency material response, 72010
Jordan	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women	UN-Women's Project Eid-bi-Eid to promote women's economic empowerment in Za'atari and Azraq refugee camps and nearby host-communities	85100504	2016	Multilateral	1–10m	Women's equality organisations and institutions, 15170
Lebanon							
Lebanon	World Bank Group	Lebanon Syrian Crisis Multi Donor Trust Fund	85202506	2014	Multilateral	1–10m	Basic health care, 12220
Lebanon	UN Children's Fund	No Lost Generation -strategy. Aid to the education sector in Lebanon	85202507	2014	Multilateral	1–10m	Primary education, 11120
Lebanon	Suomen Nuorten Miesten Kristillisten Yhd	Vocational Training and Economic Opportunities for Syrian refugees and host Lebanese communities	85202521	2016	Multilateral		Vocational training, 11330
Lebanon	Geneva Call (INGO)	Geneva Call: Generating and fostering ownership of International Humanitarian Norms in Lebanon (2nd phase)	85202525	2017	International NGO	<1m	Basic health care, 15220
Iraq							
Iraq	Finnish Red Cross	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Iraq emergency operation, Finnish Red Cross		Finnish NGOs	Bilateral	Not known	Emergency material response, 72010
Iraq	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization in Iraq (FFIS) UNDP		Multilateral aid, earmarked	Multilateral	Not known	Immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation, 73010
Iraq	World Food Programme (WFP)	Support to World Food Programme (WFP) operations in Iraq		Multilateral aid, earmarked	Multilateral	Not known	Emergency food response, 72040



Annex 5: List of key stakeholders interviewed¹³

GLOBAL INTERVIEWS

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Deputy Director General	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Management of Department for Africa and the Middle East
Director General	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Management of Department for Africa and the Middle East
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Management of Department for Africa and the Middle East
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Management of Department for Africa and the Middle East
Programme Officer	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa
Senior Adviser, Africa Policy Team	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa
Team Leader, Africa Policy Team	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa
Desk Officer	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Middle East, Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) Team
Desk Officer	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Middle East, Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) Team
Ambassador; Senior Adviser, Trade and Development	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Management of Department for Development Policy
Deputy Director General	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Management of Department for Development Policy
Director General	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Management of Department for Development Policy
Senior Adviser, development policy	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Management of Department for Development Policy
Senior Officer (statistics)	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Administrative and Legal Cooperation Matters
Director	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Civil Society

¹³ In line with the EU personal data protection law, no names have been included in this annex, rather identifying stakeholders via their organisations and positions only.



Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Senior Officer	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Civil Society
Desk Officer, AfDB, World Bank Group	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Development Finance and Private Sector Cooperation
Director	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Development Finance and Private Sector Cooperation
Director	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for General Development Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for General Development Policy
Director	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy, Humanitarian Assistance & Policy	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy
Senior Adviser	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy (environment and climate)	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy (gender equality)	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy (non-discrimination and persons with disabilities)	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy, education	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy, health questions	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Commercial Counsellor	MFA	Department for External Economic Relations	Trade Policy Unit
Senior Development Policy Adviser to Deputy Department Director	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Deputy Director General
Deputy Director General	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Management of Department for the Americas and Asia
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Management of Department for the Americas and Asia
Senior Specialist	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Management of Department for the Americas and Asia



Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Desk Officer, Afghanistan, Pakistan, development cooperation	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Director	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Programme Officer	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Desk Officer	MFA	Development Evaluation Unit	Development Evaluation Unit
Development Evaluation Consultant	MFA	Development Evaluation Unit	Development Evaluation Unit
Director, evaluation of development cooperation	MFA	Development Evaluation Unit	Development Evaluation Unit
Programme Officer	MFA	Development Evaluation Unit	Development Evaluation Unit
Desk Officer	MFA	Political Department	Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management
Ambassador; Senior Adviser Mediation	MFA	Political Department	Unit for UN and General Global Affairs
Desk Officer, Special Questions	MFA	Political Department	Unit for UN and General Global Affairs

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
Head of CMI's Asia Programme	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Programme Director	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Programme Director	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Secretary General	Development Policy Committee (KPT)
Senior Strategic Advisor, Civilian CSDP	EEAS
Adviser, Just Peace	Felm
Senior Adviser on Peace and Reconciliation	Felm
Regional Director	Fida International
Director of International Cooperation, Strategy and Programme Development	Finn Church Aid
Executive Director	Finn Church Aid
Global Programme Coordinator	Finn Church Aid
Head of Programmes	Finnish Red Cross
Programme Director	Finnpartnership – Finnish Business Partnership Programme
Director, International Programmes	Save the Children Finland



Afghanistan

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Senior Advisor	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Senior Adviser, Development Policy	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Management of Department for the Americas and Asia
Ambassador	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Kabul	
Coordination and Partnerships Manager	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Kabul	
Coordinator, Development Cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Kabul	
Counsellor, Development cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Kabul	
Deputy Head of Mission	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Kabul	
Ambassador of Finland in Kosovo	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Pristina	

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
Chairperson	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Chief Executive	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Executive Director & Co-Chair of WPS Working Group	Afghanistan Justice Organization
Senior Strategic Advisor, Civilian CSDP	EEAS
Gender Adviser & Co-Chair of WPS Working Group	Embassy of Canada
Head of Development Cooperation	Embassy of Denmark, Kabul
Counsellor	Embassy of Norway, Kabul
Senior Development Adviser	Embassy of Norway, Kabul
Counsellor Development Cooperation	Embassy of Sweden, Kabul
Regional representative, Asia	Finnish Red Cross
Director	Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)
Director	Marie Stopes International
Senior Programme Manager/Governance	Marie Stopes International
Deputy Ministry, Literacy	Ministry of Education
Senior Technical Adviser	Ministry of Education
Deputy Human Rights Director	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan
Director, Women Rights, Human Rights	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan
Women International Relations Manager	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan
Director of Strategy	Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)
Former Adviser, Reform	Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)
Former Deputy Finance Director	Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)
Former Minister of Interior Affairs	Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)
Director, Citizen Charter	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation



Position	Organisation
Senior Adviser, Citizen Charter	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
Senior Field Coordinator, Citizen Charter	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
Deputy Minister	Ministry of Women Affairs
Development Analyst, Chief Economist Team, INTEM	Sida
Deputy Country Representative	UN Women
Human Rights Officer	UNAMA
Senior Human Rights Officer	UNAMA
Deputy Country Director	UNDP
Programme Coordinator (Rule of law and security unit)	UNDP
Representative & Director	UNESCO
Operations Officer	World Bank

Myanmar

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Senior Adviser, Development Policy, forest questions	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Desk Officer	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Desk Officer	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Desk Officer, Myanmar	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Desk Officer, Myanmar	MFA	Department for the Americas and Asia	Unit for South Asia
Councillor, Head of Development Cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Bangkok	
Ambassador	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Myanmar	
Counsellor (Development)	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Myanmar	
Deputy Head of Mission, Head of Development Cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Myanmar	
Head of Cooperation (currently UNDP Resident Representative for Kosovo)	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Myanmar	
National Program Officer	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Myanmar	

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
Senior Advisor	Business Finland office in Myanmar
Trade Representative	Business Finland office in Myanmar
Program Director	Community Partners International (CPI)
Staff	Community Partners International (CPI)
Staff	Community Partners International (CPI)



Position	Organisation
Acting Head of Cooperation	Delegation of the European Union to Myanmar
Director of Programmes	Demo Finland
Programme coordination, Myanmar, Sri Lanka	Demo Finland
Director	Department of Social Welfare State
Managing Director	Eden Center for Disabled Children
Deputy Head of Mission	Embassy of Denmark, Yangon
First Secretary	Embassy of Sweden, Myanmar
Head of Swedish Section Office	Embassy of Sweden, Myanmar
Field Coordinator	Ethnic Women
Myanmar Project Manager	Felm
Country Director Myanmar	Finn Church Aid
Desk Officer, Asia	Finn Church Aid
Program Coordinator	Finn Church Aid
Associate Director, Head of Energy and Infrastructure portfolio	Finnfund
Programme Officer, International Operations and Programmes	Finnish Red Cross
Country Director	Finnish Refugee Council
Programme Director	Finnpartnership – Finnish Business Partnership Programme
Assistant FAO Representative	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Programme specialist	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Representative (Naypyitaw)	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Representative (Yangon)	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Director	Free and Justice
Head of Country Office	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Health Programme Manager	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Head of Country	International Idea
Program Manager	International Idea
Regional Director	International Idea
Gender Coordinator	Joint Peace Fund (JPF)
Head of Programme	Joint Peace Fund (JPF)
M&E officer	Joint Peace Fund (JPF)
Director and Head of Department	Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)
GBV coordinator	Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)
Logistic Assistant	Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)
MCH Coordinator	Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)
Coordinator	Karen Women Democracy Action Group (KWDAG)
Advocacy Officer	Karen Women Empowerment Group (KWEG)
Program Director	Kaw Lah Foundation
Regional Coordinator	Local Resource Center (LRC)



Position	Organisation
Community Empowerment Officer	Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
3 boys and 3 girls	Marie Stopes International
Mother of 4 months old baby boy	Marie Stopes International
Mother of 9 months old baby girl	Marie Stopes International
National Consultant	Marie Stopes International
Project Manager	Marie Stopes International
Project Manager	Marie Stopes International
Senior Operations Manager	Marie Stopes International
Senior Operations Manager	Marie Stopes International
Program Coordinator	Metta Development Foundation
Project Coordinator	Metta Development Foundation
Deputy Director	Ministry of Education, Department of Basic Education (Academic)
Director General (DG)	Ministry of Education, Department of Basic Education (DBE)
Director	Ministry of Education, Department of Basic Education (Ethnic)
Director	Ministry of Education, Department of Basic Education (Finance)
Deputy Director	Ministry of Education, Department of Basic Education (Planning and Statistic)
Deputy Director General	Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education (DHE)
Deputy Director	Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Forest Department
Deputy Director	Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Forest Department
Director	Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Forest Department
Staff Officer	Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Forest Department
Staff Officer	Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Forest Department
H.E Deputy Minister	Ministry of Finance
Senior Adviser at Ministry of Planning and Finance	Ministry of Planning and Finance (FERD)
Secretary of DACU	Ministry of Planning and Finance (FERD), Development Assistant Cooperation Unit (DACU)
Deputy Director	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Department of Social Welfare (DSW)
Deputy Director	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Department of Social Welfare (DSW)
Deputy Director General	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Department of Social Welfare (DSW)
Director	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Department of Social Welfare (DSW)
Admin Logistic	Mon Women Organization (MWO)
Project Manager	Mon Women Organization (MWO)



Position	Organisation
Vice Chair	Mon Women Organization (MWO)
Country Director	Myanmar Land Core Group
Country Director	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)/ Demo Finland
Democracy School Manager	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)/ Demo Finland
Policy Advisor	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)/ Demo Finland
Gender and M&E staff	Network Activity Group (NAG)
Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission	Royal Norwegian Embassy, Yangon
Portfolio Manager/Thematic adviser (civil society and partnerships)	Save the Children Finland
Assistant Doctor	State Health Department (Kayin)
Deputy Director	State Health Department (Kayin)
Nurse	State Health Department (Kayin)
Chief Technical Advisor	Sustainable Forest Management Scaling-Up Project in Lao PDR
M&E officer	Swe Tha Ha
Program Coordinator	Swe Tha Ha
Chair	Taw Win Thazin Women (Hlaing Bwe)
Officer	Thanungdaunggyi Women Group (TWG)
Programme Analyst (Climate Change)	UNDP
Senior Project officer	UNESCO
Gender Equality/GBV Programme Specialist	UNFPA
Humanitarian Program Analyst	UNFPA
Humanitarian Response Specialist	UNFPA
Program Specialist: Women and Girls First Program	UNFPA
Country Manager	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Director	Women Empowerment Group (WEG)
Coordinator	Women Initiative Group (WIG)
Secretary	Women Organization Network (WON)
Education Officer	World Bank
Program Manager	World Bank
Senior Economist	World Bank
Country Director	Yangon Film School



Occupied Palestine Territories (oPt)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Senior Adviser, Africa Policy Team	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa
Desk Officer	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Middle East
Senior Adviser	MFA	Department for Development Policy	Unit for Sectoral Policy
Head of Cooperation	MFA	Representation Office of Finland	
Program Officer and Development	MFA	Representation Office of Finland	

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
M&E Manager	AMAN Coalition for Accountability and Transparency
Head of Development Cooperation	Austrian Development Agency
Consul, Head of Development Cooperation	Consulate General of Sweden
Head of Cooperation,	Consulate General of the United Kingdom Belgium
Head of Middle East and North Africa Programme	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Programme Director	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Education Adviser	DFID
Head of Mission	European Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support EUPOL COPPS
General Director	Filastiniyat
General Director	Filastiniyat
Education Advisor	Finland Representative Office
Desk Officer	Finn Church Aid
Programme Coordinator	Finn Church Aid
Consultant	Future Rize for Consultancy & Advertising
Head of Development Cooperation	GiZ
Program Coordinator	Juzoor for Health and Social Development
Principal Project Manager	KfW
Programmes Coordinator	KfW
Head of Office	Local Aid Coordination Secretariat LACS
General Director	MAAN Development Center
Programs Manager	MAAN Development Center
Deputy Minister	Ministry of Education
EU File Director	Ministry of Finance
General Director of International Relations	Ministry of Finance
Aid Coordinator	Office of the EU Representative
Head of Development Cooperation	Office of the EU Representative



Position	Organisation
Programme Manager	Office of the EU Representative
Programme Manager	Office of the EU Representative
Head of Planning, Policy and Aid Coordination	Office of the Prime Minister, Palestinian Authority
Chairman	Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Program Director	Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Acting Manager-International Relations	Palestinian Land Authority
Head of Projects Unit	Palestinian Land Authority
Executive Director	Palestinian Peace Coalition General Initiative
Programme Director	Palestinian Peace Coalition General Initiative
Institutional Development Manager	Palestinian Water Authority
Technical Advisor to Aid Coordination Unit/International Relations Officer	Palestinian Water Authority
Head of Planning, Policy and Aid Coordination	Prime Minister's Office
Coordination Officer-	Prime Minister's Office, Area C National Coordination Office
Programme Adviser	Representative Office of Ireland
Deputy Head of Development Cooperation	Representative Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
Head of Cooperation	Royal Danish Representation Office
Programs Manager	Sharek Youth Forum
Program Leader	Sustainable Development and Infrastructure, West Bank and Gaza
Urban Development Specialist	Sustainable Development and Infrastructure, West Bank and Gaza
Water Specialist	Sustainable Development and Infrastructure, West Bank and Gaza
Director of Cooperation	Swiss Cooperation Office Gaza & West Bank
General Director	Teacher Creativity Center
Programs Manager	Teacher Creativity Center
Senior Program Advisor	The Representation Office of Norway to Palestine
Chief Donor Relations Division	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
Director	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
Director of UNRWA Operations Gaza	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
Head of Advisory Commission Secretariat	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
Partnership Specialist	UNICEF
Social Policy and M&E Specialist	UNICEF
Assistant Special Representative/ Policy	UNDP
Chief of Education	UNICEF
Youth and Adolescent Specialist	UNICEF
Head of Office	West Bank Protection Consortium
Representative	West Bank Protection Consortium



Somalia

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Director	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa
Coordinator for Somalia Development Cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Nairobi	
Coordinator for the Horn of Africa Political and Development Affairs	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Nairobi	
Head of Cooperation	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Nairobi	

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
Health Advisor	DFID
Counsellor for Kenya and Somalia, Head of Cooperation	Embassy of Norway, Nairobi
Head of Development Cooperation Somalia	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Regional Director of International Cooperation, Horn of Africa	Embassy of Switzerland, Nairobi
Head of Section, Public Sector Development and Social Sector Section	European Union Delegation, Nairobi
Advisor, Somali Academy of Science and Arts	Federal Government of Somalia
Chief Financial Officer, Federal Treasury	Federal Government of Somalia
Director General, Ministry of Interior	Federal Government of Somalia
Head of Donor engagement, National Development Plan Manager and Principal Advisor to the Minister of Planning	Federal Government of Somalia
Country Director	Finn Church Aid
Desk Officer, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda	Finn Church Aid
Desk Officer, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda (on leave)	Finn Church Aid
Chairwoman, Finnish diaspora contact point	Finnish Somalia Diaspora Association
Director General, Ministry of Planning and National Development	Government of Somaliland
Director of Policy, Planning and Strategic Information, Ministry of Health Development	Government of Somaliland
Chest Physician	Hargeisa Group Hospital
Dialysis Specialist	Hargeisa Group Hospital
Programme Coordinator/Country Director	International Solidarity Foundation
Regional director	International Solidarity Foundation
Chief of Mission	IOM Mogadishu
Head of Office, former	IOM Somaliland
International Program Officer, Labor Mobility and Human Development Division	IOM Somaliland
Head of Office	Italian Development Cooperation in Somalia



Position	Organisation
Executive Director	Lääkäriin sosiaalinen vastuu / Physicians for Social Responsibility
General Director	Marginalised Communities Advocacy Network
Senior Gender and Social Affairs Advisor	Presidency of Puntland
Deputy Minister	Puntland Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change
Director General	Puntland Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change
Director of Administration	Puntland Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change
Director of Environment	Puntland Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change
State Minister	Puntland Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change
Medical Director	Puntland Ministry of Health
Public Health Director	Puntland Ministry of Health
Vice Minister	Puntland Ministry of Health
Deputy Minister of Labour, Youth and Sports	Puntland Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports
Head of Programme Development and Quality	Save the Children Finland
Portfolio and Partnership Manager, International Programmes	Save the Children Finland
Acting Deputy Country Director	Save the Children International
Area Representative-Southern States	Save the Children International
Deputy Country Director	Save the Children International
Technical Advisor	Somali Academy of Science and Arts, Somali Federal Republic
Chairman	Somali Family Association, Board of Directors
Member	Somali Family Association, Board of Directors
Member	Somali Family Association, Board of Directors
Technical Advisor	Somali National University, Faculty of Education
Senior Advisor in Policy, Strategy and International Cooperation Issues	Somaliland Ministry of Health Development
Executive Director	Soydavo, ISF strategic partner
Climate change and resilience	UNDP
Deputy Representative, former	UNDP
Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP
Inclusive politics portfolio	UNDP
Institutional capacity building	UNDP
Programmes strategy	UNDP
Rule of law	UNDP
Assistant Representative, Head of Office Somaliland, former Director of Planning in Ministry of Health Development, Somaliland	UNFPA
Deputy Representative	UNFPA
GBV/Youth Specialist	UNFPA
Humanitarian Specialist	UNFPA
Midwifery Programme Specialist	UNFPA



Position	Organisation
Representative	UNFPA
Sexual and Reproductive Health Specialist	UNFPA
Protection Cluster Co-ordinator	UNHCR
Deputy Representative	UNICEF
Head of Office	UNICEF
Nutrition Officer	UNICEF
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	UNICEF
Deputy Representative	UNOCHA Somalia
Senior Political Affairs Officer	UNSOM
Executive Director	VIKES-Foundation for Communication and Development
Journalist, Member	VIKES-Foundation for Communication and Development
Senior Operations Officer	World Bank

Syria/Iraq

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Position	Organisation	Department	Unit
Previous Head of Middle East Unit	MFA		
Previous team leader for the Middle East Peace process	MFA		
Previous Team Leader Middle East Peace process, previous deputy HOM/HOC, currently deputy HOMs in Hague	MFA		
Previous UNRWEA Desk, now in UN, Middle East Desk	MFA		
Programme Officer, Middle East Peace Process Team	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Middle East
Team Leader, Middle East Peace Process Team	MFA	Department for Africa and the Middle East	Unit for the Middle East
Ambassador	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Beirut	
Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Beirut	
Programme Officer	MFA	Embassy of Finland in Beirut	

Other organisations and stakeholders

Position	Organisation
Senior Advisor	Berghof Foundation
Director	Common Space Initiative
Head of Middle East and North Africa Programme	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Programme Director	Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
Counsellor/Head of Development Cooperation	Embassy of Sweden, Beirut
Project Manager	Felm
Senior Adviser, Syria Initiative	Felm



Position	Organisation
Senior Project Manager, Syria Initiative	Felm
Desk Officer	Finn Church Aid
Humanitarian Adviser	Finn Church Aid
Humanitarian program coordinator, Desk for MENA	Finnish Red Cross
Head of Programmes	UN Women
Assistant Representative	UNCHR
Partnership Development Specialist	UNDP
International Programme Coordinator	UNFPA
Associate Reporting Officer	UNHCR
Deputy Representative (Protection)	UNHCR
Deputy Representative	UNICEF
Deputy Representative	UNICEF
External Relations Officer	World Food Programme

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